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DISARMAMENT IN PERSPECTIVE:

An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939


VOLUME III

LIMITATION OF SEA POWER

ACDA/RS-55

PREPARED FOR

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY



PREPARED BY

CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE AT LOS ANGELES FOUNDATION

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Volume III: LIMITATION OF SEA POWER

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Prepared For
THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Prepared By

CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE AT LOS ANGELES FOUNDATION

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The judgments expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other Department or Agency of the United States Government.

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Chapter 13

THE WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY, 1922

The Washington Conference, beginning in November 1921 and concluding in February 1922, produced seven treaties and twelve resolutions, two of which introduced arms control provisions.¹ The Five Power Naval Treaty, containing the most comprehensive, negotiated arms restrictions to that time, brought about 1) a reduction in battleships, 2) quantitative limits (or ratios) on capital ships and aircraft carriers, 3) qualitative restrictions on future naval construction, and 4) restrictions on fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. Additionally, the naval pact inaugurated a new balance of sea power by establishing battleship parity between the United States and Great Britain, and by acknowledging Japan's preeminence in the western Pacific. The delegates also signed a second Five Power treaty which laid down certain broad rules governing the conduct of submarine warfare and ruled out the "use in war of asphyxiations, poisonous or other gases." This ill-fated venture, which terminated for lack of ratification, soon took form in two other accords: the latter in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the former in the London naval pact of 1930. For an analysis of the submarine issue, see Chapter 16.

The remaining agreements, the most important of which were the Four Power and Nine Power treaties, dealt with a wide variety of issues. The Four and Nine Power accords on Pacific insular possessions and China were integral components of the naval settlement because they served to bridge political questions and arms limitation. Without facing up to the politics of Asia, there would have been few concessions on armament issues.

Many post-1941 commentators have questioned the wisdom of the naval pact. These critics have condemned the Five Power Naval Treaty on the grounds that it lessened the

Anglo-Saxon counter-weight to Japan in the western Pacific, it failed to gain limitation of auxiliary warships, and it placed the United States at a disadvantage by halting the development of its Pacific bases.² Perhaps American negotiators should have had more foresight; but treaty-making is only in part an act of prophecy. Its main function is to register the best interests of the nation in terms of contemporary reality.

Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes had found America's Pacific interests in serious disarray in 1921. The war had left Japan in a strategically advantageous position with the removal of European power, the construction of a modern fleet, and the seizure of the former German Pacific islands. The Harding administration had a large fleet under construction, but prospects were dim that Congress would appropriate the funds to complete it. The United States long had the right to build bases in the Philippines and Guam, but Congress had regularly refused to exercise it. If failure to limit auxiliary warships was a chink in the naval pact, prospects for continued negotiations to this end were good. From this perspective, Hughes had reason to believe that the Five Power Naval accord, along with the other Pacific treaties, provided a sound foundation for American interests in the 1920s.³

Most of the criticism after 1941 overlooked the basis of the problems in the early 1920s in its charge that the Washington treaties prevented the United States from maintaining a firm, viable Far Eastern policy. That the provisions of the naval pact did not survive the political conditions which threatened them does not deny their contemporary validity; rather it exposes the potential flaw inherent in any contract--the inability to recognize new political dimensions. To argue contrary would be to argue against adopting any treaty arrangements.

The Five Power naval pact stands out, then, in several respects: first, it was negotiated on a multilateral basis of reciprocity and established a general naval balance of power; second, it ended a dangerous and costly naval construction race in capital ships; third, it effected disarmament and established quantitative and qualitative controls; fourth, it was generally upheld by all parties, with violations being few and insignificant; and finally, it provided the basis for ultimately, in the London Treaty of 1930, bringing all warships of the three major sea powers under limitation.

Origins of the Conference

To citizen and statesman in Tokyo, London, and Washington, the spring of 1921 scarcely appeared to be the harbinger of peace and prosperity. At that moment these governments were verging on a general naval race; indeed, before the year was out they would have 227 warships under construction.⁴ Japan, England, and America, all former partners against Germany in the still too recent Great War, appeared ready to pit their resources against one another if some alternative could not be found.

The 1919-1921 crisis over naval construction was important in three essentials. First, its immediate origins lay in the festering Anglo-American discord, a point obscured by subsequent differences over Far Eastern affairs. Second, the crisis was further stimulated by issues distinctly related to American internal politics. Here the psychological impact of the "Naval Battle of Washington" -- that is, Wilson's claim that the United States could provide for its security only by either joining the League or building a powerful fleet--unfortunately lent credence to the arguments of big navy advocates in all three governments. And third, the crisis was finally eased to the negotiating tables by popular pressure. The Washington conference was, in no small measure, due to a determined public in all three nations.

A Naval Race Threatens. World War One destroyed the pre-1914 naval equilibrium in Europe and Asia. If Anglo-German naval competition had been terminated at Versailles, the wartime American building program now threatened Britannia's rule. Even though the British had emerged from the war with the largest armada yet assembled,⁵ they recognized early their inability to finance a new contest with the United States. Determined nonetheless to preserve their supremacy, the British turned to diplomacy during the armistice proceedings and the Peace Conference to accomplish that which their economic resources could not. In Paris, however, the Americans outmaneuvered Lloyd George and used their naval construction program to support their position on the disposition of the German fleet, the organization of the League, and the Covenant's recognition of the Monroe Doctrine.

Wilson shrewdly built America's naval potentiality into political leverage by urging Congress to complete the administration's naval construction schedule. Outraged by the marauding actions of German submarine, harassed by British

blockade tactics, and annoyed by Japanese expansionist ambitions, the President decided in 1916 to seek an American navy "second to none."⁶ The Navy Act of 1916 called for the accelerated construction of 156 warships, including ten super-dreadnoughts and six high-speed battle cruisers.⁷ Immediate wartime demand for escort and anti-submarine vessels, however, curtailed the building of these heavier ships. Less than a month after the armistice, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels submitted to Congress, with Presidential approval, not only a request for appropriations to complete the 1916 construction schedule, but a second three-year building plan to double the number of ships in the 1916 program.⁸ Daniels noted in his diary that he pressed for construction funds because the United States needed "to strengthen our Navy" and for the building program because it would be "a good instrument to use at the Peace Conference."⁹ Wilson "earnestly" seconded the proposals in his State of the Union message on December 2, 1918. He recommended the "uninterrupted pursuit" of the building measures as "it would clearly be unwise for us to attempt to adjust our program to a future world policy as yet undetermined."¹⁰

With the naval construction appropriations moving slowly through the legislature, Wilson engaged the British in the "Naval Battle of Paris" and then the American Senate in the "Naval Battle of Washington." The Administration's success in the former and failure in the latter unquestionably stimulated tension over naval armaments.

The Anglo-American diplomatic encounter, stretching from the October 1918 prearmistice dispute over "freedom of the seas" to the final debate in April 1919 over recognizing the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant, has been described as "one of the most wanton rivalries in armaments it is possible to conceive."¹¹ If this view overstates the situation it nonetheless conveys the temper of the contest. The controversy stemmed from Lloyd George's determination to obtain at the Peace Conference "a firm understanding between the British Empire and the United States of America and France and Italy that there will be no competitive build up of fleets or armies between them."¹² To bring the Americans around, the Prime Minister in a note on March 25, 1919, implied that he did not feel bound to support the inclusion of the League Covenant in the peace treaty or to endorse Wilson's proposal to recognize the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant. American negotiators grasped the significance of the British move at once. House recorded in his diary that "George is trying to

draw a bargain by yielding on the Monroe Doctrine provided we will give way on our Navy Program, but I am determined not to yield and not to tangle the two."¹³ Nor was Wilson so inclined.

While the President rejected a separate naval limitation pact with England, preferring to allow the League to deal with the problem of armaments, American naval officers pressed for British recognition of America's right to parity in sea power. As discontinuing the 1916 and 1918 construction schedules met continued British naval supremacy, the Americans at Paris opposed altering the former program (the one the British were primarily alarmed about) and compromised only the latter. In April Lloyd George relented before Wilson's determination, for to continue his opposition could only anger the Americans to the point where they might decide to go ahead with both building programs--the "Naval Battle of Paris" was over. Wilson had achieved his goals and the 1916 naval schedule was in tact; all he had conceded was a promise to discuss future naval construction plans and to modify the 1918 program should the League gain life.¹⁴

To many observers, the Wilson administration appeared to have been waving a "stuffed club" and had no intention of carrying out the supplementary building program.¹⁵ Daniel's subsequent withdrawal of the second three-year building plan in 1919 tends to support the theory that American naval expansion had been a "bluff" and that the administration had been displaying a "paper navy." However, neither the British, Daniels, nor the admirals on either side of the Atlantic shared this belief. Determined British efforts at Paris and the subsequent dispatching of Viscount Grey to Washington seeking an agreement on naval construction, even after Daniel's withdrawal of the 1918 program, indicates how seriously they took the affair.¹⁶ They were not worried about the second building plan gaining Congressional approval; but they did wish to halt completion of the 1916 schedule. After all, the United States had proceeded to lay down fifteen capital ships between 1918 and 1921. Daniels revealed his feelings when he later charged that "It remained for a future administration to scrap the capital ships Wilson refused to scrap."¹⁷ Even Congress, in rejecting the 1918 proposal, did so by a slim margin; the second three-year program passed the lower house only to be defeated in March, 1919, by Senator Robert LaFollette's twenty-six-hour filibuster. And the next session of Congress authorized completion of the 1916 naval construction program. Before Congressional committees and within both

the Wilson and Harding administrations, American naval officers pressed their view that this nation's commitments required a fleet equal to that of Great Britain. If the construction plans were to be stopped, it would be because of mounting Congressional and public opposition to naval appropriations.

Wilson posed the same basic alternatives to his fellow Americans that had carried the day in Paris--either join the world body and enjoy "collective security" or remain outside and provide their own defense--in his bid to gain the Senate's endorsement of the League. From May, 1919, until March, 1921, the "Naval Battle of Washington" raged around the administration's choices of the League and disarmament or increased naval Construction and higher taxes. During his fateful September, 1919, speaking tour, the President repeatedly argued that defeat of his plans for the new international order would result in a resurgence of undisguised militarism. If this should occur, Wilson warned, "We should have to be ready to take care of ourselves, maintain...a great army and an irresistible navy," and provide "taxes such as even yet we have not seen." Adoption of the Covenant would preface a reduction of armaments and a lowering of taxes.¹⁸

Daniels used the same tactics in repeated visits to Capital Hill. "There are just two courses," he argued on one occasion,

"and only two, open: 1) To secure an international agreement with...the nations, which will guarantee an end of competition in navy building, reduce the national burden, and lead in the movement to secure the buttress world peace. 2) To hold aloof from agreement or association... This will require us to build a navy strong enough and powerful enough to be able on our own to protect Americans.."¹⁹

All that was needed to stop armament competition, he had maintained, was to "get the United States into the League."²⁰ Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt echoed the warnings of his superiors that, if international relations drifted "back to what they were before" the war, the American people would find themselves supporting a navy costing a billion dollars a year.²¹

Inherent in the nature of this domestic strategy was the risk of alarming both the British and the Japanese, a risk

that rapidly became a reality. At first British leaders ignored the "naval battle" being waged in Washington for they did not believe that the Senate would turn down membership in the League. Even the increasing anti-British tone of the debates did not raise much alarm, for they had come to accept a certain amount of "twisting the Lion's tail" in America's domestic politics. The British government, concerned with its own financial situation, had begun a drastic, unilateral reduction of its wartime fleet by cancellation of ship building, extensive scrapping of obsolete vessels, and the placing of vast numbers of warships in reserve. Despite moves dictated by economy and great combat losses, the Royal Navy still retained a marked superiority. Even if the Americans carried out the 1916 construction program, the British would hold their supremacy, particularly in cruisers. Yet if their immediate position was secure, the British were concerned that while they had stopped construction of capital ships, the Americans and Japanese had not.²²

When the United States refused to join the League, the British were confronted with either resuming naval building or seeking an agreement with their erstwhile allies. Restating in March, 1921, their "one-power standard," the British government chose to keep abreast of American naval strength. In Commons, Winston S. Churchill spoke for the traditionalists, when he declared: "Nothing in the world, nothing that you may think of, or dream of, or anyone may tell you; no arguments, however specious; no appeals, however seductive, must lead you to abandon that naval supremacy on which the life of our country depends."²³ Denying they were building against the United States and asserting there was no chance of war with the Americans, the British reluctantly announced construction of three sister-ships to the battle cruiser Hood.²⁴

The Japanese also responded to American construction. Tensions arising out of commercial rivalries and discriminatory practices had put Japan and the United States increasingly at odds during the past two decades. The World War, which found European nations withdrawing from the Far East, sharpened this confrontation. President Wilson's efforts in August, 1914, to seek a voluntary neutralization of the Pacific failed: the Japanese soon seized Germany's Pacific islands, captured German leaseholds on Shantung, sent troops into Siberia, and pressed a weak Chinese government with the notorious Twenty-One Demands.

Two points dominated Japan's subsequent naval expansion plans: the growth of her opportunities, and the actual American building programs. The Tokyo government announced in 1915 an "eight-four" construction program (eight battleships and four battle cruisers) to augment their current fleet of eight battleships and four battle cruisers. In 1917 the Japanese laid down one battleship and another the following year. In July 1920, the Japanese decided to expand their earlier 1915 program by undertaking an ambitious "eight-eight-eight" building schedule; this plan called for the construction, beyond the earlier program, of twelve additional capital ships and supporting craft. Their intention, viewed highly unrealistic by American naval officers, was to have twenty-five of these heavy warships completed by 1927.²⁵

American construction certainly influenced Japanese planning. At League meetings in 1920 and 1921, Japanese delegates complained that American building program caused uncertainty in the Far East and justified their opposition to League proposals to limit armaments.²⁶ In the Japanese Diet, during the debates on the 1920 naval program, that nation's dilemma was illustrated when a member asked: "Are we then building warships against the United States, or England, or not?" A spokesman for the Admiralty replied: "No, against neither. But it is obvious that our own programme must be influenced by what is being done abroad."²⁷

Popular Demand for Naval Limitation. As the world's three largest naval powers prepared for an armament race, popular opinion within each country searched for alternatives. This domestic pressure, paying little heed to arguments concerning "security requirements" or overseas commitments, saw only an increasing danger of war and higher taxes resulting from this competition. Gradually, these men and women came to believe that negotiated naval limitations could attain relative security, at a reasonable cost, for all parties.

The American Senate's rejection of League membership stimulated pacifists, liberals and budget-minded conservatives to seek a substitute to the Wilsonian alternatives. The Nation scathingly raked the tactics of Wilson and Daniels: "The possibility that there might be another way out--simply by inviting Japan and England to agree to stop building--never enters the mind of these two statesmen, nor the minds of Congress."²⁸ Legislators listened to pacifist contentions that ninety-three percent of the government's current income went for past, present and future wars. This argument

impressed congressmen eager to repeal the high wartime taxes yet faced a budget deficiency which by July 1921 might reach two billion dollars.

Apprehensive of the economic burden and the danger of the current naval competition, Senator William E. Borah urged a limitation agreement. This arch foe of the League found in the idea of negotiated disarmament an alternative to the League and an answer to critics who claimed that the "isolationists" had nothing creative to offer. With characteristic directness, Borah asked the Senate on December 14, 1920 to adopt a resolution favoring a fifty percent cut in American, British and Japanese naval programs. Senator Thomas J. Walsh introduced another resolution, six days later, requesting the President "to inform the League Council that the United States desires to co-operate with the League Disarmament Commission in formulating plans of general reduction of armaments."²⁹ Senate Majority Leader Henry Cabot Lodge cautiously extended his support to naval limitation. Coming to terms with Japan and England might produce some reductions, but he warned that "nothing could be more foolish or more war-breeding than for one power to reduce and leave the others to build and threaten until they bring on a fight." In June 1921, the Republican National Committee elected new officers who voiced their opinion favoring the slashing of armament expenditures.³⁰ The Borah resolution was incorporated in the July 1921 appropriations bill. Borah's measure earned for its sponsor the reputation of forcing Washington officials to call a conference earlier than they might have otherwise.

Entering the White House on March 4, 1921, Warren G. Harding gingerly approached the issue of naval limitations. While his post-election statements and his inaugural address were taken to mean that the new administration planned early steps to ameliorate the arms competition, Harding once in office appeared to procrastinate. Although concurring with the popular dislike for large military expenditures, the President seemed to desire postponing any discussion of disarmament until, perhaps, 1924.³¹

Public alarm at the impending arms race also mounted in Tokyo. Representative Yukio Ozaki, Borah's counterpart, began rallying legislative and popular support for a negotiations among the naval powers. This liberal parliamentarian introduced, on February 10, 1921, a resolution demanding a reduction of naval armaments in concert with the Anglo-Saxon

nations. The Japanese government cautiously indicated a willingness to discuss naval matters, but refrained from any initiative. Pointing to similar measures pending in the American Congress, Ozaki argued that his resolution would express approval for such a meeting or, if an invitation was not forthcoming, for calling one in Tokyo. When his proposal failed (by a vote of 285-38), Ozaki appealed to the people directly. An awakening electorate began to rally behind the plea for disarmament so that when the invitation to confer materialized, it would not lack for popular support.³² If the government did not evidence enthusiasm in public, economic necessity and popular opinion brought it to accept the idea.

The British public did not relish a naval armament race. That they required little urging to support limitation talks may be gleaned from journals of such divergent views as The New Statesman, a radical weekly; The Times, a moderately conservative press; The Manchester Guardian, a liberal paper; and The Spectator, a conservative organ. Perhaps The Economist best summarized popular sentiment when it opined that "a three-part naval understanding between Britain, America, and Japan is not too great a task for reasonable diplomacy to achieve...We in Great Britain must reconcile ourselves to the abandonment of the Two-Power standard. If the United States--now the richest and potentially the strongest country in the world--are determined to possess a navy at least as strong as ours, nothing that we can do will prevent them."³³

To ask the United States for a naval conference might damage British prestige, reduce their bargaining position, and alarm the commonwealth governments. Also irritation over the Anglo-Irish "war", while not directly involved with disarmament, led anti-British elements in the United States to denounce any dealings with Great Britain. From January to June, 1921, the British government sought to clear the way for the United States to take the initiative in arranging for a three-power meeting.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Among the many tensions leading to the competitive naval schedules was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902; indeed, the major preconference crisis centered on the future of this pact. The Alliance had been designed by the British to enlist Japanese power to balance Russian and, after 1911, German ambition in the western Pacific.³⁴ With war and revolution eliminating these nations as Pacific power, two aspects of the alliance greatly disturbed

the Americans: (1) the outlying insular possessions of Guam and the Philippines now lay within an area largely commanded by the Japanese Navy; and (2) the pending renewal of the alliance appeared, with all other potential enemies removed, to be poised against the United States. Persistent denials by British and Japanese diplomats to the contrary, American leaders feared that their opposition to Japanese activities in Asia might also embroil the United States with Great Britain.

The British government, caught in the center of this political storm, sought a solution which would maintain its influence in Tokyo and would increase Anglo-American cooperation in the Pacific. If both objectives were not attainable, British officials divided as to which goal should be stressed, with the majority holding in favor of stressing joint Anglo-American policies.³⁵ From Tokyo, the Japanese pressed for the continuance of the pact because they were involved in a multitude of disputes resulting, largely, from their ambitious efforts to expand their sphere of influence in Asia. While desirous of retaining their special relationship with Great Britain, Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Ambassador to Washington, declared that "by no stretch of the imagination" could this agreement be thought of "as an instrument of hostility or even defense against the United States."³⁶ If in London the alliance was proving to be an embarrassing relic, in Washington it provided the admirals with additional justification for building a powerful fleet.

Clearly the key to naval limitations lay with putting to rest Far Eastern tensions. Nowhere was this more readily understood than in London where statesmen of Great Britain and the Dominions prepared, in late June 1921, for an Imperial Conference. These leaders, certainly all of those representing nations bordering on the Pacific, coveted American friendship and were prepared to modify the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to attain it. The American government forced the issue when Secretary of State Hughes bluntly demanded, on June 23, that the alliance be immediately terminated. Washington's determination on this point may be measured by Hughes' willingness to accept the British suggestion of a tripartite pact as a substitute. With Harding's endorsement, this proposed agreement--later to appear as the Four Power Pact--confined itself to a restatement of American principles toward the Far East and, to be acceptable to the Senate, contained no mention of military or political commitments. Thus when the Imperial Conference convened the fate of the alliance

had been decided; however, the Dominions did add their unqualified support to the proposed modification and thereby paved the way to a general discussion of naval limitation and Far Eastern issues.³⁷

With the resolution of American objections to the Anglo-Japanese pact, Secretary of State Hughes abruptly cabled London, Rome, Paris, and Tokyo on July 8, 1921 to test their willingness to meet in conference.³⁸ Prompting his action was the administration's determination to maintain leadership of any international gathering, and particularly to head-off any British initiative in arranging a separate conference on Far Eastern problems.³⁹ The tentative agenda released by Washington on September 10 revealed that the conference would be asked to consider four broad areas: 1) arms limitation, including naval vessels and rules for controlling the "new agencies of warfare;" 2) Pacific and Far Eastern problems, including the status of China and Siberia; 3) the Pacific mandated islands; and 4) the "status of existing commitments" yet remaining unsettled.

Negotiating the Naval Treaty

Delegates to the conference gathered in Washington, D.C. on the third anniversary of the 1918 Armistice. Vivid memories of sacrifices extracted by the Great War, an event inspired in part by an earlier naval race, cast a sobering mood over the otherwise gala atmosphere. At Arlington National Cemetery, the United States had chosen this occasion to bury its Unknown Soldier; in this solemn moment President Harding reminded the assembling diplomats that the hopes of peoples for peace rested in their hands.

In the negotiations that followed, the policies of different nations and the roles of various statesmen created a complicated mosaic. Yet the successes of the conference stemmed from two factors: the fundamental desire of the three oceanic powers (the United States, Great Britain, and Japan) to reach an accommodations, even at the price of substantial concessions; and the dominate personalities of the leading delegate from each of these nations who wisely and judiciously formulated each compromise. For clarity and continuity, the essential elements of the negotiatory process are outlined here.

- 1) Secretary Hughes, almost singlehandedly, set the

direction and pace of conference debates. Despite a great deal of talk about naval limitation preceding the conference, only the American delegation had prepared a detailed plan to accomplish these ends. During the preparatory sessions Hughes succeeded, against objections from his admirals, in establishing the twin principles which guided his diplomacy: the limiting of ship construction on a "stop now" basis, and the defining of national interests in terms of "relative security." He seized the initiative at the outset of the conference by boldly outlining his program and sustained this momentum throughout the negotiations by continually pressing for mutuality of interest among the seapowers.

2) British policy during the negotiations centered on (a) bringing naval competition to an end, (b) ensuring that its cautious granting of parity in capital ships did not endanger its supremacy in auxiliary warships, (c) gaining the abolition of submarines, and (d) lessening tensions between Washington and Tokyo while remaining on friendly terms with both capitals. That they accomplished the first, second, and fourth of these objectives was due to Lord Balfour's decision to work closely with Hughes.

3) Japan came to the conference worried that it might be politically isolated because of the ensuing Asian Disputes and that, because of this isolation, vigorous naval competition might ruin its economy. Given a prominent role in the negotiations as recognition of their status as a major seapower, the Japanese responded by carefully balancing their concessions with concern for national interests. Baron Kato was tested by these sharp negotiations and by domestic uncertainty; his resoluteness prevailed, ultimately, on both fronts.

4) French and Italian delegates found themselves generally on the sidelines and, when in the limelight, on the defensive; yet the policies of each influenced the outcome. The French prevented the abolition of submarines (with assistance from the Italians and Japanese) and, possibly, the extension of Hughes' formula to auxiliary warships. But they failed to gain recognition of their demands for political security or to achieve discussion of land armaments. The Italians kept their demands simple: parity with France, and began a controversy that persisted for two decades.

5) The individual roles of Hughes, Balfour and Kato figured prominently in the negotiations. For Hughes and

Balfour this conference marked the zenith of their political careers; thus each statesman possessed the political independence necessary to recognize their common interests and to persuade, cajole, and demand that their respective governments follow their lead. Because of his dual role as delegate and Minister of the Navy, Baron Kato was uniquely positioned to negotiate the necessary compromises and to impose these accommodations on dissident Imperial naval officers.

The American Plan. Hughes opened the Washington meeting in dramatic fashion. "The world looks to this conference to relieve humanity of the crushing burden created by competition in armaments," he declared, "and it is the view of the American government that we should meet that expectation without any unnecessary delay."⁴⁰ After reviewing the futility of past efforts to achieve limitations, the Secretary of State proposed an immediate ten-year construction holiday on capital ships. Then in electrifying directness, Hughes enumerated his proposal for naval limitation and disarmament:

- 1) that all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned;
- 2) that further reduction should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships;
- 3) that in general regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned;
- 4) that the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

Before delegates could digest these points, the secretary suggested specific reductions. Of the original 1916 program, the United States had completed only one battleship; the remaining fifteen capital ships, on which over \$330 million had been spent, together with fifteen older battleships--making in all thirty ships totaling 845,740 tons--would be dismantled in exchange for reciprocal limitation. The British would give up the newly authorized Hoods, along with nineteen older capital ships--a total of 583,375 tons. Japan would sacrifice the giant Mutsu, seven battleships and eight battle cruisers at various stages of construction, and ten older capital ships--a total of 448,928 tons.⁴¹

The American plan further proposed, after a ten-year holiday, that capital ships be replaced at the age of twenty years and that no ship exceeded 35,000 tons.⁴² During this period the maximum capital ship tonnage allotted to each of the three powers would be:

United States	500,000 tons
British Empire	500,000 tons
Japan	300,000 tons

An agreement along these lines, Hughes concluded, would halt competition, relieve economic burdens, meet the demands of national security, and stop preparations for offensive naval warfare.⁴³

That the American plan emphasized naval reductions was due to Hughes' persistence. In preconference discussions the Navy Department sought a fleet equal to upholding the Open Door and protecting the Philippine Islands. Additionally, the Navy's General Board expressed concern with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, renewal of which they warned would necessitate building a fleet equal to the combined navies of Britain and Japan. In their study of naval limitations, senior naval officers had recommended that naval quotas be adjusted so that by 1928 the United States and Great Britain would have one million tons of capital ships each, while Japan would be allotted 600,000 tons. These figures would be achieved by allowing each nation to complete its currently authorized construction program; meanwhile, no increases in naval building would be permitted between 1922 and 1928.⁴⁴ What this would mean is shown in the table below:

	1921*	1928*	ratio*	with treaty	treaty ratio
U.S.	500,650 tons	1,118,650 tons	10	1,000,000	10
G.B.	1,015,825 tons	1,187,825 tons	10	1,000,000	10
Japan	419,600 tons	974,850 tons	8-1/2	600,000	6

* General Board estimates of capital ships after completion of building programs without limitation.

While this plan would end naval competition, it would also, as Thomas Buckley has perceived, "strength the position of the United States, weaken Japan, and leave Great Britain much the same."⁴⁵

When this initial plan proved unacceptable to the Navy's civilian chiefs because it did not halt construction, the General Board substituted a modified version. This proposal, assuming the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be cancelled, placed capital ship and auxiliary tonnage at:⁴⁶

	Capital Ships	Ratio	Aircraft Carriers	Combatant		Auxil- ary Ratio
				Surface Auxiliary	Submarines	
U.S.	820,000	10	100,000	500,000	100,000	10
G.B.	820,000	10	100,000	500,000	100,000	10
Japan	410,000	5	60,000	300,000	60,000	6
France	410,000	5	60,000	300,000	60,000	6
Italy	410,000	5	60,000	300,000	60,000	6

If the United States did not complete its post-Jurland battleships and battle cruisers and if its capital ship tonnage fell below one million, America's ratio vis-à-vis Japan must be two to one. Both proposals contained a similar desire: to give America the strongest, most modern fleet.⁴⁷

Finally, on October 24, 1921, the "approved" Navy plan, designed largely by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Admiral Robert E. Coontz and Captain William V. Pratt was forwarded to Hughes. This proposal called for the scrapping of eight (but completing the other seven) of the United States' authorized capital ships, together with 268,000 tons of older ships. A treaty along these lines would give the United States and Great Britain 735,000 tons of capital ships, and limit Japan, Italy, and France to 435,000 tons.⁴⁸

Rejecting the Navy programs because they did not contain sufficient reductions, Hughes proposed that the "Big Three" (United States, Great Britain, and Japan) simply cease building. Moreover, the secretary would peg all fleets to the existing American navy, asking Britain and Japan to scrap capital ships until a ratio (expressed in tonnage) of 10-10-6 was reached. This plan, he felt, had the advantage of avoiding the dilemma of balancing each nation's "security" requirements. The General Board pessimistically warned that his plan would remove American naval influence from the Far East leaving the way clear for Japanese expansion. By November 4 the American delegation and President Harding had become convinced that, everything considered, Hughes' plan met all requirements: it halted the naval race, eliminated costly construction, provided actual reduction, and secured America's

vital interests. One of the arguments favoring Hughes' approach was the uncertainty of congressional naval appropriations for if these monies were not forthcoming the result could easily be a unilateral naval reduction much to America's disfavor.⁴⁹ And, moreover, Hughes' "stop now" plan had public appeal because it ended capital ship building and offered reductions.

Hughes' critics have charged him with not understanding the naval requirements necessary to maintain America's Far Eastern commitments and interests. If the secretary did not view his nation's Pacific interests through "a port-hole" it was because he dealt with the broader aspects of the Asian dilemma. Here, as the Sprouts have pointed out, lay the root of the naval crisis. "A navy which American experts would regard as adequate" for security of the United States' out-lying possessions as well as its traditional Far Eastern policies "would have to be strong enough to blockade Japan and to disrupt Japanese communications with the mainland of Asia, and hence strong enough to reach out and defeat the Japanese fleet in its Home waters." Japan, for its part, was determined that nothing should impair its "prestige or seriously disrupt the naval status quo upon which depended not only the strategic security of the Island Empire but also its future destiny in Asia."⁵⁰ As Hughes sought to sustain America's numerical advantage in warships over Japan without an arms race, he recognized that limitations hinged on the concept of "relative security."

Hughes' exceptional candidness in his opening address also has been criticized for showing all of his diplomatic cards without waiting for concessions. Yet his directness had advantages. The dramatic timing of the speech and its positive theme galvanized broad support for actual limitations. Any diplomat who would now challenge the American plan had to deal with an expectant public both at home and abroad. And, too, Hughes secured the initiative as future negotiations necessarily would be tied to the American plan. By directing the conference's attention to naval armaments, the United States placed itself in a powerful bargaining position for, with its enormous fleet under construction, it could demand meaningful reductions in exchange for similar concessions.

Diplomatic reaction to the American plan formed slowly. At the second plenary session on November 15 both British and

Japanese spokesmen accepted the American plan "in principle," although they intimated certain reservations. Lord Balfour acknowledged capital ship parity, but thought the submarine tonnage too large and questioned the tonnages of non-battle fleet cruisers. While approving of Hughes' plan, Baron Tomosaburo Kato cautioned that a state "must be provided with such armaments as are essential to her security." As Japan did not claim parity with England and America, Kato voiced the hope that they would consider Japan's view toward modification of replacement tonnage. The next day Kato insisted on a ratio of seventy percent and equality in aircraft carriers.⁵¹

American and Japanese delegates, with the British tacitly supporting the former, deadlocked over the definition of existing naval strength--a definition vital to Hughes' formula. Whereas the Americans computed ships under construction in measuring actual naval strength, placing the two nations currently on a 10-6 ratio, the Japanese held that only ships "in being" should be counted. Accordingly, they argued that the existing relative strength lay somewhere between 10-6.9 and 10-8.6 thereby justifying Japan's claim to seventy percent.⁵² Hughes warned the Japanese that their intransigence would end the talks and revive naval competition. Faced with bearing the onus for disrupting the conference, but fearing terms which might weaken its diplomatic, strategic, and domestic positions, the Tokyo government sought a tolerable middle ground. With Balfour acting as intermediary, Kato implied on December 1 that Japan might accept the lower ratio if the United States would allow the battleship Mutsu to be retained and agree to the status quo in fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific.⁵³

Japan's desire to retain the Mutsu revealed the intricacies of the ratio "system." With instructions to preserve the 10-10-6 formula, American naval experts revised their computations. Under the new schedule the United States would complete two more battleships and Britain would be allowed to build two new ones, although Hughes' original proposal was to halt all construction of capital ships. The ratio had been preserved; but at the cost of an additional 25,000 tons to American and British totals, and 13,600 to Japan's.⁵⁴

Hughes' concession broke the deadlock: a few days of further negotiations (including the drafting of the Four Power

Treaty and the nonfortification clause) resulted in the announcement on December 15 of a tentative agreement among the "Big Three."

The Non-Fortification Clause. The controversial decision to prohibit additional fortifications or naval installations in the western Pacific affected the Asian balance of power as certainly as did the capital ship ratios. It focused on the political nature of arms limitation agreements for it pointed at America's commitments to the Philippines and interests in China, at Great Britain's China trade and Imperial obligations to Australia, New Zealand, and other outlying possessions, and at Japan's interests on the Asian mainland and its own national security.

American naval officers and diplomats divided over the proposed status quo on fortifications and bases in the Western Pacific. Since warships could not secure this nation's interests in Asia without supporting installations, the General Board recommended against even discussing any restrictions on American bases.⁵⁵ Yet American naval strategists were alarmed about Japan's acquisition of the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana islands as they threatened to surround the Guam outpost and isolate the Philippines. In 1918, these officers had belatedly and unsuccessfully urged President Wilson to claim the former German islands for the United States.⁵⁶ Since the Navy had long recommended the development of extensive facilities at Guam and Manila, the admirals now would presumably press more determinedly for construction of these installations as vital to American security.

To American diplomats the issue appeared more complicated. Would Congress, which never had shown interest in these costly Pacific construction projects, provide the required funds? How would the Japanese view their security interests? That Japan was apprehensive about expanding American installations in the Western Pacific can be gleaned from reports circulating in 1921 that Tokyo would demand a halt to the construction of insular bases in return for its acceptance of naval limitation.⁵⁷ As Japan had already pledged not to fortify the mandated islands in accordance with the League's restrictions on trusteeships, its strategists feared that enlarged American bases would impair the sea communications of the Imperial Navy. If the conference deadlocked on the issue of nonforti-

fication, and the armaments race continued, American diplomats worried that this competitiveness might escalate to include the construction of bases.

In keeping with his twin principles of "stop now" and "relative security," Hughes took the issue before Harding and the delegation for consideration. The President accepted the idea provided it ensured adoption of the American plan for naval limitation. Elihu Root informed his fellow delegates that he had earlier inquired of the possibilities Congress would vote funds for construction of Pacific bases. Both Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican majority leader in the Senate, and Oscar Underwood, Democratic minority leader, had agreed that "Congress would never consent to spend the vast sums required in adequately fortifying" Guam and the Philippines.⁵⁸

With Harding's approval and the delegation's consent but without the Navy's knowledge, Hughes informed Baron Kato that American agreement to non-fortification hinged on the exemption of Hawaii, the acceptance of American ratios, and "the proposed quadruple entente /the Four Power Pact of December 10, 1922 / in the Pacific."⁵⁹ Agreement in principle came quickly. On December 12, Baron Kato accepted the 10-6 ratio provided that the status quo regarding fortifications was acknowledged. Three days later, Kato, Balfour, and Hughes publicly revealed that, in addition to reaching an understanding on naval limitation, they had agreed to maintain at the current level fortifications and naval bases in "the Pacific region," except for Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, the islands proper of Japan, and the coasts of the United States and Canada.⁶⁰

Efforts to elaborate this principle into Article XIX of the Five Power Treaty proved more difficult. Each nation had interpreted "the Pacific region" to protect or benefit its own strategic position. Kato temporarily withdrew his earlier concession to include the Bonin Islands and Oshima because Tokyo now insisted they were part of Japan proper. If these islands were included, he would violate his instructions and would appear publicly to have retreated from the announcement of December 15.⁶⁰ Balfour suggested nonfortification within an area north of the equator, west of the international date line, east of the 110th meridian, and south of 30° N. latitude -- rather than on designated islands. Although Hughes leaned toward this proposal, Kato promptly objected because Balfour's idea would restrict mostly Japanese islands

leaving the British free to fortify their positions south of the equator, particularly Singapore.⁶¹

Nevertheless, the British pressed for exemption of Singapore and the islands near Canada, New Zealand, and Australia; while Hughes added a proviso covering any islands Japan might acquire in the future. To both requests the Japanese acquiesced; indeed, Kato even agreed to include the Bonin and Oshima islands. The prospect of a deadlock, laid at Japan's door, was too threatening.

The final agreement defined the area to be covered by the status quo of fortifications and bases thusly: "1) the insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and b) the Hawaiian Islands; 2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and c) New Zealand; 3) the following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, and Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire."⁶²

Not being a member of the League the United States technically did not have Japan's mandate pledge. This legal "loop-hole" was quietly closed by Hughes and Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Japan's Ambassador at Washington, on the sidelines of the conference. The convention, signed without fanfare on February 11, 1922 found Japan reiterating all the rights and pledges including non-fortification, for the benefit of the United States.⁶³

Aircraft and Aircraft Carriers. These instruments presented three issues: 1) should aircraft be subjected to quantitative limitations or qualitative restrictions? 2) what ratios should be applied to aircraft carriers? and 3) did aircraft make obsolescent the traditional battle fleet? The first two questions belonged to the technical experts and the third issue to political representatives. Regardless of the logic of these discussions, they influenced future policies for the naval experts played down the military significance of

the airplane and the politicians overdramatized its capabilities.

Air power posed, in part, a technological issue. While initial American plans did not suggest limitation of aircraft, it did imply some regulation of this new weapon (such as that to be applied to submarines) under the agenda item calling for "rules for control of new agencies of warfare." Proposals were introduced ranging from an attempt to limit aircraft by restricting the number of pilots in each country to outlawing the bombing of unfortified cities. Twelve meetings of the subcommittee produced only deepening pessimism. General restrictions were, most observers felt, unwise because design differences between commercial and military aircraft at this primitive stage of development were slight.⁶⁴ Moreover, any efforts to limit military air fleets would require a system of international inspection, agreement on ratios among different aircraft, and the regulation of experimental activities.⁶⁵ Unsurprisingly, the delegates decided to concentrate on the limitation of aircraft carriers.

Hughes originally suggested limiting aircraft carrier tonnage to 80,000 for Great Britain and the United States, and 48,000 for Japan. Later the secretary recommended a quota of 27,000 for Italy and France. He also urged that a qualitative limit of 27,000 tons be put on carriers.⁶⁶ These figures implied a definite ratio for (given the trend in carrier design toward vessels weighing 25,000 to 35,000 tons) they would allow three ships of 25,000 tons each to each Great Britain and the United States, two ships to Japan, and one each for Italy and France. Even though they did not foresee the importance of the carrier, none of the delegates were satisfied with their allotment. Britain complained that three carriers were insufficient to support its separate fleets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Lee, thought five carriers (135,000 tons) would fulfill Britain's needs. Baron Kato objected to the application of the ratio in this category because of special geographical considerations. He argued that Japan required equality with the Big Two because the carrier was "strictly defensive" in nature, like that of the submarine. The Italian delegation requested a second ship in case the first was either damaged or undergoing alterations; this would put their needs at 54,000 tons or parity with France. Then Admiral de Bon insisted that France must have three carriers (60,000 to 75,000 tons); two would be for the main fleet, the third for use in the colonies.⁶⁷

Hughes accepted an adjusted ratio, which ultimately was incorporated in the naval treaty, but asked to be allowed to convert two uncompleted battle cruisers (33,000 tons) into carriers.

Aircraft Carriers*

United States	135,000 tons
British Empire	135,000 tons
Japan	81,000 tons
France	60,000 tons
Italy	60,000 tons

* All carrier tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, was considered experimental and could be replaced without regard to age.

While conversion of the Lexington and Saratoga posed an exception to the 27,000 ton limit, the United States pledged to keep within the overall tonnage allotment. Personally, the secretary did not favor the conversion clause but American naval officials were convinced that while Congress would not likely vote funds for construction of new carriers, they might appropriate money to alter vessels thirty percent completed.⁶⁸

To the United States Navy the airplane proved a mixed blessing. Public fascination with the recent innovation, stimulated by Brigadier General William Mitchell, created a domestic climate hostile to construction of expensive naval armaments--even aircraft carriers. Aviation enthusiasts pressed the claims of aerial bombardment to extravagant lengths; indeed, they pointed to the sinking of captured German warships, including a 22,000 ton dreadnaught, during extended bombing tests off the Virginia Capes as dooming the capital ship and as making future interocean warfare impossible. Economy-minded legislators seized these claims to challenge the expenditure of tens of millions on "obsolete" battleships.⁶⁹

There can be little doubt but that Mitchell's claims became an embarrassment to American seapower.⁷⁰ With the impressions that he and other air power enthusiasts created it became exceedingly difficult in later years for the Navy to persuade Congress to keep its fleet up to treaty limits.

Problems of French-Italian Parity. France handed the American grand design for naval limitations its only setback.

The French were annoyed because of the conference's emphasis on Pacific rather than European issues, the delegates' decision to ignore the problem of land armaments, the naval ratio's implications of parity with Italy, and the naval treaty's relegation of France to a third-class seapower. France's quest for increased security and manifestation of national pride led to tactics that appeared obstructionist; yet, these actions might better be understood in light of France's deepening political isolation since 1919.⁷¹

Few American statesmen of the interwar years truly understood France's intense search for "security." The Versailles treaty had reconstructed a Europe to French liking; therefore, their concern at Washington dwelled on strengthening this position. If they were to reduce their armaments, the French insisted on political compensation. Herein lay the interwar differences on disarmament between the Anglo-Saxon powers and France; the former believed that disarming would reduce tensions and hence augment security, while the latter consistently argued for "security, then disarmament."

French disappointment at the Washington meetings was ill-concealed. They expected an Anglo-American deadlock over parity, whereupon the delegates would shift to the major object of French concern, land armaments. To their amazement the British conceded this principle. Excluded from the Big Three's preliminary naval negotiations, the French saw the question of European armies become a remote, even regional, issue.

Compelled to deal solely with naval armaments, the French soon vented their frustrations. Concentrating on land armaments, France had by 1914 forfeited its position as a major seapower. World War One accelerated this trend as France found itself ranking far behind the United States, Great Britain, and Japan by 1921. With no capital ship construction projected until 1927, the French planned to build only cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.⁷² During the November talks England insisted on capital ship tonnage equal to the combined totals of Japan and France. This meant that, with the 5-5-3 ratio, France would have to settle for 200,000 tons or less. But the French, determined not to be dictated to by erstwhile allies, indicated that they intended to claim capital ship parity with Japan and submarine parity with England and America.⁷³

The crisis broke into the open on December 15 when the Big Three announced that they had arrived at a settlement. Shortly thereafter Hughes presented the French and Italian delegations with capital ship tonnage limits of 175,000, while the Italians accepted, the French demanded 350,000 tons. Undoubtedly Hughes expected some protest from the French but nothing as extravagant as this; the French were asking more tonnage than the Japanese.⁷⁴ The secretary argued that the relative strength of the French navy would be greatly enhanced by the treaty: where the existing ratio of Great Britain and the United States over France (with 164,500 tons of capital ships) was currently six to one, the treaty would reduce this differential to three to one.⁷⁵ Without building, without additional expense, the French could redress their naval balance. Only French pride and annoyance led their delegates to characterize this argument as unspeakable, unthinkable.

Unwilling to risk protracted negotiations and unconvinced that the French delegates spoke for their nation, Hughes promptly asked Premier Briand, then back in Paris, to intervene. Placing the fate of conference squarely with the French government, the secretary cabled "that the attitude of France will determine the success or failure" of the meeting. After reiterating the American arguments in favor of the ratio, Hughes urged the Premier to consider carefully the matter. He also took precautionary measures, preparing an alternative four-power treaty, should the conference falter. Briand replied favorably on December 18, assuring Hughes that his delegation would accept the suggested capital ship tonnage. Yet while agreeing to a low ratio of "ships of offense /i.e., battleships/, which are the most costly," Briand asserted that "so far as defensive ships are concerned" (cruisers, destroyers and submarines) his government could not accept similar inferior tonnage limits.⁷⁶ This reservation would be interpreted differently in future discussions on auxiliary vessels: the Americans refused to extend its meaning beyond the battleship issue; while the French assumed that they would now be granted as many smaller warships (defensive vessels) as they wished.

Briand's concession on capital ships inadvertently revealed the deterioration of Franco-Italian relations.⁷⁷ Britain might acknowledge parity with America but France could not reconcile itself to naval equality with Italy. American justifications for a two-ocean navy, and hence superiority over Japan, seemed to the French applicable to their situation between the Atlantic and Mediterranean. At no time in the past had Italy's navy matched that of France: in 1914

France had 755,150 tons to Italy's 423,800 tons; in 1921 the former still held an advantage of 520,000 tons to 335,000.⁷⁸ Italy saw in the demise of the Austro-Hungarian fleet a grand opportunity for consolidating its position in the Adriatic. But Italy too saw itself vulnerable from the sea with coastline nearly twice the length of France's. Consequently, Italian delegates came to Washington with the simple, yet potentially explosive, claim to parity with "the strongest fleet of any of the Powers situated on the Mediterranean." Beyond this, the Italians declared their willingness "to reduce their naval armaments to zero, if France did/ the same."⁷⁹

England's support for Franco-Italian parity generated suspicion among French officials. While they thought they saw clandestine signs of Anglo-Italian collaboration in certain Italian stillborn suggestions on land armaments, the French were sure now the British desired a new naval balance in the Mediterranean.⁸⁰ For France the issue was one of prestige and principle.

Failure to Limit Auxiliary Warships. Negotiations to extend limitation to auxiliary vessels soon became hopelessly stymied. Fundamentally, the controversy centered on whether the submarine would be limited or abolished. Hughes' original plan allotted 90,000 tons of submarine to Britain and America, and 54,000 tons to Japan.⁸¹ The General Board had suggested that the United States and Great Britain be allowed 100,000 tons, to 60,000 tons each for Japan, Italy, and France.⁸² Both of these recommendations reversed the previous administration's policy: an oft-cited memorandum prepared for Wilson in Paris by his naval staff, argued for outlawing submarines because they were useful only in "treacherously" attacking merchant ships. This report held "Civilization demands that naval war be placed on a higher plane and confined to combatant vessels."⁸³ At Washington, however, only Britain championed the popular anti-submarine cause for they still had vivid memories of nearly being isolated in 1917 and 1918 by German submarines.

France became the submarine's principal defender, abetted by Japan and Italy. Their attitude stemmed from economic and political factors: the former because submarines were cheap to build, no minor consideration for a nation committed to maintaining a large army; and the latter because they might provide the leverage necessary to bring Britain to discuss the political aspects of European security.⁸⁴

As the debate unfolded the United States found itself caught between Britain's demand for abolition and France's insistence upon construction. On December 22, Lord Lee sought to enlist public sentiment to gain "not merely restriction on submarines, but their total and final abolition." He challenged the French attitude as endangering their most likely ally should war come again and chided the Americans for being inconsistent by advocating capital ship reduction while allowing for construction of submarines. France's chief delegate, Albert Sarraut, firmly restated his nation's refusal to accept the ratio for submarines simply because one nation had misused them. Italy and Japan joined in labelling the submarine an indispensable weapon for defense.⁸⁵

Hoping to break the deadlock, Hughes proposed a compromise allotment of quotas: England and America would receive 60,000 tons, and France, Japan, and Italy would keep their present tonnages (31,391 tons, 31,452 tons, and 21,000 tons respectively). This belated attempt to return to the American plan--reduction, not enlargement of naval forces--failed to gain French acceptance. Hughes then asked the British to consider a French suggestion of 60,000 tons for each of the five powers. Balfour could see no reason for France to have such an extravagant tonnage; moreover, if the submarines were limited, instead of abolished, England could not agree to restrictions on antisubmarine warships.⁸⁶

Balfour's argument torpedoed Hughes' search for a basis of compromise. On December 28, 1921 the French cabinet accepted the capital ship allotment but found it "impossible to accept a limitation below that of 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and 90,000 tons for submarines, without impairing the vital interest of the country and of its colonies and the safety of their navel life." Balfour replied that "if at Britain's very gates a fleet of 90,000 tons of submarines (60,000 tons of which were to be of the newest type) was to be constructed, no limitation of any kind on auxiliary vessels capable of dealing with submarines could be admitted by the Government which he represented."⁸⁷

Masked by France's apparent obstructionism in the submarine controversy were serious British reservations about Hughes' proposals to extend Anglo-American parity to auxiliaries. When Balfour on November 15 accepted equality it had been linked to Hughes' proviso that capital ships, with

auxiliary vessels necessary to a battle fleet, should provide the measure of total fleet strength; but overlooked were his reservations against parity for all warships. The chief British delegate noted at the time that other questions, particularly regarding cruisers not attached to battle fleets, must be considered. This qualification was prompted by the Admiralty's belief that imperial requirements, i.e., protection of sea lanes and commerce, must ultimately decide total auxiliary tonnage.⁸⁸ Later discussions made it apparent that Britain had by no means agreed unqualifiedly to Hughes' ratios, although the Americans thought they had.

Hughes salvaged the qualitative limitation of 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns on cruisers, even if he failed to extend the ratios to auxiliaries. This restriction clearly delineated this combat ship from the heavier capital ships, preventing the possible construction of 20,000-ton vessels in the guise of cruisers.⁸⁹ This proposal found staunch support among many American officers, but among British naval professionals the 10,000-ton limit touched off a storm of criticism. Many officers argued that, like the appearance of the Dreadnought in 1906, it outdated their large cruiser fleet of 3,500 to 5,000 tons. Others had hoped, by keeping the tonnage maximum on cruisers low, to augment the relative combat worth of armed merchant ships.⁹⁰ Britain's superiority in this latter capacity had not been missed by American officers. They desired the 10,000 ton, long-range cruisers to offset Britain's numerical advantage and to make up for the lack of fortified American bases west of Hawaii.

The Washington Treaties

The number of agreements recorded by the Washington delegates attested to the conference's productivity and to the interlocking nature of naval limitation and politics.⁹¹ Where the Five Power naval pact spelled out naval reductions, stipulated capital ship and aircraft carrier tonnages, and levied specified qualitative restrictions on future construction, the Four and Nine Power Treaties recorded political understandings toward the Pacific and the Asian mainland. Clearly one could not have the former without the latter; together these three accords created a new equilibrium of technology and sea power.

The Four and Nine Power Treaties have been criticized on several counts; the former for containing only "paper

promises," and the latter for failing to resolve the China problem. With his usual acumen, Roland N. Stromberg questioned the criticism that "the Four-Power Treaty was an absurdity because it rested on 'public opinion' rather than on 'military power.'" Such logic, he contended, failed to recognize that "the use of military force must (in a democracy) always rest on public opinion and that a pledge to use force is still only a 'parchment' pledge."⁹² Critics to the contrary, the Four Power Pact did have an enforcement provision, its consultation clause. That this article was never invoked is not an argument against its validity; rather it argues that the dominance of domestic isolationism and the lack of political leadership rendered the treaty sterile. In these circumstances the substitution of a firm military enforcement provision would hardly have altered the accord's fate.

Of these agreements, the Nine Power Treaty unquestionably rested on the most flimsy base. It did gain international legality for the United States' traditional Open Door policy in China, but it did not terminate disagreement over China. Three areas of contention remained:

- 1) China's integrity was pledged but, in its state of political disintegration, to which Chinese government (the one in Canton and Peking) did the pledge pertain? and what were the true boundaries of China? did these encompass Manchuria?
- 2) The Open Door doctrine promised "equal opportunity," but how was this to be defined in context with the established "spheres of influence?" was it possible to mix free competition with monopoly?
- 3) The Treaty promised China's continued national development, but how was this to be accomplished in the light of extra-territoriality, the presence of foreign troops, and many other special concessions accumulated over the years? how would these privileges be interpreted in light of increasing Chinese nationalism? could foreign citizens and property be protected without them?

These questions formed the seedbed of future American-Japanese rifts--abetted by America's discriminatory immigration policies and by the Depression's economic problems, which would in the 1930's negate all three treaties.⁹³ That

these old problems undermined the 1922 American-Japanese modus vivendi is clear. More difficult to understand is why neither Washington nor Tokyo pressed for revision of the Nine Power pact when its inadequacies became evident.

Terms of the Five Power Naval Treaty. Signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy on February 6, 1922, this accord registered actual disarmament, established quantitative limits for capital ships and aircraft carriers, acknowledged a "ratio" formula, and placed qualitative restrictions on future construction. Its importance lay also in what it did not accomplish--particularly its failure to achieve the limitation of auxiliary warships. Nonetheless, the Washington ratio concept guided negotiations on naval armaments for the next decade and a half.

In terms of actual disarmament, the Five Power pact hewed closely to Hughes' original suggestion for the scrapping of sixty-six capital ships, totaling 1,878,043 tons.

Capital Ships to be Scrapped

	<u>Hughes' Proposal</u>		<u>Treaty Commitments</u>	
	<u>Ships</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Ships</u>	<u>Tons</u>
United States:	15 building 15 older vessels	845,740	13 building 15 older vessels	770,540
Great Britain:	4 building* 19 older vessels	583,375	4 building* 20 older vessels	591,373
Japan:	8 projected** 7 building 10 older vessels	448,928	8 projected** 7 building 10 older vessels	415,028

* The Hoods, not yet laid down.

** Not yet laid down (159,828 tons)

The procedures for scrapping were carefully defined by the treaty (Part 2, Chapter II), as follows:

I. A vessel to be scrapped must be placed in such a condition that it cannot be put to combatant use.

II. This result must be finally effected in any one of the following ways:

- a) Permanent sinking of the vessel;
- b) Breaking the vessel up. This shall always involve destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers, and armor, and all deck, side, and bottom plating;
- c) Converting the vessel to target use, exclusively. Not more than one capital ship may be retained for this purpose at one time by any of the Contracting Parties.

Compliance with these stipulations followed a two-stage schedule: preliminary dismantling within six months, final scrapping within eighteen months.

The retained capital ships provided for a ratio of 5-5-3 among the Big Three; the British Empire's larger number of ships and greater tonnage was off-set by American qualitative superiority.

Retained Capital Ships

	Pre - Post			(to be reached by 1941)		
	Jutland	Total	Tons	Pre - Post	Jutland	Total
						Tons
United States:	17 15	1 3a	500,650 525,850a	0	15	525,000
British Empire:	21 17	1 3b	580,450 558,950b	0	15	525,000
Japan:	3	2	301,320	0	9	315,000
France:	10	0	221,170c	0	-d	175,000
Italy:	10	0	182,800c	0	-d	175,000

a After completion of 2 post-Jutland ships & scrapping of 2 older vessels.

b On completion of 2 new ships & scrapping of 4 older vessels.

c France & Italy could begin to lay down new tonnage in 1927, 1929 & 1930.

d Within tonnage limitations; number not fixed.

By 1941 these differences would be eliminated and mathematical parity achieved with fifteen 35,000-ton ships. By

placing capital ship construction on a ten-year holiday (excepting two ships each for Britain and America), by enumerating the vessels retained and scrapped, and by specifying the qualitative features and construction schedule of their replacements, competitive building was ended.

Aircraft carriers were limited by tonnage, rather than by number, in keeping with the ratio.

Aircraft Carrier Limits

United States	135,000 tons
British Empire	135,000 tons
Japan	81,000 tons
France	60,000 tons
Italy	60,000 tons

The treaty defined a carrier as a vessel exclusively designed for carrying aircraft and equipped with a flight deck.

Qualitative restrictions specified by the Five Power accord included:

Capital Ships

- a) No capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons.
- b) No capital ship shall carry guns with a caliber in excess of 16 inches.

Aircraft Carriers

- c) No aircraft carrier shall exceed 27,000 tons, except that nations may build no more than two 33,000-ton vessels.
- d) Armament of carriers shall not exceed 8-inches in caliber; if it mounts this caliber the total number of such guns shall not exceed ten.

General Provisions

- e) No warship hereafter laid down, other than capital ships and aircraft carriers, shall exceed 10,000 tons. This restriction does not apply to troopships or non-combatant vessels.
- f) No warships hereafter laid down, other than capital ships, shall carry a gun in excess of 8 inches in caliber.

g) No preparations shall be made in peacetime for installation of warlike armaments on merchant decks, other than the necessary reinforcing of decks to mount guns not exceeding 6 inches in caliber.

Given the lengthy duration of this agreement, until December 31, 1936, provisions were made to protect the general interests of the contracting powers during the period its terms were in force. If the "national security" of any of these nations was modified by "any change of circumstances" each signatory had the right to reconvene the conference. If technical and scientific developments should alter the purposes of these limits and restrictions, the United States was empowered, upon mutual consent, after eight years to convene the signatories to consider possible changes in the treaty's terms. Other provisions covered the functioning of the pact during an outbreak of hostilities involving any contracting power.

Four Power and Nine Power Treaties. Taken together the Far Eastern agreements (with the Five Power Naval Treaty) recorded at the Washington conference a remarkable American diplomatic accomplishment. For Japanese World War One had been a fortunate historical accident allowing them to expand their sphere of influence over vast areas of the Asian mainland and the western Pacific. War and revolution had eliminated German and Russian power in this area, while victory had left England and France weakened and unable to reassert their former influence. Only the United States remained to fill the vacuum caused by the decimation of the pre-1914 Asian balance of power, but it had not fared well. "Japan was entrenched legally, diplomatically and by military force in Shantung, Manchuria, and Eastern Siberia," John Chalmers Vinson has written of postwar conditions. "Equality of commercial opportunity existed only in theory, while the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of China stood in grave danger of total eclipse."⁹⁴ In the spring of 1921, American statesmen found their Far Eastern policies in shambles; yet at the Washington meetings, a few months later, a new balance was struck and for the first time in nearly a decade the tide of Japanese ambition receded.

This new balance rested on the concept of "relative security" as reflected in the Five Power Naval pact; but

agreement here came about only with the easing of political tension in the Pacific area. The latter was accomplished through the Four Power pact which abrogated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and offered consultative procedures, the Nine Power accord which established the American doctrine of the Open Door in China, and Japan's agreement to withdraw her occupation forces from the Shantung area and from Siberia.

The Four Power pact was a vehicle to ease the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and yet not alienate any party: the Americans insisted the old alliance must go; the Japanese desired to retain its relationship with England; and the British wished to placate both Washington and Tokyo. After early attempts foundered, it fell to Hughes to put the pieces together.

In late November, 1921, Balfour, Chandler P. Anderson and Shidehara each tried drawing up a treaty draft. Balfour's proposed tripartite alliance would have: 1) maintained "the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia" and protected the existing territorial status quo "in the islands of the Pacific Ocean and the territories bordering thereon;" 2) provided for frank consultation "as to the best means" of protecting the territorial rights if threatened; 3) provided for any two parties "to protect themselves" with a defensive military arrangement if needed; and 4) abrogated by inference the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Hughes insisted that any new arrangement must replace not only the alliance, but also the Root-Takahara and Lansing-Ishii agreements; moreover, in the defensive military arrangement, he saw the ghost of the Anglo-Japanese pact. Anderson's and Shidehara's drafts were quickly discarded: the former failed to abrogate the Alliance and the latter re-introduced the phrase "vital interests" which harkened back to the Lansing-Ishii agreement.

Hughes' draft proposed that: 1) the pact apply only to "insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific Ocean," eliminating mention of the Asia mainland or Japan's "vital interests;" 2) each party pledge to respect the other's rights and, should a dispute among signatories arise, the four powers would discuss the issues; 3) the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be officially abrogated; and 4) should an outside threat emerge, the signatories "shall communicate with one another fully and frankly." France accepted membership in the pact, expanding it to a quadruple accord. This innovation

salved French feelings at the time of the capital ship crisis, assuaged the Senate's isolationists, and removed the fear that the two former allies might try to outvote their new partner.⁹⁵

Basically Hughes' draft became the Four Power Treaty and was formally signed on December 13, 1921.

The Nine Power treaty negotiations dealt with the problems of China, problems that had been carefully ignored in the earlier Four Power talks. American and Japanese policies clashed sharply at this time as the former's concern for the Open Door met headlong with the latter's insistence on her "vital interests."⁹⁶ In private negotiations the American proposals carried. Elihu Root, who had been in McKinley's cabinet when John Hay announced the Open Door principles, offered a resolution embodying these ideas:

- 1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
- 2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
- 3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- 4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

If the first three points were merely a restatement of earlier principles, the fourth had a special history of its own. Hughes took this opportunity to reveal a suppressed protocol to the original Lansing-Ishii agreement.⁹⁷

Two other Far Eastern settlements came from the conference. Separate Sino-Japanese negotiations, aided by the good offices provided by Hughes and Balfour, resulted in the withdrawal of Japan from the Shantung area. When the status of Siberia and Northern Sakhalin came up, the Tokyo government announced that, with satisfactory arrangements to protect Japanese citizens and stop the spread of Bolshevik propaganda, their troops would be recalled. True to

their word, the final withdrawal of Japanese military forces from Russian territory came soon after the conference ended.

Chapter 13 Footnotes

¹ For a list of these agreements, see U.S. Senate, Report of the American Delegation, S. Doc. #125, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1922); text of the naval treaty can be found in U.S., Statutes at Large, XXXXIII, 1655-85.

² For example, see Dudley W. Knox, "The United States Navy Between World Wars," an introduction to Samuel E. Morrison's History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (1955), I, xxxvii-xl; Louis Morton, Strategy and Command in the United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (1962), Series 7, vol. X, 25-26; Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, pp. 28, *passim*.

³ Harold and Margaret Sprout have written: "The Conference itself dramatically emphasized the potentialities of Anglo-American cooperation. And the Washington Treaties sketched in outline a new order of sea power which, with a little more imagination and courage, might have guarded the world's peace for generations still to come." Toward A New Order of Sea Power (1943), p. xi.

⁴ Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States (1962), p. 85.

⁵ On January 1, 1920, the world's major navies had the following warships:

	<u>British Empire</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Battleships	45	36	20	13	14
Battle Cruisers	9	-	-	7	-
Cruisers	19	15	20	10	7
Light Cruisers	79	18	8	17	10
Flotilla Leaders	26	-	-	-	7
Destroyers	355	220	76	68	47
Submarines	103	105	57	25	800

Included in the above are the following ships completed in 1911 or after:

	<u>British Empire</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Battleships	27	13	12	5	5
Battle Cruisers	7	-	4	4	-
Cruisers	3	-	2	-	---

	<u>British Empire</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Light Cruisers	56	-	-	5	6
Flotilla Leaders	25	-	-	-	7
Destroyers	339	194	38	29	29
Submarines	99	88	40	16	73

(Building: British Empire, 1 battle cruisers, 9 light cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders, 6 destroyers, 10 submarines; United States, 7 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 115 destroyers, 42 submarines; France, 8 submarines; Japan, 2 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 10 destroyers, 11 submarines.)
 Source: as cited in Mary Klachko, "Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Columbia Univ., 1962), pp. 192-93.

6 The preparedness movement of 1914-1916 is developed in Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (1948), pp. 322-46 and in Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military (1956), pp. 156-75. Outten J. Clinard believes that the 1916 Naval Act was aimed at Japan, "Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917," University of California Publications in History, No. 36 (1947) p. 171. In Toward a New Order pp. 37-40, the Sprouts argue it was provoked by more immediate European conditions and the potential threat of Japan. George T. Davis, in A Navy Second to None (1940), p. 224, holds that it was framed with postwar necessities in mind. Undoubtedly all of these factors influenced to varying degrees the public, the administration, and the members of Congress.

7 Four battleships were to weigh 32,600 tons and be capable of cruising at 21 knots, the other six were to be 43,200 tons, capable of 23 knots; the battle cruisers were to weigh 43,500 tons and cruise at 33 knots. For itemized strength figures, see the Navy Yearbook, 1916, pp. 480-81.

8 Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era--The Years of War and After (1946), p. 368; Navy Department, Annual Reports, 1918, pp. 32-33; Daniels strongly recommended the supplementary building program in annual report and at two appearances before the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives, Hearings on Naval Estimates for 1919, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess., (1919), pp. 820ff.

9 E.D. Cronon, ed., Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels (1963), p. 350.

10 New York Times, Dec. 3, 1918.

11 Frederick Moore, America's Naval Challenge (1929), p.1.

12 Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I, p. 270.

13 Quoted in Klachko, "Anglo-American Naval Competition," p. 143.

14 Miss Klachko's study presents the most exhaustive treatments of this contest yet, see particularly Ch. V & VI; also see, Sprouts, Toward A New Order, pp. 61-69.

15 New York Times, February 6, 10, 1919, Hearings on Naval Estimate, 1919, pp. 820ff.

16 See Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (1926-1928), IV, 499ff.

17 Daniels, The Wilson Era, p. 382.

18 See R. S. Baker and W.E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace (1927), I, 196, 412, 392, 638.

19 Committee on Naval Affairs, Disarmament in Its Relationship to Naval Policy and Naval Building Programs of the United States, Hearings, 66th Cong. 3rd sess. (1921), p. 537.

20 Department of Navy, Annual Reports, 1918, (Washington, D.C., 1919), pp. 144, 386; for the Naval establishments concern with using their construction programs for political ends, see Lt. Comdr. Wallace L. Lind, editorial in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XLVI (June, 1920), p. 945.

21 New York Times, February 1, 1920.

22 Figures are cited in Klachko, "Anglo-American Naval Competition," Ch. IX.

23 As quoted in Benjamin H. Williams, The United States and Disarmament (1931), p. 137.

24 In Aug. 1921, bids were invited for these warships, Hector C. Bywater, Navies and Nations (1927), p. 121; also

see Roland A. Chaput, Disarmament in British Foreign Policy (1935), pp. 96-97.

25 Hector Bywater, "The Limiting of Naval Armaments," Atlantic Monthly, v. 129 (Feb., 1922), p. 260; Raymond Leslie Buell, The Washington Conference (1922), pp. 130-44.

26 John Chalmers Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (1955), pp. 47-48.

27 Quoted in Hector Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem (1921), pp. 155-156.

28 Nation, April 10, 1920, p. 453.

29 Cong. Rec., Dec. 14, 1920, pp. 310, 4163.

30 Quoted in John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge (New York, 1953), p. 403; The Times, (London), June 11, 1921.

31 Vinson, The Parchment Peace, pp. 55, 85; New York Times, Dec. 5, 1920; but Pusey asserts that Harding always endorsed an arms meeting but had left it to Secretary of State Hughes to decide when the "time was ripe." Hughes, II, 455.

32 Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (1935), pp. 227-230; in 1921 Japan was spending 48.7% of its annual revenue on the navy and army, 55% of the navy funds went for new construction, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 47 (July, 1921), p. 1104.

33 The Economist, June 25, 1921, pp. 1358-59.

34 See Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1966)

35 See D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, XIV, 287-322.

36 New York Times, Jan. 4, Feb. 6, and Jul. 4, 1921; also Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Diplomatic Commentaries (1936), pp. 34-60.

37 J. Chal. Vinson, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Pacific Historical Review, XXXI

(1962), pp. 262-66: the printed version in Foreign Relations omits that portion of the memo which relates to the proposed three-power pact. Vinson also demolishes the myth that this meeting witnessed a struggle between Australian Prime Minister William H. Hughes, who supposedly pressed for renewal of the alliance, and Canadian Prime Minister Arthur Meighen, who supposedly persisted until the conferees accepted the American demand for its abrogation.

38 For the timing of Washington's initiative, see Thomas H. Buckley, "The U.S. and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922", unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Indiana Univ., 1961), pp. 43 ff. Hughes deliberately did not specify "naval armaments" in this initial message, F.R., 1921, I, 21-22.

39 F.R., 1921, I, 24.

40 Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (1922), p. 52; hereafter cited as C.L.A..

41 The United States would be left with 18 capital ships (500,650 tons), Great Britain would retain 22 older, more lightly armed, capital vessels (604,450 tons), and Japan would have 10 capital ships (299,700 tons). For the entire American plan, see C.L.A., pp. 78-92.

42 Some British naval officers thought this figure excessive and urged unsuccessfully, adoption of a lower limit, see Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again (1947) pp. 4-5.

43 C.L.A., pp. 50-62; for details of Hughes' "Inspired Hour," see Pusey, Hughes, II, 466-73.

44 Report of the General Board, Sept. 12 & 17, 1921, as quoted in Buckley, "U.S. and the Washington Conference," pp. 122-24; Sprout, Toward A New Order pp. 141-42.

45 Buckley, "U.S. and the Washington Conference," pp. 123-24.

46 Report of the General Board, Oct. 14, 1921, in Ibid., p. 125.

47 Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931 (1963), p. 55.

48 Buckley, "U.S. and the Washington Conference," p. 126.

49 Ibid., pp. 126-30; Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, p. 51; Sprouts, Toward a New Order, pp. 139-40; Philip Jessup, Elihu Root (1930), II, 449.

50 Sprouts, Toward a New Order, pp. 126-27.

51 C.L.A., 96-104, 106; F.R., 1922, I. 69n.

52 F.R., 1922, I, 69-72; the American rebuttal was pointed: "We have fifteen ships averaging approximately 53% completed and some of them range as high as 88%. By no logical process of thought can these be considered non-existent." Ibid., p. 73.

53 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

54 Sprouts, Toward a New Order, pp. 173-76.

55 Report of the General Board, Oct. 20, 1921, cited in Buckley, "U.S. and the Washington Conference," p. 143; Pusey cites a report of Oct. 14 as taking the same position, Hughes, II, 477.

56 League assignment of the former German islands to Japan merely formalized a previous agreement. Japan and England had, according to the Greene-Motono note of Feb. 16, 1917, agreed to partition German islands in the Pacific; Great Britain would support Japan's claims to islands north of the equator and Japan would respond in like spirit to British claims to islands south of the equator. (F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, V., App. II, p. 134.) To earn this award, the Japanese sided in eliminating German sea raiders and military influence from the Pacific area. At Paris, the Wilson administration, particularly its naval experts, became alarmed as the significance of the secret arrangement became clear. In a memorandum prepared on Dec. 14, 1918, for the American delegation, Breckenridge Long argued the value of the United States' ownership of the Carolinas, Marshalls, Marianas, Yap, Pelew, Samoan Group, and the Guano Islands. (Ibid., II, 514-15.) Perhaps because of the obvious conflict with Wilsonian principles there was general agreement among all American experts that the United States could advance no legitimate claim to these islands. In any event, Lloyd George's decision to honor the 1917 agreement with Japan resolved the issue.

(*Ibid.*, V, 126.) Australia and New Zealand reluctantly acknowledged Japan's claims in exchange for northerly outposts in New Guinea and Samoa. These two dominions greatly antagonized the Japanese by their "Asian exclusion" attitudes. See Nicholas Efimenco, "Imperialism and the League Experiment with the Mandate System," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Minnesota, 1948), pp. 271-86, 305-12.

57 The Sprouts point out that the press contained several intimations in the summer and fall of 1921 that the Japanese would demand some limitation of insular naval bases, in return for their agreement to naval limitation, Toward A New Order, p. 167. The British also reported Japanese concern with American bases with western Pacific, see excerpt from The Naval and Military Record and Royal Dockyard Gazette (Apr. 19, 1922) in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings (May, 1922), p. 1025.

58 F.R., 1922, I. 74; Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 449.

59 F.R., 1922, I, 75-83, 127-30, 247. American Naval officers apparently were not consulted. Adm. Coontz later testified that, to the best of his knowledge, neither the Navy Dept. nor the General Board were consulted about this decision. He personally considered it put the United States at "a very great disadvantage." U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the London Naval Treaty of 1930, 71st Cong., 2nd sess. (1930), p. 247.

60 In preliminary talks he had included the Bonin Islands and Oshima for he recognized American reluctance to halt fortifications in the Philippines if Japan fortified these; but the Japanese government insisted that they were part of Japan proper. If he now included them in an agreement he would be violating his instructions and would appear publicly to have retreated from the announcement of Dec. 15. See Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After (1928), pp. 84-85.

61 F.R., 1922, I, 150-56, 245-46.

62 Ibid., p. 253.

63 F.R., 1922, II, 600-604. Art. II reads: "The United States and Its nationals shall receive all the benefits of the engagements of Japan, defined in Articles 3,4 ('...no

military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory.') and 5 of the aforesaid Mandate, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a Member of the League of Nations." The U.S. was also to receive a duplicate copy of the annual report submitted by Japan to the League.

64 C.L.A., pp. 792-802; U.S. Senate, Report of the American Delegation, S. Doc. #125, 67th Cong., 2nd sess. (1922)

65 Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armaments: Subcommittees (1922), pp. 196-268. Hereafter cited as Subcommittees.

66 C.L.A., p. 672. In 1921, the United States had 19,360 tons of carriers built or building, and Great Britain had 87,190 tons; while Japan had 21,000 tons, France 24,230 tons, and Italy none.

Report of the General Board, Oct. 8, 1921, cited in Buckley, "U.S. and the Washington Conference," p. 186n.

67 Sprout, Toward A New Order, pp. 227-35.

68 Pusey, Hughes, II, 485-86; Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After, pp. 96-99.

69 See Harry H. Ransom, "The Battleship Meets The Airplane," Military Affairs (Spring, 1959), pp. 21-27; Sprout, Toward A New Order, pp. 211-24; for an excellent summary of contemporary views on the military potential of the airplane, see the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 47 (Sept., 1921), pp. 1451-61.

70 See Dudley W. Knox's introduction to S.E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (1955), I, xlv-xlix.

71 See Donald S. Birn, "Britain and France at the Washington Conference, 1921-1922," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Columbia Univ., 1964).

72 The French parliament refused to vote appropriations just before the conference. For legislative objections to capital ships and preference for smaller warships, see M. de Kerguizec, "French Naval Aims," Foreign Affairs, IV, no. 3

(Apr., 1926), pp. 369-82.

73 New York Times, Nov. 22, 1921. This seems to confirm earlier remarks by the French naval chief of staff that his government would not accept naval limitation terms less than those granted to Japan. Naval Intelligence Report to the General Board, cited in Buckley, "U.S. and Washington Conference," p. 159n.

74 Buckley, "U.S. and the Washington Conference," p. 162; interestingly earlier General Board plans would have granted France, Italy, and Japan each 600,000 tons, while its revised version would have allowed parity at 410,000 tons.

75 Subcommittees, pp. 24-32.

76 F.R., 1922, I, 130-31, 135-36; Pusey, Hughes, II, 483.

77 Earlier Briand was alleged to have insulted the honor of the Italian army by suggesting that the latter's desire for disarmament stemmed from the "moral decomposition" of Italy's military forces. This incident touched off a furor at a time when France most desired to satisfy legitimate Italian aspirations and keep them in the Versailles system, see Birn, "Britain and France at the Washington Conference," pp. 94-95.

78 H. Meunier, "La Question de la Parité Navale Franco-Italienne," Revue Politique et Parlementaire (Apr. 10, 1930), p. 76.

79 Senate, Conference on the Limitation of Armament, S. Doc. #126, 67 Cong. 2nd sess. (1922), p. 162; F.R., 1922, I, 65

80 See Birn, "Britain and France at the Washington Conference," pp. 92-93.

81 C.L.A., p. 86. Actually these figures would allow considerable construction for in 1921 the United States had 50,522 tons of submarines with an additional 51,577 tons to be completed by 1929; Great Britain had 82,464 tons with none projected; Japan had 12,990 tons with 26,868 tons contemplated; France had 28,826 tons with 14,024 tons projected; and Italy had 20,108 tons with 120 tons projected. General Board Report, Sept. 17, 1921, cited in Buckley, "U.S. and Washington Conference," p. 169 fn.

82 General Board Report, Oct. 8, 1921, Ibid., pp. 169-70.

83 Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (1922), III, 201.

84 Sprout, Toward A New Order, p. 191.

85 C.L.A., pp. 474-90. This attack on France's position served to expand growing Anglo-French resentment, see Birn, "Britain and France at the Washington Conference," pp. 158-66.

86 C.L.A., pp. 556, 558-60; F.R., 1922, I, 143-44.

87 C.L.A., pp. 568-70, 576.

88 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, XIV, 513-16; Roland A. Chaput, Disarmament In British Foreign Policy (1935), pp. 110-13.

89 The Sprouts feel that none of the delegations realized the impact these qualitative limitations would have on "either their respective strategic problems or the future balance of power upon the sea," Toward A New Order, pp. 211-12.

90 Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World (1934), p. 48.

91 In all, the conferees signed 7 treaties and approved 12 resolutions.

92 Roland N. Stromberg, Collective Security and American Foreign Policy (1963), pp. 56-57.

93 These questions were sharpened by Burton F. Beer's paper "Disarmament in the Pacific: The United States and Japan in the 1920's" read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, Dec. 28, 1965. For some of the answers, see Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (1965).

94 Vinson, The Parchment Peace, p. 24.

95 F.R., 1922, I, 1-8; Buckley, "U.S. and the Washington Conference," p. 203n.; Pusey, Hughes, II, 496.

⁹⁶ Sadao Asada, "Japan's 'Special Interests' and the Washington Conference, 1921-22," American Historical Review, LXVII (1961), pp. 62-63.

⁹⁷ C.L.A., p. 900; F.R., 1922, I, 278-79; Pusey, Hughes, II, 502-503; also J. Chal Vinson, "The Annulment of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement," Pacific Historical Review, XXVII (1958), pp. 57-69.

Chapter 14

THE CONTEMPORARY VERDICT, 1922-1927

Naval limitation concepts that emerged from the Washington conference, largely embodied in the Five Power Naval Treaty (1922), substantially influenced the policies of the major seapowers during the 1920's. Analysts assessed the technical and political complexities of these restrictions with mixed feelings. If domestic opinion generally favored naval disarmament, there were instances during the ratification process of partisanship for political advantage. And, too, in the three dominate naval powers there remained vocal individuals, naval officers primarily but by no means exclusively, who questioned the goals and means of naval limitation.

To the majority of civil authorities, citizens, and newspapers in the United States, Great Britain, and Japan the Washington treaty "system" appeared to be a sound means of halting a prospective naval race, relieving international tensions in the Pacific, and reducing the burden of taxes. In Italy other domestic political issues pushed the naval limitation issue aside, while in France the quantitative schedule impinged on national integrity. The ratification process reflected this verdict: the United States completed its procedures on March 29, 1922, Great Britain on July 20, 1922; and Japan on August 5, 1922. Ratification by Italy followed in January, 1923; but French opposition to the naval treaty and, to a lesser degree, the Four Power pact prevented assent until July 11, 1923. France did not act favorably on the Nine Power agreement until two years later, and never did ratify the other accords.

In the United States and Japan proponents and opponents of these treaties attempted to use them even after ratification for partisan advantage. The popular enthusiasm accorded the agreements, particularly the naval limitation

pact, was capitalized on by their proponents, while this same sentiment caused their opponents to approach the treaties gingerly. In Great Britain, the treaties were less a factor of partisanship after ratification than before as both major parties, for different reasons, accepted the Washington "system". Conservatives frowned at the price of naval limitation but embraced the economies it brought; the Laborites argued for more extensive disarmament but accepted the treaties as an initial step. In France the major political factions enlisted under the banner of security, arbitration, and disarmament, in that order; they supported the government's emphasis on general disarmament preceded by a guarantee from aggression.

Beyond the contemporary political verdict lay the widespread dissatisfaction of the naval establishments revealing a bifurcation of civil naval attitudes. In each of the three major seapowers political leaders tended to view the Washington treaties in an optimistic light, while the naval officers of each nation took a pessimistic attitude.

In assessing the Washington treaty "system" during the 1920's as it applied to the signatory states, the following three points stand out.

1) Although the verdict was not unanimous, the treaties and agreements negotiated at the Washington Conference were overwhelmingly endorsed by popular opinion in all five countries, with the exception of France where the verdict was more mixed and less favorable.

2) While the Washington system was in general favorably received, it became the subject of partisan rivalry, with the parties in power seeking to capitalize on the political advantages to be found in the public support of the conference and the opposition parties thereby forced, in an effort to minimize these advantages, to raise criticisms, reservations and qualifications. Most of the opposition to the conference, therefore, was based on political expediency; there were few in any of the countries who based their opposition on a rejection of disarmament per se.

3) The main differences which arose over the Washington treaties were not so much between political parties as between civilian and military assessments of the conference and its results. Not only was there a common pattern of opposition to the treaties by naval spokesmen in all of the

countries, but even more remarkable was the conclusion of each of the naval officials that "their" country had lost in the negotiations. Thus, while the diplomats tended to assume that all countries gained by the Washington treaties, the naval officials in each of the countries generally assumed that only the "other" countries profited by the conference.

The Civil Verdict

The conferees had been summoned to end naval competition, to promote world peace, and to arrest mounting tensions in the Pacific. When they finished their deliberations, the delegates viewed their efforts with unabashed satisfaction. Secretary of State Hughes insisted that "no more extraordinary or significant Treaty has ever been made." Instead of merely discussing the burdens of naval armaments, the Five Power agreement had actually diminished them. "This Treaty ends," Hughes declared, "absolutely ends, the race in competition of naval armaments. At the same time it leaves the relative security of the great naval Powers unimpaired."¹ To Lord Balfour the conference inaugurated a "new era" for the maritime powers. They had formulated a guarantee for China, written a nonaggression pact covering the Pacific island possessions, and agreed on a treaty for reduction of capital ships and for ending the building rivalry among the leading naval powers. These three achievements, Balfour claimed, were related: to judge one, the other two agreements must be taken into consideration. Together these "unique" treaties accomplished "the diminution of armaments, and with the diminution of armaments a corresponding diminution in the likelihood of armaments being ever required."²

Baron Shidehara viewed the treaties in similar perspective. He lauded the termination of "competition in naval armaments" that had so long been "ruinous to national welfare and harmful to international peace." Shidehara believed the Four Power Treaty, the Nine Power Treaty, the agreements relating to Chinese problems, particularly Shantung, and the adjusting the "difficult question of the Pacific mandates" ushered in an era of peace in the Pacific. The Italian delegation joined in applauding the Washington treaties. Senator Schanzer singled out the naval treaty as the initial step "toward eliminating the danger of future wars and creating more solid foundations for the financial policy of great nations."³

Only the French delegation voiced misgivings. While the French government had signed the limitation agreement, M. Sarraut explained that many Frenchmen doubted that disarmament alone would bring lasting world peace. A stable, peaceful world could be guaranteed only if "those who may still feel tempted to unleash the horrors of conflict know that they can no longer do so with impunity."⁴ To the French, naval limitation alone, separate from comprehensive military limitation and political organization, fell short of establishing peace.

The American View. Public response in America was warmly sympathetic. The Sprouts write that it was "one of enthusiastic though by no means unanimous applause," while Thomas Buckley concluded that the treaties' supporters far outnumbered their opponents. Leonard C. Hoag found that the American public "expressed itself very freely on the effects of the conference" and that in general the public "expressed satisfaction with the conference treaties and urged prompt and complete ratification."⁵

The press, had followed the conference quite closely and had usually supported the administration's position. A Literary Digest poll of newspaper reaction to the treaties pending ratification revealed that of the 803 papers approached, 723 favored ratification while 66 stood opposed and 14 refused to commit themselves. In the opinion of the Digest, "Reports of opposition are so negligible as to make it clear to us that the people are more significantly united on the proposals of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament than they have been on any similar issue."⁶ The Hearst press figured prominently among those newspapers who opposed the treaties. William Randolph Hearst alternately praised the French for their independent stand and criticized the administration for falling into "the doormat class" by negotiating with the British.⁷ One Hearst daily held those who hailed the conference as a victory for peace to be victims of a "pathetic delusion." Not only had the agreements failed to achieve peace, they had, according to this editor, created for the United States an even greater danger of "new wars."⁸

Numerous organizations worked to secure ratification of the treaties while opposition groups were a rarity. A Committee for Treaty Ratification sprang into operation with support of such men as A. Lawrence Lowell and John Foster

Dulles. Additionally, the National Council for the Limitation of Armaments claimed that forty-three groups of all kinds, civic and pacifist, had pledged their active support. The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America presented a petition signed by over 14,000 ministers.⁹

Business and organized labor also endorsed the Washington treaties. Conservative organs, such as the Wall Street Journal, the Bankers Magazine, and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle believed that the conference had resulted in solid achievements and that it promised future reductions in armaments. Organized labor, led by Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor, had long supported the disarmament movement while denying pacifist tendencies. Yet the Washington naval treaty presented Gompers and his workers with a poignant conflict between self-interest and idealism. On February 9, 1922 some 18,000 shipyard workers were laid off because of the naval treaty's curtailment of construction. Believing the government failed to live up to its promise to find other work for the shipyards, Gompers appealed to the Secretary of Navy to reconsider or modify his dismissal order. Labor leaders also presented the government with a plan, in a series of fifteen proposals, for the conversion of government plants to manufacture other supplies. Although Secretary Denby promised early consideration of the A.F. of L.'s suggestions, he notified them on February 25 that "it was not...within my power to continue in needless employment those who are paid from a trust fund administered by the Navy Department of the United States."¹⁰ The unwillingness or inability of the Harding administration to provide for reconversion of industries affected by the naval limitation treaty caused organized labor to view future proposals with increasing skepticism.

The British View. British enthusiasm for the Washington treaty "system" rivaled that of America's in official and public circles. Arriving back in London, Lord Balfour became the idol of the hour: he found Prime Minister Lloyd George, the Cabinet, and cheering crowds awaiting him at Waterloo Station. Articulate British opinion followed somewhat the same pattern as its American counterpart. Prominent newspapers vied with one another in their praise of the Washington agreements. The quasi-official Times was most laudatory; but London's conservative Daily Telegraph and liberal Manchester Guardian Weekly, also extended praise. These organs reported that the conference brought the

English-speaking peoples closer together and provided an excellent example of how pragmatic, limited negotiations--harnessed to sound judgment, sincerity and good will--could attain joint recognition of national principles and interests. The Conference was also acclaimed as a positive step in diverting resources from armament to economic reconstruction.¹¹

Not all Englishmen believed the conference produced such laudable products. Even an occasional supporter objected to certain aspects of the negotiations: The Manchester Guardian criticized the obstructionist roles of France and Japan, the failure to achieve military disarmament or to abolish submarines, and Japan's retention of the Mutsu. There was, inevitably, an emotional adjustment to England's loss of naval supremacy. The Outlook challenged the idea that weakening the Royal Navy aided the cause of world peace. "If we were disarmed," it argued, "none would listen to our advocacy of disarmament." Others rebuked the government's bowing to American demands and leadership.¹² To these critics, the end of British naval primacy meant the end of the Empire.

British labor and manufacturing interests rallied behind the naval limitation and disarmament effort. The conservative press in the heavy manufacturing area around Sheffield, which would be hard hit by the pact, supported its goals. Agreeing with the aims of naval disarmament, the Sheffield Telegraph and the Independent believed firms manufacturing armaments should receive government compensation for their investments. When the Economy Committee under Sir Eric Geddes proposed, on February 11, 1922, a £21 million reduction for the Royal Navy and recommended the dismissal of 35,000 men from the fleet concern developed in business circles. Dockyard cities revealed anxiety over the reductions in naval construction as ship building was their major industry. In spite of unemployment problems--either existing or potential--British labor lined up behind the cause of disarmament on ideological grounds. The National Joint Council of the Labor Party extended its support in November 1921 urging "drastic" reductions of naval armaments and other military weaponry. On the eve of the conference, the London Labour News complained that the working man was not represented in the British delegation and declared that "if only the representatives of the old governing caste is to have a voice, the conference is doomed to failure because of its lack of moral authority."¹³ If labor officials felt a twinge of ambivalence at the conference's products, it stemmed from

unwillingness to extend the government credit and from resentment at being excluded from a popular undertaking.

The Japanese View. In Japan the treaties encountered sentiments that ranged from ardent approval to bitter denunciation. One prominent observer believed that the treaties were "on the whole favorably commented upon in the press as relieving the international tension particularly over the Pacific and as relieving the burden of taxation."¹⁴ Toyokicki Iyenaga, writing in Current History, concurred in this opinion and expressed his belief that critics, while vociferous, represented a minority of the Japanese people.¹⁵

Ultranationalists displayed an exaggerated concern with national prestige and empire. They argued that the government had sacrificed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, tied Japan's hands in the Far East and China, and agreed to a dangerously inferior naval ratio. The Yamato complained that Japanese diplomacy, particularly regarding the Shantung settlement, failed to maintain national honor: "Japan's position in the Washington Conference was that of a defendant before a court of law. If the decisions of the conference were not a declaration against Japan, what else could they be?" And the Yomiru, a favorite among intellectual circles, claimed the Washington treaties deposited the greatest gain to Great Britain, the United States second, France third, China next, but "the most miserable is Japan." The preponderant opinion among critics was that China fared better than any one else at Washington.¹⁶ Most outspoken, the Yorodzu charged that the United States invited the delegation to Washington, professing to work for peace, but had "tricked them one and all." This Tokyo paper found only American treachery in the entire undertaking: "When the Conference was opened, America introduced her selfish proposals and forced our country to accept the proposals blindly.... We are firmly resolved to reject such a slavish peace." This voice, now only a whisper, was a harbinger of things to come.¹⁷

Within Japanese commercial circles optimism loomed high that the Washington system sealed a new rapprochement which would mean better trade opportunities with China and the United States. Next to the United States, Japan had emerged from the World War with the greatest economic gains, the new arrangement might extend this prosperity. Subsequent events substantiated in part these hopes: during the 1920's America continued to be Japan's largest customer, taking 40% of all

her exports, while sales to Japan comprised the largest single American market. The China market, on the other hand, proved disappointing to Japan.

Although organized labor lacked a strong voice in Japanese politics, the government demonstrated concern over the impact of naval limitation on shipyard workers. In February, 1922, the naval ministry cancelled work on surplus capital ships; at the Kawasaki yard in Kobe where work stopped on two battleships, the 3,000 workers were shifted to accelerate the construction of other warships. The naval ministry was reported to be considering a scheme for pooling current contracts for cruisers, destroyers, submarines and other auxiliaries to lessen the treaty's impact on the shipyards.¹⁸ In the Diet the Government party, the Seiyukai, introduced a resolution calling upon the administration to take measures to meet the unemployment which would occur once the naval pact went into force. The resolution was promptly adopted.¹⁹

French and Italian Views. Popular opinion in France and Italy to the Washington treaty "system" is difficult to assess. Although the French Navy Minister claimed, during the debate on capital ship tonnage, that 330,000 tons constituted the lowest figure "public opinion" and Parliament would accept, there is little evidence that Frenchmen cared. Naval issues per se did not figure greatly among French concerns because their defense rested on military and aerial forces; indeed, the diminutive French navy reflected that nation's security priorities.²⁰

When naval issues reflected unfavorably on national prestige or on foreign policy questions, they became matters of general concern. Thus, while Le Temps and a few other journals applauded Hughes' "practical idealism," the majority of the nation's press warned against concessions and disarmament without positive guarantees. The ease with which the United States and Great Britain adjusted their differences--a factor unforeseen by French diplomats and informed observers--led prominent French critics to explain their delegation's poor showing at Washington, particularly the third-class "ratio," as plot. English and American concessions took on a sanctimonious garb of hypocrisy, as these critics saw matters, for Britain's self-sacrifice still left London with a two-power standard in Europe by holding France down to Italy's level. From Le Temps came a suggestion that France should attach extensive reservations to the Five Power Naval

Treaty--that France not regard its allotment of capital ships as a permanent measure of its battleship strength and that, if Germany violated the naval stipulations in the Versailles treaty, France not be bound by the Washington pact.

Despite a lack of enthusiasm for the Washington agreements, a consensus gradually developed in favor of their acceptance. Le Journal des Débates acknowledged this attitude when it reluctantly urged ratification of the treaties so as not to provoke other nations, "notably the United States," and compromise France's foreign policies. The journal concluded that "regrettable as was the manner in which the Washington negotiations were conducted, and contestable as may be the provisions adopted, the Government... cannot afford not to approve the treaty."²¹

To Italians the crisis over Fiume and the collapse of their parliamentary system far over-shadowed the Washington treaties. René Albrecht-Carrié has described the latter event--spanning from November 1918 to the Fascist coup of October 1922--as "a picture of aimless floundering and a sinking into an ever deeper political morass."²² Unsurprisingly, little concern was taken of naval questions in Italian popular opinion or politics during 1921-1922.

Ratification and Partisanship

In assessing the civilian verdict of the Washington treaties in the various national ratification processes, the following points stand out. First, the governments of the three major seapowers lent their prestige to the treaties to ensure their passage. Second, in American politics--through the presidential election of 1924--the Republicans took full credit for achieving naval disarmament and credited this triumph to their policy of "freedom of action" in foreign affairs; the Democrats attempted to dismiss the treaty as a halting step toward an objective that could be more easily accomplished under the League. Third, in Japan the treaties were criticized throughout the 1920's by the ultranationalists as part of a general condemnation of "soft" policies which relegated their nation to an inferior position in the Far East. And fourth, the opposition raised in France presaged the difficulties that would arise in future naval limitation negotiations.

Ratification in American Politics. In presenting the treaties to the Senate, Harding argued that the agreements, treaties, and declarations constituted as a single package. The administration held that naval limitations were predicated on the political understandings contained in the Nine Power and Four Power treaties which created a new era in the Far East. The "sum total" of these agreements warranted the assumption of "confidence and good will expressed in the Four Power Treaty and upon which the reduction of armament in the Naval Treaty may be contemplated with a sense of security."²³

Senatorial regard for the treaties was more restrained. While few senators challenged the Five Power Naval Treaty, several solons were displeased by the Four Power Treaty and the Yap agreement (recognizing Japan's Pacific Mandates in exchange for cable rights on Yap and commercial rights in the mandates.) A small but determined minority in the upper chamber used every device to delay ratification and discredit the Harding administration.²⁴ On February 15, 1922, the Democratic Senate leader moved that information relating to the secret negotiation of the Four Power Treaty be turned over. This resolution, despite the protests by Senators Lodge and Underwood, promptly passed; the administration, however, refused to comply. The senatorial opposition tried unsuccessfully to hold public hearings on the Four Power Treaty. On February 27 the Foreign Relations Committee reported the treaty intact, except for a minor reservation to quiet isolationist apprehensions. Despite a week-long assault, the administration's position--that all of the agreements were vital for a stabilized Pacific--carried. Opponents' fears that the Four Power Treaty was an alliance in disguise, that ratification constituted American acceptance of Japan's unjustifiable retention of the German mandates, or that it marked an Anglo-American entente, were thrown aside. On March 24, by a vote of 67 to 27 (55 Republicans and 12 Democrats vs. 4 Republicans and 23 Democrats) the Four Power Treaty received approval. The single alteration--the statement originally added by the Foreign Relations Committee--affirmed that the agreement carried "no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense."²⁵

Acceptance of the Four Power Treaty by the upper chamber virtually ended opposition to the remaining agreements. Some Democratic senators complained that the administration had not extended sufficient credit to Borah and his Democratic

supporters for initiating the conference, that the administration had failed to take the lead in limitation of land armaments, and that the administration had refused to join the League's efforts to lessen insecurity in Europe. But they did not dispute that the Five Power Treaty constituted a first step toward controlling naval armaments. Senator Johnson wondered aloud whether the nonfortification agreement (Article XIX) constituted an "abandonment of the Philippines and a retreat in the Pacific." Only Senator Joseph I. France of Maryland launched a verbal barrage against the naval treaty charging that "this Republic should have the most powerful Navy in the world as a first wall of defense for the protection of our own liberties and as the great benevolent right arm to be always extended for conciliation, for mercy, for humanity, for liberty, and for justice over all the peoples of the world." On March 29 the Senate, with only Joseph France dissenting, accepted the naval treaty. In rapid order the remaining agreements were endorsed by the upper house. Even the members of the Senate who had a few days earlier dramatized their fears of the Four Power Treaty joined in the unanimous decision to ratify the Nine Power Treaty with, as the Sprouts have noted, "little or no perceptible concern over possibilities of future Japanese aggression in eastern Asia."²⁶

Some members of the Democratic Party were alarmed at elder statesman William Jennings Bryan's observation that "I wouldn't be surprised if the Democratic Party would have to forego victory for some years to come, because Hughes' Conference is sweeping the country." While Cordell Hull, then chairman of the Democratic National Committee and a future Secretary of State, did not agree with Bryan's pessimistic outlook, he did draw up a critique of the Washington agreements for use in the congressional campaigns of 1922 and the presidential race of 1924. Not denying the value of naval limitation and disarmament (after all, these ideas had great popular appeal and were publicly endorsed by leaders of both parties), he criticized the Republicans for spurning a world organization to guarantee peace and disarmament, and substituting for it "a more or less regional arrangement." He agreed that the minor amount of disarmament accomplished, the Pacific consultation established, and the good will expressed must be numbered among the Conference's achievements. However, he believed:

the achievements of the conference were very partial, and that the United States paid a heavy price compared with other countries and adopted some dangerous and unwise

international policies. The disarmament agreed upon was in battleships and aircraft carriers and not in cruisers, submarines, and other means of combat. To my mind, the destruction of such vessels was far greater on the part of the United States than in any other country. I pointed out that Japan was even then greatly strengthening herself in naval vessels other than battleships, and was now much stronger, relatively, than before.

Nor did Hull place much trust in Japan's intentions to adhere to the spirit or the letter of the agreements she had recently signed. "She is busy consolidating her influence in China," he noted, "with the object of attaining a complete hold over the richest areas to the end that their entire resources and foodstuffs, coal, iron, and other products will be at the disposal of Japan in the future."²⁷

John W. Davis, Democratic presidential nominee in 1924, continued this same criticism. In his campaign Davis acknowledged the Washington Conference as "a milestone toward world peace;" but chided the Republicans for negotiating "an 'exclusive alliance,' the very sort of an alliance the Republicans told the nation we should not be drawn into." He criticized the Four Power Pact as being "between first rate powers who utterly ignore the interest in the Pacific of other powers, like Holland."²⁸

Davis looked upon the Washington Conference as a stop-gap until "the nations of the world get ready to sit around a table in organic conference;" until that time he accepted the naval ratio of 5-5-3. The Democratic nominee thought "that naval equality with Great Britain was entirely adequate protection for the United States...but I am unwilling to accept...inferiority to Great Britain or any other nation." Davis did attack Coolidge and Hughes for failure to maintain these ratios in auxiliary vessels. "I charge the present administration with inefficiency or worse in permitting our naval strength to fall to the level of that of Japan." He questioned the need for the naval limitation agreement if it perpetuated United States naval inferiority to Great Britain: "Why did we need an agreement with any power to maintain such a navy as we desire?"²⁹

These verbal assaults on the Washington Conference provoked a response from Hughes that the Democratic nominee could not have read the treaties. He defended the naval

treaty for stabilizing naval armaments and stopping competition. Davis' charges did force newly appointed Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur to admit publicly that the navy was not up to the 5-5-3 ratio. Considering auxiliary warships the United States fleet was "only 80 per cent" as powerful as Great Britain's naval forces.³⁰

Another leading Democratic campaigner, Norman H. Davis, international financier and former Under Secretary of State for Wilson, baited the Republicans for their dilatory approach to disarmament. While they might be satisfied with the Washington Conference, it constituted only a "partial and half-hearted step" which proved two things: sporadic, unique international undertakings rendered ineffective and incomplete products, and a select body of nations could not promote disarmament. Indeed, the limiting of certain weapons stimulated competition in weapons which defied quantitative controls by mathematical ratios, such as innovations in chemical warfare. To Norman Davis, no relation to the presidential nominee, only "Organized, careful, continuous conferences and cooperation can deal with these matters. Occasional showy conferences of plenipotentiaries cannot."³¹

The bitterness with which Wilsonian Democrats viewed the Harding administration and the Washington Conference can be seen in the comments of Josephus Daniels, a former Secretary of the Navy under Wilson. Writing years later, he revealed his partisanship:

with bull-dog tenacity, the British held on to their national religion--domination of the seven seas--and later in the Harding Administration, by pulling the wool over the eyes of American leaders who did not lead, won in Washington what they could not extort in Paris. By the terms of the inept Washington Conference the United States obtained a fake equality by scrapping giant dreadnaughts on the way to completion--exactly what Lloyd George vainly demanded in Paris--while it naively scrapped some blueprints. As if that backward step was not enough surrender, the succeeding administration quit building ships and let the American Navy fall into a poor second place and abandoned the American doctrine for which it went to war in 1812 and to secure which the Sea Battle of Paris was fought to procure acceptance of the second of Wilson's Fourteen Points.³²

Not all Democrats, not even all Democrats who served the naval establishment, were so critical. In 1922 Franklin D. Roosevelt, former assistant to Daniels and future employer of Hull, was enthusiastic about the Washington Conference. In a letter discussing a prospective essay, he outlined a number of points on which he would rest his analysis:

I would show briefly but frankly that for the past twenty years, i.e., almost from the time we got the Philippines, our hold on them and Guam in case of war was not problematical, but the odds distinctly against us...that the developments of modern war, i.e., submarines, aircraft, etc., have all tended to strengthen Japan's position on the western side of the Pacific Coast...I would point out that a living up to the naval limitations treaty in both letter and spirit on our part will help to make Japan do so also, and that there is no permanent reason why the Treaty could not be extended to other craft in the near future.³³

Roosevelt could not resist being critical of the Harding administration. He accused them of ignoring open diplomacy and failing to enlighten Americans on the faithfulness with which Japan was carrying out the Washington agreements. Nor did he believe that the Administration was publicizing either Japan's treaty concessions or her efforts to erase the friction between the two nations. Roosevelt agreed with those critics who believed that the United States had been "seriously crippled" in its ability to defend the Philippines and Guam, yet: "We have done this with our eyes open and the full knowledge that the only Power we might have to fear in the Western Pacific is Japan. In spite of this knowledge, and in the belief perhaps that a war between Japan and the United States would be ridiculous and futile, we have decided to stop competitive armaments."³⁴

Ratification in British Politics. Ratification of the treaties moved swiftly in Great Britain. King George V's address to Parliament on February 7, 1922 focused on the proceedings at Washington and the "new and closer phase of friendship" in Anglo-American relations. The Washington conference presented, Prime Minister Lloyd George told an applauding House, "one of the greatest achievements for peace that has ever been registered in the history of this world." In Parliament temperate criticism came from Laborite opposition and conservative dissidents: to the former the Washington

treaties did not go far enough; to the latter they contained a prodigious national sacrifice. To Laborites' complaints that the negotiations dealt only with the "arithmetic of peace," Lloyd George retorted that "all peaces resolve themselves into arithmetic as to how many ships, what tonnage, how many guns and what men." But "the arithmetic therefore means reducing the dynamics of war, and that is done."³⁵

A few Conservatives objected to granting naval equality to the United States. The M.P. from Devonport decried the "great loss of prestige" which accompanied the naval pact, and Churchill labelled the renouncing of supremacy "a sacrifice, prodigious and formidable, and from many points of view questionable." It would be unthinkable for Great Britain to make greater concessions at future conference and accept inferiority, Churchill warned; Great Britain had its imperial obligations.³⁶

On July 20, royal assent was extended to the treaties and the government was vested with the legal powers to fulfill its treaty requirements. Penalties were established for building warships without permission, for arming merchant vessels in peacetime, or for violating restrictions governing noncombatants and neutrals.

The only lingering controversy to attend the Washington treaties in British politics stemmed from the failure of the United States to extend separate invitations to the self-governing Dominions. Throughout the Empire status-conscious officials found their representation within Great Britain's enlarged delegation unacceptable. Sir John Salmond of New Zealand complained that while they could participate in the negotiations they "never voted separately on behalf of their own Dominions on any question."³⁷

Ratification in Japanese Politics. Prime Minister Takahashi endorsed the Washington agreements as the beginning of lasting peace in the Pacific and urged their prompt ratification. Prince Tokugawa also lauded the treaties as worth whatever sacrifice that might be required for they had inaugurated a dramatic improvement in Japanese-American relations.³⁸ Nevertheless the Japanese government encountered more opposition during ratification, despite an apparently optimistic popular opinion, than did the governments of the United States and Great Britain.

Although ratification fell within executive decision, the Washington treaties attracted partisan discussion in the Diet. Debate here centered around two major issues: 1) the reduction of naval armaments, and 2) the replacing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with the Four Power Pact. Most noticeable, according to Tatsuji Takeuchi, was the lack of debate on the China question. Opposition party leaders lost little opportunity in challenging the government party, Seiyukai, for its inconsistencies. On January 24, 1922 the Seiyukai cabinet was asked why it now supported military and naval limitation when the previous year it opposed the Ozaki resolution. Foreign Minister Count Uchida denied the government ever opposed a limitation of naval vessels. Three weeks later an effort was made to embarrass the government by a resolution condemning the government's failure to explain its actions to the people. This maneuver failed.³⁹

Finally, the Kenseikai party challenged the government's willingness to compromise during the conference. On March 16, they introduced a resolution of want of confidence, denouncing the cabinet's retreat from its original instructions to the delegation. Refusing to be swayed, the government majority argued that the conference, because of the compromises, was a success. The resolution was defeated 254 to 141.⁴⁰ On August 5, 1922 the Prince Regent, acting with the favorable recommendations of the Privy Council, completed ratification of the treaties. They were promulgated twelve days later.

For Tokyo the 1920's were to become known as the Shidehara era--a decade during which the Japanese government premised its diplomacy upon conciliatory policies. While the Washington treaties increased mutual regard, United States-Japanes relations grew in amiability with America's generous aid to Tokyo earthquake victims in 1923. Unfortunately, two factors detracted from this friendly climate--the Immigration Act of 1924 and the rise of "jingoism" in Japan.

Ratification in French and Italian Politics. France and Italy were linked in the Washington naval treaty by the logic of French foreign policy and by French national prestige. And it was the latter which caused the ratification struggle in Paris to be contested. For the first time, as one anguished Deputy put it, France had been represented by the

head of state and yet had not been permitted to discuss French security issues as an equal.

These points were enmeshed in French politics. Premier Briand lost his office in January 1922 partly because of his concession on capital ships--which may account for his later wariness of Coolidge's proposal for new naval negotiations. The position of Raymond Poincaré's ministry was therefore most delicate as he had been Briand's foremost critic.⁴¹ He did not consequently, press for prompt ratification of the treaties.

Vocal opposition in the press and the Chamber lessened the prospects of the naval pact and the Four Power agreement when they were submitted to the Chamber on May 30, 1922. The Committee on Foreign Affairs kept the treaties so long that it appeared that they might never come before the Chamber. In contention were two considerations: first, the matter of the naval "ratios" in the Five Power pact and the indignities that they implied, and second, the lack of guarantees in the Four Power treaty for the integrity of Indo-China. The first issue was by far the more crucial, for pairing off France with Italy in the capital ship ratio implied the "loss of control" in the Mediterranean. French anger fell not on Italy, but on Britain who was accused of engineering the arrangement. When the new government of Benito Mussolini ratified the naval treaty in January, 1923, this action received a generally neutral reception in the Paris press.

Poincaré intervened in June 1923, a year after the treaties were submitted to the Chamber. The Premier, alarmed at the prospect of reservations being attached by the Committee, took direction of the ratification procedure. At stake was executive prerogative in foreign affairs, an area of power that Poincaré did not intend to allow the Chamber to usurp. He offered a single reservation--that the capital ship ratio not apply to auxiliary warships--and succeeded in gaining ratification of the Five Power Naval Treaty on July 7, 1923 by a vote of 411 to 96.⁴²

The Four Power Treaty had been recommended for ratification on January 22, 1923, with two conditions: 1) that the 1907 Franco-Japanese pact, respecting the independence of China and establishing equal commercial treatment, not be affected by the new accord; and 2) that the United States Senate's amendment be endorsed and that France likewise incur

no military obligations. Poincaré sidestepped both proposals by raising the Pacific agreement as a question of confidence on July 9, 1923; the Four Power Treaty was accepted by a vote of 437 to 0. The Senate acted favorably on July 11 and both accords were promulgated.

Not until August 5, 1925--when a long deadlock with China over the Boxer indemnity had been resolved--was the Nine Power Treaty ratified. The treaty pertaining to submarine and gas warfare was never brought to a vote.

The Military Verdict

Professional naval opinion among the signatory nations unanimously condemned the Five Power Naval Treaty. Almost as one, these naval officers concluded that their nation's interests, honor or military security had been sacrificed by politicians in quest of a popular delusion--peace through disarmament. To the Americans, it appeared that both the British and Japanese had strengthened themselves, particularly the Japanese, at United States expense. British and Japanese naval officers were convinced that only the Americans had left the conference with everything they desired. In addition the Japanese professional protested the inferior ratio.

American Naval Views. American officers viewed Articles IV, VII (establishing the 5-5-3 ratios), and XIX (non-fortification) as affecting the navy's ability to carry out its mission. While treaty ratios governed capital ships, these professionals recognized--as the general public often did not--that the American navy fell far below these ratios in the unlimited, lighter classes of warships. (See tables on the following pages.)

Failure to distinguish between the limited and unlimited classes led to differing interpretations of the treaty. American pacifists believed that, while the letter of the treaty limited only heavier vessels, its spirit dictated the ratio be applied to all classes. Further, they anticipated "big-navy" supporters' use of the same thesis: the United States must build to these ratios in all classes. Hence the pacifists argued that the treaty ratios constituted maximum goals. This restrictive interpretation was reflected in the initial discussions of the House Naval Affairs Committee to plan the 1923 naval program. The committee emphasized Congress' determination to cut military expenditures; therefore,

Cruiser Strengths, 1923-1930

	1923				1924				1925				1926				1927				1928				1929				1930							
	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.	Lt.	Hvy.						
British Empire																																				
Pre-1922	42	4 ^a	42	4 ^a	42	2 ^a	42	2 ^a	38	2 ^a	37	2 ^a	35	2 ^a	35	2 ^a	37	2 ^a	35	2 ^a																
Post-1922 (Built)	4	--	4	--	4	--	4	--	1 ^a	1 ^a	1 ^a	2 ^a	6	2 ^a	6	3 ^a	8	3 ^a																		
(Building)	2	2	2	2	2	2	6	--	6	--	6	--	14	--	14	2	6	4	1	6	4	1	6	4	1	6	4	1	6	4	1					
(Projected)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9	--	9	--	3	--	3	--	3	--	3	--	3	--	3	--	3	--	3	--				
Total (Built)	46	4	46	4	46	3	43	4	44	4	43	3	43	4	44	4	43	3	43	3	43	3	43	3	43	3	43	3	43	3	43	3				
United States																																				
Pre-1922	9	10	8	10	11	11	11	11	13	9	13	9	13	9	13	9	13	9	13	9	13	9	13	9	13	9	13	9	13	9	13	9				
Post-1922 (Built)	--	--	7 ^b	--	9 ^b	--	10 ^b	--																												
(Building)	3 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--	1 ^b	--				
(Projected)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9 ^c	--	8 ^c	--	8 ^c	--	8 ^c	--	13 ^c	--	25 ^c	--	5	--	5	--	5	--	5	--	5	--	5	--	5	--	5	--
Total (Built)	9	10	15	10	20	11	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9	23	9				
Japan																																				
Pre-1922	12	8	12	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8	13	8				
Post-1922 (Built)	3	--	5	--	7	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--	10	--		
(Building)	6	2 ^d	4	2 ^d	3	6 ^d	--	8 ^d	--	6 ^d	--																									
(Projected)	--	6 ^d	--	6 ^d	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Total (Built)	15	8	17	8	20	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8	23	8				

Source: Great Britain, Admiralty: "Fleets--The British Empire and Foreign Countries," Accounts and Papers (for the various years, 1923-1930). London: H.M.S.O., 1923-1930.

a Improved Birmingham types:

(pre-1922)	Hawkins	9,800 tons	7.5 inch guns
(pre-1922)	Vindictive	9,996 tons	7.5 inch guns
(1925)	Frobisher	9,860 tons	7.5 inch guns
(1926)	Effingham	9,770 tons	7.5 inch guns

b Omaha type 9,000 tons 6 inch guns

c Includes Phoenix and Brooklyn types: 10,000 tons 6 inch guns

(1925)	8 authorized	0 appropriated
(1926)	8 authorized	2 appropriated
(1927)	13 authorized	3 appropriated
(1928)	25 authorized	0 appropriated

d Includes 4 Furutaka class 7,100 tons 8 inch guns

e 8 classed as "coast defense;" or "special service"
(7 heavy cruisers and 1 light cruiser; all pre-1922)

Tables on Naval Strengths, 1922-23

One of the problems of determining naval strengths is the incompatibility of statistics. While the three tables below demonstrate the nature of this dilemma, the basic contentions of American naval officers regarding modern cruisers appear to have been justified.

I. Current Naval Strengths, 1923

	<u>Modern Cruisers*</u>	<u>Old Cruisers*</u>	<u>Destroyers</u>	<u>Submarines</u>
United States	0/ 0	11/11	295	125
British Empire	2/29	0/11	193	65
Japan	2/15	5/ 5	98	57

* Defined as : Heavy cruisers (8-inch guns)/Light cruisers (less than 8-inch tuns)

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1923, pp. 401 ff.

II. Current Naval Strengths, August, 1922

	<u>Cruisers 1st line*</u>	<u>Cruisers 2nd line*</u>	<u>Destroyers</u>	<u>Submarines</u>
United States	0/ 0	11/12	313	88
British Empire	6/45	4/15	208	96
Japan	0/14	6/ 4	67	33

* Defined as: Cruisers/Light Cruisers

Source: United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
"Professional Notes," Vol. 48 (Aug. 1922), p. 1411.

III. Current Naval Strengths, January, 1923

	<u>Cruisers*</u> <u>(Heavy)</u>	<u>Cruisers</u> <u>(Light)</u>	<u>Destroyers</u>	<u>Submarines</u>
United States	0/10	0/9	309	104
British Empire	2/ 0**	40/8	202	66
Japan	0/ 0	11/4	78	40

* Defined as: modern (i.e., post-1914)/old (i.e., pre-1914)

** Heavy cruisers Courageous and Glorious at 18,600 tons,
mounting four 15-inch guns and eighteen 4-inch guns.

Source: G.B. Parliament. Admiralty. "Fleets--The British Empire and Foreign Countries," Accounts and Papers, (Vol. XV /1923/, 67). 1923.

it held that the ratios were maximum levels. The United States, in their view, had no obligation to build to treaty strength.⁴³

Naval officers challenged these popular interpretations of the ratio system as illusions. Rear Admiral B.A. Fiske strove to demonstrate that "parity" with Great Britain was largely fiction because it referred only to capital ships. He pointed to Britain's larger cruiser force, to its more numerous and superior personnel, and to the submarine protocol which would decidedly benefit England and impede America in any armed conflict.⁴⁴ Other naval officers sought, often without much success, to emphasize that capital ship tonnage comprised only one index of sea power. It was imperative, they argued, that component parts of the fleets and support facilities also be measured.

More disturbing to American naval officers than the ratio issue was the restriction (Article XIX) against developing and fortifying the Pacific possessions. This abnegation they believed not only unnecessary, but crippling. Captain Dudley W. Knox, a severe critic of the Washington treaties, charged that the "sacrifice we have made respecting Western Pacific Bases" incurs "the difficulties of the long journey for our fleet to the Orient and of maintaining a large navy force there operating actively" while reducing American reserves in home waters "to a decided inferiority." As Britain and Japan possessed bases in the Far East while the United States was now denied them, Knox concluded that "we no longer possess the power to defend the Philippines or to support any other American Far Eastern Policy."⁴⁵ The United States Naval Institute, a body with membership limited primarily to military officers, in its Proceedings echoed Knox's criticisms in subsequent articles condemning the Five Power Treaty and particularly Article XIX. These articles pessimistically insisted that Japan had gained at America's expense.⁴⁶ Senior officers believed that if Guam could not be fortified, then the United States had to keep the Philippines, even in their underfortified state, to stem "inevitable" Japanese ambitions in the south Pacific.⁴⁷ Hence, during the interwar decades, these professionals opposed granting Philippine independence.

Defenders of the Washington treaties in the American naval establishment were few. Principally the task fell to Captain (later Admiral) William V. Pratt who had served as a naval adviser to Hughes.⁴⁸ He counted three areas in

which the treaty benefited the United States: 1) a naval policy had been established with the ratio system; 2) with the limitation on capital ships an opportunity existed for a balanced fleet; and 3) the strain on national resources had been lessened by terminating naval competition. Pratt discounted claims that the non-fortification clause greatly diminished American power; he believed that, whatever the disadvantages, they were "probably more than offset by the good-will resulting from the concessions made by all three nations."⁴⁹ He reminded his critics that Japan had also agreed to leave its island frontier unfortified. He thought the sacrifices made were acceptable, in the broader view, if the limitations were soon extended to all classes of warships. Yet he warned against delusion concerning the agreements: "until that time arrives when the ideals for which our country stands are world ideals, until international friction ceases, until moral suasion is its own sanction and law is self-enforcing, this country can no more afford to allow its gray guardians of the peace to disintegrate as did its stately clipper ships, than can a great city afford to give up its guardians of the law."⁵⁰ To Pratt the agreements, while not ushering in the millenium, were sound.

The fortifications agreement (Article XIX) was defended privately by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. He noted in his diary on January 29 and 30, 1922, that this pledge "leaves us, in my opinion, in a slightly better position than Japan. We trade certain fortifications which we would never have completed, for fortifications which they /the Japanese/ would have unquestionably completed. We retain one outpost in the Pacific of great importance and they give up all but their mainland."⁵¹

The Washington treaties, particularly the nonfortification pledge, created a wedge between America's naval officers and diplomats. This division hindered formulation of both naval and foreign policies down to 1938 when the treaty restrictions ceased. If naval spokesmen generally opposed the Five Power naval pact, diplomatic officials assumed the disarmament arrangements were mutually advantageous to all signatories. "The conference was the complete negation of naval policy," Elihu Root recalled with satisfaction. "The basic governmental policy so far as the Pacific was concerned was to maintain friendly relations with Japan." And, he argued, the object of the conference was "to make that governmental policy our naval policy." To Root, who had become acquainted with the Far East as both Secretary of War

and State, force could not keep the door open in East Asia. He concluded that the Japanese government understood enough about American public opinion to know that it would not sanction the use of military forces to protect the "open door" policy and the integrity of China. Thus, the elder statesman held that the surrender of American fortification rights was more apparent than real.⁵²

The belief that Article XIX was unnecessary to achieve naval limitation may be questioned. Japanese naval officers feared large, well-fortified bases on their side of the Pacific. They realized, as a British professional journal noted, that "so long as such bases were non-existent /they/ would have little fear from attack, even by a would-be aggressor whose combined naval resources were far superior to /their/ own."⁵³ One achievement of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 had been the removal of a large Russian fleet from Asia and the establishment of Japanese supremacy in the Sea of Japan and its adjacent waters. When the United States appeared disposed to develop naval bases in the Philippines and Ladrone Japanese officers, although saying little publicly, were, according to a British naval spokesman,

gravely perturbed at the prospect of having as it were, the United States navy brought to within easy reach of /their/ coasts, a development calculated to threaten local command of the sea which /they have/ always regarded as something to be maintained at all costs. While it might be too much to affirm that the execution of the American fortification scheme would have been regarded by Japan as a casus belli, it was very widely believed in the Far East that war between the two countries would have become simply a matter of time if the Americans had persisted in their plan.

Although American officers discounted Japan's desire for the nonfortification pledge, some professional observers felt that "Without some clause relating to these Pacific fortifications the Washington naval agreement would have been practically valueless as a safeguard against war, and, in fact, would probably not have been negotiated at all."⁵⁴

By 1921 leading Navy (and Army) planners accepted the premise that Japan was America's most probable national enemy.⁵⁵ The General Board concluded that Japan's foreign policy centered about three principle objectives: 1) territorial aggrandizement, to be accomplished peacefully if

possible, but by military means if necessary; 2) economic and commercial pre-eminence in Asia; and 3) eventual political domination of the Orient. Given these assumptions, American military analysts believed that United States traditional policies and goals in the Far East would clash with Japanese ambitions. To the navy only a preponderance of American sea power in the western Pacific could deter Japan, uphold the "Open Door", and protect the Philippines.

American professionals assumed that Japan's willingness to forego fortifying its outlying bases did not represent a sacrifice equal to that accepted by the United States. From the standpoint of naval strategy, time and distance were serious considerations. Long before the United States Navy would be able to reach Asiatic waters, Japan could overwhelm the weakly defended American bases in the Pacific and utilize them, together with its own insular possessions, to oppose an invading fleet. Lacking bases, and with naval aircraft still experimental, these professionals ruled out an assault on Japan unless the attacking fleet entered the western Pacific with forces at least twice as strong as the Japanese.⁵⁶

At the vortex of this dispute between sailors and diplomats lay the Philippines: what was the nature of America's commitment there and how would it be met? The defeat of Germany and the upheaval in Russia during World War I had altered the Far Eastern power structure and complicated severely the defense of the Philippines. While Japan's mandated islands, astride the United States Navy's line of communications, became a complication, this by no means explained the dilemma. Nor did the American public's desire for disarmament complete the problem. At the root of this situation lay the fact that an American fleet, with fortified support installations powerful enough to guarantee the security of the Philippines, would pose a threat to Japan's security. Conversely, a Japanese fleet sufficient to guarantee the inviolability of the Japanese homeland would be powerful enough to render defense of the Philippines impossible or, at best, extremely doubtful.⁵⁷ The United States could either nurture naval limitation or develop its capability to defend the Philippines; it could hardly expect to accomplish both. Consequently, the navy argued that the United States should back its Far Eastern policies by military force regardless of the political strains and naval competition it might produce. The State Department took the

view that the nation's interests in the Pacific were best served by political arrangements which lessened tensions even if it meant, by implication, leaving the Philippines as a hostage to Japanese-American cordiality.

British Naval Views. British naval professionals opposed the naval treaty on two counts: first, it had given the United States too much via parity in capital ships; and second, it had left the size of cruisers too large. The most widely-publicized objection on the first count came from Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wester-Wemyss, former First Sea Lord and America's antagonist at the so-called "Naval Battle of Paris." Wester-Wemyss in his polemical essay lamented Britain's voluntary resignation from its traditional position of naval supremacy. This act of renunciation was unparalleled in history. Whatever justification for such action, he regretted that England's voice would "no longer carry the same weight" in councils of nations. With this loss of authority went a corresponding loss of prestige; thus Britain had won the late sea war only to lose it at the conference. Most difficult for Wester-Wemyss was why America wanted a navy equal to Britain's, other than for prestige. He did not believe America's naval requirements warranted parity.

In the Far East, Wester-Wemyss saw the naval agreements as a "check to Japan's rising naval power." He had doubts whether the treaties would be sustained if events proved Japan's limited navy insufficient for national defense. He foresaw the disintegration of China into an "intolerable state" making foreign intervention inevitable; if intervention became necessary in China, Japan was the country "to which, by racial propinquity and geological position, the task would seem naturally to fall."

In contrast to Great Britain, France, and Japan, the Americans had

emerged from the Conference conscious of having gained the substance of all they desired. They have rid themselves of a vast and ruinous ship-building program without giving up the object for which it was projected; they have secured a general ratio of naval strength which leaves them free from anxiety in all quarters; and they have obtained an equality with the first naval power with a minimum of effort.⁵⁸

The second objection came from Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond who believed that Britain was being pushed into building the wrong type of cruisers for its purposes. Instead of the 10,000 ton limit in the Five Power Naval pact, he argued that the most reasonable limit would be 6,000-7,000 tons.⁵⁹ These objections were not, of course, shared by all naval spokesmen. Admiral Chatfield, who had been in Washington, reported that "the Navy felt we might well have done worse...We had successfully resisted efforts...to limit our cruiser and destroyer numbers, and had gained the right to rebuild ships against air and submarine attack."⁶⁰

If not unanimous in opposition to the naval pact, British officers appeared skeptical of the agreement and many were openly antagonistic.

Japanese Naval Views. Japanese naval officers believed that the Naval Treaty provided the American and British navies with an offensive capability, while it failed to leave the remaining three powers with adequate defense forces. Lieutenant-Commander T. Ishimaru insisted that, from the standpoint of national defense, Japan incurred liabilities in the Naval Treaty. First, due to an unjust capital ship ratio Japan lacked security in the western Pacific. Second, Japan suffered a disadvantage because American ships were superior to Japanese vessels. Third, the Four Power Pact forced Japan to sacrifice the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This Japanese naval officer believed as did Admiral Wester-Wemyss that the principal objective of the conference, after the surrender of British naval supremacy, was the desire to check Japan's rising naval power.⁶¹

That the Japanese naval establishment did not react more negatively to the Washington treaties lay in the willingness of Navy Minister Kato to accept their results. Where this willingness stemmed is difficult to ascertain: it may have been personal identification as delegate to the conference. While the treaties awaited ratification in Tokyo, Admiral Kato called together the leading officers of the navy general staff and navy department for discussion of the treaties. For seven hours on the afternoon of April 6, 1922 Kato explained, in detail, the political and technical nature of the agreements. Apparently after this exchange of views he gained approval from his navy colleagues of his actions in Washington and thus, at least temporarily, forestalled a service-wide outcry of disappointment and condemnation. It is Takeuchi's

opinion that "the fact that Admiral Kato, the 'father of the modern navy of Japan,' had taken personal charge of the negotiations at Washington, while maintaining the strict discipline of the 'Big Navy' camp at the conference and at Tokyo, contributed no small part toward this early ratification of the Washington treaties."⁶²

Chapter 14 - Footnotes

¹ Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (1922), pp. 228, 248.

² Ibid., pp. 362-68. American statesmen shared this view of interrelation. In its presentation of the treaties to the Senate, the administration emphasized that treaties, resolutions, and declarations of the conference constituted "a whole." Each comprised "in combination with the others towards the establishment of conditions in which peaceful security will take the place of competitive preparation for war." Senate, Report of the American Delegation, Doc. #125, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1922), pp. 87-88. Later Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, in his open letter of February 27, 1932, to Senator Borah held: "No one of these [Washington] treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety." F.R., Japan, 1931-1941, I, 83-87.

³ C.L.A., pp. 274, 380.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 248-58.

⁵ Sprout, Toward A New Order, p. 267; Thomas H. Buckley, "The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-22," p. 269; Hoag, Preface to Preparedness, p. 142.

⁶ Literary Digest, Apr. 8, 1922.

⁷ "Unlike America, France Unwilling to be Shoved into Doormat Class," New York American, Dec. 27, 1921.

⁸ Sprouts, Toward a New Order, p. 268. The only subject other than armaments to command much public discussion was Article XIX pertaining to non-fortification. The New York Tribune and the Indiana Star argued that Guam ought to be fortified; while the Chicago Tribune opposed the decision regarding Guam and the Philippines. Quoted in Hoag, Preface to Preparedness, pp. 145-46.

⁹ Hoag, Preface to Preparedness, pp. 89-160.

10 Ibid., p. 151; Sprouts, Toward A New Order, p. 269.

11 Sprouts, Toward A New Order, p. 259.

12 Manchester Guardian, Feb. 2, 1922; Archibald Hurd, "The British Fleet 'Dips Its Ensign,'" Fortnightly Review, Vol. 117 (Mar. 1922); Outlook, Dec. 23, 1922; Saturday Review, Vol. 133 (Feb. 11, 1922), p. 137; C. H. Douglas, "The World After Washington," English Review, Vol. 34 (Mar. 1922).

13 Donald S. Birn, "Britain and France at the Washington Conference, 1921-1922," pp. 85, 187-88, 245.

14 Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (1935), p. 236; also Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After: p. 146.

15 Toyokichi Iyenaga, "How Japan Views the Arms Conference," Current History, Vol. 16 (Apr., 1922), pp. 22-25.

16 Ibid.

17 Literary Digest, Jan. 28, 1922. p. 17.

18 The Naval and Military Record and Dockyards Gazette (April 12, 1922), in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 48 (May, 1922), pp. 1023-24.

19 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 235.

20 Birn, "Britain and France at the Washington Conference," deals extensively with French reactions, pp. 247-59. This section is based on his study.

21 New York Times, Mar. 25, 1923.

22 René Albrecht-Carrié, Italy: From Napoleon to Mussolini (1950), p. 135.

23 Senate Document, #125, pp. 88-89.

24 Leading opponents were Democratic Senators Reed of Missouri and Robinson of Arkansas, and Republicans Johnson of California, Borah of Idaho, and LaFollette of Wisconsin.

25 Sprout, Toward A New Order, pp. 270-73.

26 Ibid., pp. 274-75; Cong. Rec., 67th Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. 62, pp. 4708-09.

27 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (1948), I, 117.

28 New York Times, July 10, 1924.

29 Ibid., Oct. 5, 21, 24, 1924.

30 Ibid., Oct. 24, 28, 1924.

31 Norman H. Davis, "American Foreign Policy: A Democratic View," Foreign Affairs, (July-Sept., 1924), pp. 27-28.

32 Daniels, The Wilson Era, p. 583.

33 Quoted in William L. Neumann, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Japan, 1913-1933," Pacific Historical Review (May, 1953) pp. 147-48. FDR's views appeared in his essay, "Shall We Trust Japan?" Asia, (July, 1923).

34 Ibid., pp. 149-50.

35 G.B., H.C. Debs., Feb. 7, 1922, c. 5, 40, 150.

36 Birn, "Britain and France at the Washington Conference," p. 243.

37 Ibid., pp. 279-81.

38 Sprout, Toward A New Order, p. 258.

39 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 234-36.

40 Ibid.

41 Poincaré berated Briand in the Chamber of Deputies for returning from Washington with an "empty satchel." Raymond Poincaré, Histoire Politique: Chroniques de Quinzaine, (1922), IV, 145.

42 "The French Government considers and always has considered that the ratios of total tonnage in capital ships and aircraft carriers allowed to the several Contracting Powers do not represent the respective importance of the maritime interests of those Powers and cannot be extended to the

categories of vessels other than those for which they were expressly stipulated."

43 Hoag, Preface to Preparedness, pp. 164, 170.

44 Admiral A.B. Fiske, "The Strongest Navy," Current History, (July, 1920), pp. 557ff. Admiral Henry A. Wiley always believed it was impossible to achieve parity with Britain under the terms of the Limitation agreement before 1945, but the treaty, he observed, "expires in 1936." He felt America had "gained the principle of parity with Great Britain, nothing else." It was a good beginning "even though much to our disadvantage." Wiley believed that had the treaty restricted all types of ships in the same ratio of 5:5:3, "it would have been less unsatisfactory and would have saved much effort on our part afterward and much expense, and some bitter feeling." An Admiral From Texas (1934), p. 316.

45 Captain Dudley W. Knox, Eclipse of American Sea Power (1922), pp. 135-36. This slim volume became a handbook for opponents of naval limitation agreements.

46 Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, pp. 57-58. Other writers, of course, did emphasize this same theme. "Japan has absolutely a free hand in the Pacific and Asia today. We have given it to her in the Arms Conference treaties." G. Schornsthemer, "Japan's Naval Mastery in Asia," Current History (Aug., 1922), pp. 744-50. "...unlike Great Britain and Japan, the United States had abdicated the right to exercise potential control over important possessions and important interests...Japan has struggled long for domination in the Far East and now, through diplomacy backed by her powerful navy, she has achieved her ambition." Commander C.C. Gill, U.S.N., "The New Far East Doctrine," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, (Sep., 1922), p. 1485.

47 This thesis was apparently developed from William Howard Gardiner's essay, "The Philippines and Sea Power," North American Review (Aug., 1922); see Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, p. 59, fn. #23.

48 Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Published a defense of the agreements in the Ladies Home Journal (Apr., 1922); but it was Pratt who provided the most authoritative arguments in favor of the treaties. See his

"Some Considerations Affecting Naval Policy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Nov., 1922); "The Case for the Naval Treaty," Current History (Apr., 1923); and "Naval Policy and the Naval Treaty," North American Review (May, 1922).

49 Current History (April, 1923), pp. 1-5.

50 North American Review (May, 1922), p. 599.

51 Quoted in Pusey, Hughes, II, 487.

52 Jessup, Root, II, p. 452. Pusey charges that "After Hughes left office...Secretary Kellogg let the United States drift into outright championship of China against Japan, even when China reneged on her treaty obligations...These deviations from the Hughesian policy of cooperation and even handed justice necessarily weakened the liberal elements in Japan." Hughes, II, p. 517.

53 The Naval and Military Record and Royal Dockyards Gazette (Apr. 19, 1922) as quoted in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings (May, 1922), p. 1025.

54 Ibid.

55 Wheeler, "The United States Navy and the Japanese Enemy: 1919-1931," Military Affairs, (Summer, 1957), pp. 61-74; also the U.S. Army's Joint Planning Committee's statement, Dec. 3, 1921, quoted in Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (1962), p. 27.

56 Knox, Eclipse of American Sea Power, pp. 53ff.

57 Gordon C. O'Garn, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern Navy (1943), pp. 5-6.

58 Lord Wester-Wemyss, "And After Washington," The Nineteenth Century and After (March, 1922), pp. 405-416.

59 Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond, Economy and Naval Security (1931), pp. 150ff.

60 Lord Chatfield, The Navy and Defense (1942), p. 197.

61 T. Ishimaru, "Why Not Insist Upon a More Logical Plan

"for Limiting Naval Armaments?" Taiyo (Ja., 1922) quoted in Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After, pp. 143-45.

62 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 237-38.

Chapter 15

THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY, 1930

The London Conference, January 21 to April 22, 1930, extended the limitation principles of the Washington naval treaty to auxiliary warships. The Naval Treaty of 1930 brought about: 1) quantitative limitation of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines; 2) postponement of capital ship replacement construction; 3) qualitative restrictions on submarines; and 4) rules governing submarine warfare. Failure at London to accommodate Franco-Italian differences, as had been done at Washington in 1922 for the Far East, restricted application of the agreement--as it affected auxiliaries--to the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Nonetheless this agreement constitutes a singular landmark in that for the only time in history, from 1931 to 1936, the navies of the world's three largest navies were brought under comprehensive limitation.

Efforts to extend the Washington treaty limitations formula to auxiliary warships involved diplomats of the major seapowers in deliberations from 1927 to 1930. Thus, the negotiations of the London naval pact span a period of three years and fall into four essential phases. First, the ill-fated Geneva Conference of 1927 opened formal discussions on the limitation of auxiliaries. Disagreement arose here over American efforts to extend the Washington ratios; a dispute that stemmed in part from the use of naval officers in the American and British delegations as chief policymakers. Second, President Hoover provided the impetus for the London negotiations when, in 1929, he invoked the "spirit" of the Lellogg-Briand pact to align Anglo-American interests. However, during the preliminary talks that followed it was evident that Japan, France and Italy would not rubber-stamp any Big Two formula. Third,

the tedious deliberations in London during 1930 joined over the issues of ratios. Britain established the minimum limits while America and Japan sought to improve their relative position through naval reductions. Fourth, the London treaty provided for, finally, only a tripartite agreement: France and Italy did not come into the basic accord because the Anglo-Americans were unwilling to extend to the French a political guarantee of security. Hoover used the Kellogg-Briand pact as a bridge to London but he would not employ it as a toll road to Paris.

The Geneva Conference, 1927

At Geneva in 1927 the United States, Great Britain and Japan attempted unsuccessfully to end naval competition among the building of auxiliary warships.¹ From the failure that attended these efforts, two important factors emerged. First, a simple extension of the Washington formula was found wanting. Tonnage allotments based on the 10-10-6 ratio left unresolved questions concerning strategic requirements, numbers of ships with each quota, and the size and armament of individual units. Second, the Geneva conclave found the naval officers emerging as chief policy-makers. This deviation from the Washington meeting called attention to the contest between the political officials and the technical experts.

A new phase of naval competition began after the Washington treaty in its unrestricted categories. Of the auxiliary construction, the cruiser caused the gravest anxiety, particularly the 10,000-ton vessel, armed with 8-inch guns. From 1924 to 1927, Japan and Great Britain set the pace by building substantial numbers of these warships, while the United States lagged behind. President Coolidge hoped to redress the growing disparity with a new treaty. Formal invitations were delivered in Tokyo, Rome, Paris, and London on February 10, 1927. Although the British and Japanese agreed to meet in Geneva to discuss naval limitation, the French and Italians declined. The French objected to any action which would interfere with the Preparatory Commission, while the Italians would not agree to any limitation which failed to recognize parity with France.²

The Cruiser Issue. The policies of the three powers clashed almost from the opening meeting on June 20, 1927. The American delegation urged a strict application of the

Washington ratios to auxiliary ships, the British sought to interpret their need independent of the "mathematical" ratios, and the Japanese pressed for a higher ratio. The American program aimed at establishing a low maximum cruiser tonnage, parity with Britain, and a 5-3 ratio for Japan. The proposal had several advantages for the United States: it would stop all foreign construction, allow the United States to catch up, and lessen Japan's naval strength.³ Consequently, American negotiators suggested the following tonnage allocations:⁴

<u>Cruiser Class</u>	<u>Total Tonnage Limitation</u>
United States	250,000 to 300,000
Great Britain	250,000 to 300,000
Japan	150,000 to 180,000
<u>Destroyer Class</u>	
United States	200,000 to 250,000
Great Britain	200,000 to 250,000
Japan	120,000 to 150,000
<u>Submarine Class</u>	
United States	60,000 to 90,000
Great Britain	60,000 to 90,000
Japan	36,000 to 54,000

The British program initially applied the existing 5-5-3 ratio for 10,000-ton cruisers mounting 8-inch guns and a limitation of 7,500 tons and 6-inch guns on all other future cruisers. The Admiralty recommended, undoubtedly with an eye toward Franco-Italian relations, an "escape clause" to meet possible competitive building by continental powers.⁵ As for total cruiser tonnage, the British Navy wanted fifteen 10,000-ton, 8-inch-gun cruisers and fifty-five cruisers with 6-inch guns having a maximum displacement of 7,500 tons. The Americans were aghast to discover that the British were demanding a total cruiser tonnage of over 570,000 tons.

If Japan's position developed slowly, it ultimately focused on a ratio of 10-7. Viscount Kikujaro Ishii declared that: "Whether justified or not, there existed in Japan a widespread feeling that the ratio of the Washington treaty imposed a position of inferiority on that country,

and that if the figure could be slightly modified in a favorable sense, 3.5 /i.e., 10-7/ for instance, although 4 /i.e., 10-8/ would be preferred, it would be of the greatest value." The high auxiliary figures of the British caused the Japanese concern. They urged that the minimum figure proposed by the United States be adopted and that, with 450,000 tons for the Americans and British, they be allowed surface auxiliaries somewhat above 300,000 tons. In addition, the Japanese delegation desired an allotment of 70,000 tons of submarines. Ishii declared that "the Japanese delegation had come to Geneva to lower naval armaments, and not to increase them."⁶

However as the Conference progressed, the negotiations developed into a headlong Anglo-American confrontation fed by differences over cruiser tonnage. The incompatibility of these two opposing programs stemmed from differing concepts of "naval equality" and strategic needs. The Americans held that naval prerequisites were relative, that is, that the number of warships required by each navy depended upon the number of ships maintained by all other fleets. Thus the American position was predicated on a mathematical equality. The British, on the other hand, compressed their requirements into an "irreducible minimum" which they contended constituted "strategic equality." Translated into tonnage and numbers of ships, the British were demanding 70 cruisers totaling 600,000 tons. The British further desired that the bulk of these cruisers be "light" vessels of 6,000 to 7,000 tons, as they wished to limit Japan to ten 10,000-ton warships. The Americans sought twenty-five heavy cruisers within an overall limit of 400,000 tons, the ratio system, and Anglo-American parity. The bulk of the Geneva negotiations centered on the unsuccessful efforts to reconcile these programs.

After four weeks of wrangling, on August 4, 1927, the diplomats and the Admirals left Geneva--the first group despondent, the latter cheerful. The diplomats were discouraged because their failure cast a deepening gloom over Anglo-American relations and accented the difficulties that lay ahead in disarmament talks; but the Admirals, at least the British and American officers, journeyed home satisfied that national honor and interests had been maintained.

Evaluation of a Failure. Speculation immediately began over the nature of the failure at Geneva. These evaluations, both contemporary and historical, have turned on the

dominating role of naval technicians. The structure of the conference, as it emerged in the first few days, placed great emphasis upon the technical subcommittees. Where at Washington Secretary Hughes had utilized the technical subcommittees as advisors and had maintained them in a subordinate role, at Geneva they dominated the political discussion. This may in part stem from the fact that Admiral Hilary P. Jones (USN) served as a co-delegate and that W. C. Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty, held a similar position within the British delegation. There seems to have been no one of sufficient political stature in Geneva to shape discussions as at the Washington conference where Hughes, Balfour, and Kato took charge.

The prominent role of technical advisors deeply disturbed Viscount Cecil who came to believe that the experts should be "always on tap but never on top."⁷ An American observer, Benjamin Williams, concurred with this viewpoint. In summarizing Admiral Jones' role at Geneva, he remarked that the Admiral "was thoroughly familiar with the technical aspects of the subject and entirely honest in his approach, but he viewed the world through a porthole."⁸ More wryly, Lieutenant-Commander Joseph M. Kenworthy noted in the House of Commons: "You might as well call a meeting of bookmakers and jockeys to abolish horse racing." Such criticism would be difficult for the naval officers to accept, and in their defense it should be noted, as Hector C. Bywater observed:

Every naval officer, be he British, American or Japanese, is quite naturally and properly concerned first, last and all the time for the interests of his particular service, which he honestly believes to be inseparable from the interests of his country. And from this viewpoint he is perfectly right. But a point may be reached at which the interests of a particular navy can only be furthered by inviting political reactions detrimental to the national interest. Then is the time for the statesman to grasp the helm, unwelcome as his intervention may be to the naval men.

Ellis has come to the same conclusion: "The two governments and their delegations /American and British/, indeed, maintained equally inflexible positions, so that the Geneva meeting finally floundered on technical differences; and neither power manifested real ability to shift to the political level, from which alone a solution might have emerged."¹⁰

With the American delegation unable to bid for parity without construction, the Coolidge administration was forced to compete for it. The General Board promptly drew up plans for a new construction program, the most ambitious one since Wilson's 1919 proposals. The Coolidge proposals called for the building of fifteen 10,000-ton cruisers and one aircraft carrier at a total cost of \$274,000,000. This measure passed the House in March 1928 by a vote of 287 to 58; but the Senate withheld its endorsement, due to stiff opposition by religious and pacifist groups, until the following session. After heated debate, the Senate on February 5, 1929, ruled affirmatively on construction of fifteen cruisers by a vote of 68 to 12. Attached to the bill was the stipulation that the President should actively encourage the naval limitation program and that, in the event of further agreement, the Chief Executive was authorized to suspend the whole or part of the authorized construction program.¹¹

Preliminary Negotiations, 1929

On entering the White House in March, 1929, Hoover profitably invoked the "spirit" of the recent Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact to renew talks on naval limitation. The new Chief Executive's determination to avoid the pitfalls which plagued Coolidge's 1927 conference led him to undertake extensive preliminary negotiations with British leaders. Although these discussions defined Anglo-American parity in auxiliary warships and narrowed their differences on cruisers, Hoover discovered that France, Italy and Japan were unwilling to fall into step. Despite these reservations, Hoover inaugurated one of the more successful naval limitation conferences of the interwar decades.

The negotiations preparatory to the London conference were important in five essentials. First, Hoover's use of the Peace Pact provided the political tonic needed to rejuvenate Anglo-American naval discussions. Second, mathematical formulas, such as Hoover's suggested "yardstick", proved unequal to solving the question of parity. Third, Anglo-American contention over cruiser parity stemmed from political considerations. The British willingly extended equality, as long as it was pegged to their naval requirements, while the Americans demanded both parity and reduction. Fourth, French objections to dealing with naval armaments, as isolated from general security issues, undercut hopes for another

five power agreement even before the conference began. And fifth, Japan resisted the ratios of the Five Power naval pact (1922) for auxiliary warships throughout these preliminaries and, instead, demanded 70 per cent of Anglo-American parity.

Anglo-American Preliminaries. Moving to inject some "life" into the League's disarmament proceedings at Geneva, Hoover drafted what he liked to call "a bold and unexpected proposal."¹² He began with the marriage of arms limitation and the outlawry of war: not that this was an unnatural union for both concepts sought to diminish the role of force in resolving international disputes. Delivering the President's message to the conferees on April 22, 1929, Ambassador Hugh S. Gibson urged them to adopt the spirit of the Peace Pact. The United States has never believed, he said,

that an effective approach to the problem of disarmament could be made by methods of reduction of armaments alone. It feels that genuine disarmament will follow only from a change of attitude toward the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. It is for that reason I venture to make this appeal that the countries here represented examine the whole problem afresh in the hope that they will find in general world conditions and in the solemn obligations they have taken among themselves a reassurance as to their security and that they will find in this the confidence to enable them to dispense with the armaments which hitherto have seemed so essential.

Turning to naval armaments, Gibson told the delegates that general reduction would be possible only by considering relative needs. To facilitate negotiations, particularly the issues posed by cruisers, he called for a "yardstick" to measure the varying national requirements. "Fundamentally," Gibson continued, "our purpose should be to release large numbers of men from military service to productive effort, and second, to reduce the heavy burden of taxation." America viewed the excuse that political and security conditions demanded increasing naval expenditures as indefensible "in that it can be avoided by a sensible agreement among the naval powers." The United States' position, he added, was that there could be "no complete and effective limitation of armament unless...cruisers, destroyers and submarines are limited." And arms limitation, he pointed out, "has come to be used chiefly in describing

agreements at existing levels or still higher levels, and is generally looked upon as having nothing to do with actual reduction."¹³ On this point he was clear; Hoover wanted reductions.

Hoover realized his desire to rejuvenate the naval limitation discussions. British, Japanese, French, Canadian, and Italian representatives responded with such unusual cordiality that Gibson feared his speech had given rise to "a degree of optimism that may be difficult to sustain."¹⁴ The Geneva conferees, even the proponents of general disarmament, hopefully adjourned on May 6 to await the outcome of this new approach to questions of cruisers and parity.

The future of naval limitation brightened immensely when English statesmen, from the Right and Left, embraced the Hoover-Gibson declaration. Conservatives, while reflecting little enthusiasm for the Peace Pact, eagerly grasped it as a basis for agreement between the two principle naval powers. But it was Labourite Prime Minister J. Ramsey MacDonald, on assuming office in June 1929, who shaped the official response to the American overture. And British Labour leaders shared Hoover's feeling for the Kellogg Pact; they, too, felt it provided a "fresh spirit" and an "unprecedented" opportunity for advancing the cause of disarmament.¹⁵

Determination to avoid a repetition of Coolidge's failure led Hoover to seek a preliminary settlement with the British before convening formal naval talks. General Charles G. Dawes, the newly-appointed Ambassador to London, served as intermediary and pressed Hoover's linking of naval reductions with the Kellogg Pact.¹⁶

As preliminary talks got underway, Hoover found it impossible to deliver the promised "yardstick." This term had caught the imagination of statesmen and citizens alike; to many it became the magical device which would bring the moral force of the Kellogg Pact to bear on the problems of parity and reduction. The general belief spread among both groups that the United States had developed a mathematically precise formula that would bridge the technical difficulties which plagued the 1927 talks. Yet Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson had no "yardstick"; indeed, they must have been amazed that this item had been so overwhelmingly endorsed. Seeking to maintain the initiative, Stimson informed Dawes that:

- 1) The President and I will try to produce such a yardstick which we favor from our naval advisers;
- 2) We will then try to persuade the heads of the governments of Great Britain and Japan to do the same independently with their naval advisers. Each Government will then produce a yardstick from the efforts of their civilian representatives, using the Navy only as advisers.
- 3) Civilian representatives of the Governments will then compare the three yardsticks and attempt to get an agreement upon a common one, the naval experts of all parties acting only as advisers in this attempt at agreement.

Despite the efforts of the Administration and their naval advisors no yardstick ever materialized. Neither the diplomats nor the admirals could devise a formula which would accurately compute the combative values of vessels that differed so widely as, say, the cruiser and the submarine.

This episode over the "yardstick" pointed up two recurring dilemmas: the suspicion of diplomats that the naval chiefs were wont to exceed their proper division of responsibility; and the preoccupation, particularly amongst Americans, with a mathematical approach to armaments. Neither attitude was desirable. The former led to the President adopting an untenable proposal without prior consultation with his naval advisors; while preoccupation with the latter allowed the British to overcome the American initiative and submit the first plan. Even more unfortunate was that, by concentrating on mathematical devices, American diplomats tended to obscure political considerations.¹⁷

By mid-July tentative agreements had been reached on the following points: there should be a postponement of capital ship replacements until 1936; America would scrap sufficient destroyer tonnage to reach parity with Britain; and America would scrap submarine tonnage to reach parity with Britain. However, the United States made it plain that its sacrifices in destroyer and submarine tonnage were predicated on reciprocal cruiser reductions by Great Britain.

Unsurprisingly, the crux of Anglo-American disagreement developed over the issue of parity in cruisers. Washington viewed the situation as follows: the British had 24 heavy cruisers armed with 7.5 or 8-inch guns, built or building,

totaling 231,000 tons and 38 light cruisers, carrying 6-inch guns, amounting to 171,000 tons. This gave the British 402,800 tons in cruisers. America was building ten 10,000 ton, eight-inch-gun cruisers, had 13 more authorized, and possessed 10 small cruisers of 70,500 tons. The total American tonnage approximated 300,000 tons. (This figure does not take into account 22 cruisers, over 21 years of age, which were slated for scrapping.) The United States was anxious to reduce its authorized program but this, Washington said, depended on where parity could be established.

MacDonald seized the initiative on July 29 by handing Dawes Britain's first concrete proposal. This plan would give the British 15 large cruisers to America's 18, but MacDonald demanded that a formula be found which would permit Britain 45 six-inch-gun cruisers. In order to arrive at parity the United States might construct up to 10 small cruisers.¹⁸ To soften his proposal, MacDonald implied that these figures might be modified through subsequent negotiation.

Washington officials were outraged. "Should we accept the program suggested by the Prime Minister we should find that our actual Navy costs instead of falling were rising and should we reach an agreement based on the program suggested by him it would become the laughing stock of those who, in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact, seriously desire disarmament. Taking Washington's admonishment in stride, MacDonald readily perceived the real issue in Anglo-American contention: "At the moment the bulk of your cruiser strength is in a program," he wrote on August 1, "ours is on the water. If you /are to/ have parity you have to build a part of your program." A week later MacDonald reminded Dawes that the British fleet was scattered in various divisions with different functions. Britain required these cruisers because, in addition to defense needs, it was responsible for policing the southern Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister said he was working on a plan which would make the British naval strength in 1936 the standard of parity. If Britain did not replace its overage cruisers during this time, its cruiser strength would be reduced to 15 eight-inch vessels and 34 six-inch vessels by 1936. MacDonald saw little possibility for additional reductions unless Anglo-American efforts could make the world "feel" peace. While he did not deny the spirit of

the Peace Pact, the Prime Minister cautiously limited its influence to London and Washington.¹⁹

Tokyo presented another factor. The British Admiralty, with its security problems in the Southwest Pacific, desired to limit the Japanese fleet to twelve 8-inch-gun cruisers. In a private letter to Dawes on August 30, MacDonald pointed out that at a ratio of 5-5-3.5 (or 10-10-7 which Japan indicated she would insist upon), Japan's authorization would be sixteen, or one more than the British. "If you fixed your 8-inch cruisers at twenty," he continued, "the ratio would mean that Japan could build fourteen. I am perfectly certain that the Dominions would reject any agreement upon that basis." However, if Hoover would settle for eighteen, which would allow Japan 12.6 or thirteen ships, subsequent negotiations might bring the Japanese to accept the desired twelve. Hoover subsequently dropped his heavy cruiser demands to twenty-one, a figure which MacDonald could not lower. Yet during these preconference discussions emerges a tacit Anglo-American understanding that Japan's large cruiser ratio would be held at 60 per cent.²⁰

Rebelling at the thought of building to British levels, Hoover complained that currently the British were to lay down 91,000 tons between 1930 and 1936, while to gain equality the United States would have to construct an additional 145,000 tons. And yet the President apparently realized the impossibility of achieving both reduction in existing American naval strength and parity with Britain. As the American public would accept nothing less than parity, he must strive to end competition and for "what will not only be parity but what will carry to our people a conviction of parity."

"This parity business," MacDonald agreed, "is of Satan himself. I am sure it has struck the President as it has me as being an attempt to clothe unreality in the garb of mathematical reality." Disclaiming any interest in parity, the Prime Minister dramatically announced "I give it to you with both hands heaped and running down." Yet he auctioned that the equality "we are trying to devise is one between you and the rest of the world in relation to the British position in it. If the appearance of parity is to be obtained, neither of us can get away from the fact that standard must be fixed by British needs." While anticipating no major disagreement between the Anglo-Saxon powers, MacDonald added that he was "not justified in making the same assumption" regarding the

rest of the world.²¹

By mid-September these private consultations had reduced the differences between the United States and Great Britain. The preconference negotiations on cruiser parity ended with the British asking for 15 eight-inch cruisers totaling 146,000 tons, and 35 six-inch ships totaling 192,000 tons, making a grand total of 339,000 tons. Hoover would regard as parity in combatant strength, 21 eight-inch cruisers with a tonnage of 210,000, ten of the existing Omaha class of six-inch ships with a tonnage of 70,000, and five new six-inch ships totaling 35,000 tons, giving it a grand total of 315,000 tons.²² None of the above figures were to be considered absolute since the British felt that their superiority of 24,000 tons was more than offset by the differences of six 8-inch-gun cruisers. Hoover, confronted with the possibility of having to spend still millions of dollars to gain actual parity, still hoped the formal conference might bring reductions.

France and Japan Dissent. President Hoover's hope that the "spirit" of the Kellogg-Briand Pact would, in itself, continue to surmount the obstacles to naval limitation was shattered by French concerns for political security. In a note of September 25, 1929, they had reminded the Americans that, for France as well as for Italy, there were "Questions more vital than proportion of naval armaments." Foremost among these, the French explained, was "the question of general security" and they believed that achievement of this lay "within a defensive entente with Great Britain and a favorable interpretation of the Kellogg Pact by the United States." They asked only that the Americans extend the pact to include a commitment to consult with affected nations should aggression take place. Despite expressed American and British desires to the contrary, the French circulated their views toward naval limitation before the conference officially opened.²³

In retrospect, it can be seen that France's position on limitation, in its December 20 memorandum, undercut any remaining hopes Hoover had of gaining parity and naval reductions. With unerring clarity the French laid bare the weakness of American efforts to tie disarmament to the Peace Pact. This agreement, they said, "is based upon the great force of public opinion, but its methodical application had not yet been organized; it does not determine all those questions of pacific procedure, of mutual aid against an

aggressor, which the outlawing of war implies." Acknowledging the pact as a step in the right direction, they denied that in its present state it was sufficient to guarantee the security of nations. The League Covenant, however incomplete it might be, provided the foundations of a complete security system based upon the application of methods of pacific settlement and of assistance to a State unjustly attacked. Only on assurance of external assistance, the French note continued, would nations be in a position to reduce their armaments. Pointing at Hoover's attempt to isolate disarmament from international politics, they declared "a technical agreement regarding armaments must presuppose a political agreement."

Then the French bluntly spelled out their naval requirements. Geographical features of each country must be taken into consideration, they said, as the theory of relative needs did not meet all issues. France was confronted with borders on three seas together with a far-flung colonial empire of 11 million square kilometers, peopled by 60 million inhabitants, and with an extremely vulnerable commerce. After this array of fact and theory the French left the door ajar to those who sought limitation and parity--a guarantee of security might bring concessions.²⁴

The preconference negotiations caught the Tokyo government in the untenable dilemma--not unlike the Hoover administration--of demanding a 70 per cent ratio in all auxiliary categories and at the same time seeking economic relief through naval reductions. The former pledge was to satisfy "big navy" advocates and ultranationalist jingoists, while the latter plea was to meet the depression. Successive Japanese governments had expressed satisfaction with the Washington naval treaty's capital ship ratios and its status quo on Pacific fortifications; however, they vehemently denied that they had ever accepted the 5-5-3 ratio for auxiliary warships. Although the Japanese in 1921-1922 and in 1927, held to the 70 per cent level, they did not formally lay claim to a specific ratio regarding naval auxiliaries prior to 1929.

It was this absence of a formally stated position which confused American officials. They tended to interpret an alleged statement of Admiral Kato at Washington in 1921 and the conciliatory attitude of the Japanese in 1927 as a willingness to accept any plan approximating the Washington ratios. It had become an unfortunate habit in American

circles to dismiss Japanese desires for the higher ratio as a matter of prestige, to be satisfied with some slight modification upwards.²⁵

This frustrating situation stemmed in large measure from the vagueness of Japanese naval policy up to 1929. The formulation of Japan's position lagged behind public and partisan considerations. The major opposition party in the Diet (the Minseito) used the February, 1929, American building program to harry Prime Minister Tanaka's government party (the Seiyakai). Overnight the Minseito shifted from its championship of naval strength to an advocate of naval limitation, as it criticized the government's tax program and inadequate limitation policy.²⁶ To the "fleet Clique" within the Japanese navy, however, any talk of limitation had become distasteful.²⁷ Not only did they resent the capital ship ratio, these Japanese officers believed application of the same ratio to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines held disastrous consequences to their nation's security.

Discussions began in Japanese admiralty circles early in June 1929 to prepare the Imperial navy's position. When the invitation for the informal London meeting arrived, these officers had developed "three fundamental claims" as the minimum requirement for defense and security. This program called for: 1) a ratio in 10,000 ton, 8-inch-gun cruisers equal to 70 per cent of the highest tonnage allotted to either the United States or Great Britain; 2) a ratio on all auxiliary ships, excepting heavy cruisers and submarines, equal to 70 per cent of the highest tonnage assigned to either principle naval power; and 3) a rejection of any radical limitation or abolition of submarines and the retention by Japan of its current 78,500 tons of submarines. These demands the navy justified as adequate for defense, but insufficient to pose an offensive threat to any of the other major naval powers.²⁸

Meanwhile Prime Minister Osayuki Hamaguchi, who took office in July 1929, announced that Japan's basic approach would center about three major considerations:

- 1) her navy should constitute no menace toward others, while at the same time, she would tolerate no threat or insecurity from others;
- 2) the aim of the conference should be an actual reduction in naval armaments;

3) Japan would be willing to accept a ratio lower than that of either Great Britain or the United States provided that it be adequate for defense in any contingency.

The Hamaguchi government let it be known that they were going to London supporting the 70 per cent ratio, particularly with the United States. The Japanese public seemingly applauded both positions: the desire for naval reductions and the 70 per cent ratio. If the Japanese government's policy seemed contradictory it was no more so than Washington's: just as America demanded parity with Britain and hoped to achieve it by getting the British to lower its minimum strength to meet Hoover's desire for economy, so the Japanese insisted on the 70 per cent ratio and hoped to achieve it without additional construction.²⁹

The London Negotiations

That negotiations at London would prove tedious was obvious from the outset.³⁰ It was clear from the preconference exchanges that Britain's demand for sufficient warships to meet its worldwide requirements would establish the minimum limits and that the other seapowers must somehow accommodate themselves within these limits or be prepared to expand them. Thus at London, as at Washington in 1921-1922, the crux of naval limitation lie in establishing mutually acceptable ratios. Indeed the negotiations of the London conference were virtually consumed in attempting to resolve three such issues, 1) the United States' bid for reductions and for parity with Great Britain; 2) Japan's desire for reductions and its claim to a 10-10-7 ratio in cruisers; and 3) Italy's demand for simple parity with France. Agreement but not always satisfaction, was possible in the first two instances because of the Anglo-American decision to seek a quantitative solution and because of Japan's restricting its claims to this same approach. In the third instance, Italy also attempted to hold the issue at quantitative levels; however, France forced the deliberations away from numerical formulas to political considerations. It was the unwillingness of the Anglo-Saxon powers to meet French political demands that led France and Italy to forego the London provisions governing auxiliary warships.

Domestic political considerations, too, foreshadowed the outcome of the London deliberations. Britain was represented

by a very weary Prime Minister engaged in a running battle with Parliament for his political future. MacDonald had only a minority cabinet and when the House of Commons was in session he had to attend every evening never knowing whether before the night was over he would still be in office. France was also in the throes of political convulsions. French Premier Tardieu and Foreign Minister Aristide Briand arrived in London knowing full well that their own political futures were tenuous at best. Coupled with these factors were Hoover's concern with the Senate's isolationism and the Japanese government's problems with its restless ultranationalists.

The Anglo-American Understanding. Stimson and MacDonald preempted the initial phase of the conference, from mid-January until mid-February, to adjust America's parity demands with Britain's professed naval requirements. These deliberations effected three results. First, the compromise figures arrived at established a rough Anglo-American parity, but ended any hopes President Hoover held regarding reductions. Actual cruiser parity was going to be expensive. Second, in arriving at their understanding the Americans and British extended political considerations, as defined by diplomats, the highest priority. Stimson and MacDonald followed through with their January 17 decision that naval "experts" should take a backseat to the diplomats. And third, the Anglo-American agreement presented the other delegations with a fait accompli on essential issues. Whatever proposals these seapowers chose to bring forth would be measured against the Big Two's private accord; the desires of Japan, France, and Italy had been reduced to quantitative claims for they would be considered only in relation to their effect upon the Anglo-American understanding.

The first wrinkle in the preconference understanding came when the Prime Minister proposed total abolition of battleships. On their last night at sea, the American delegation had received word of MacDonald's sudden switch in interest from cruisers to battleships. The General Board had recommended that if a new ratio was to be found it should be by actual ship count, 15-15-9. The United States would scrap three ships, Great Britain five, and Japan one, with the United States being allowed two new battleships and Japan one to offset Britain's postwar Rodney and Nelson. The Board refused to acknowledge that parity existed until this "handicap" had been removed; nor would it consider reduction in the size of the battleships. To American admirals,

the battleship still remained the vaunted backbone of the fleet.³¹

Everything considered, the Americans agreed that any reference to battleships must be postponed until the cruiser matter had been settled. When MacDonald tried to bring up the question of battleships after the conference had begun, Stimson rebuffed him insisting that this matter was covered in the existing treaty and that all other issues must be disposed of prior to changes in this class.³²

The vexing problem of cruisers dominated attention. The key to this issue lay in the allotment of the high-speed, long-ranging 10,000-ton vessels mounting 8-inch guns. The American delegation came to London with the General Board's recommendation of 21 ships for the United States and 15 for Britain. This might satisfy American admirals as parity, but it became obvious that British officers thought otherwise. MacDonald declared that his Admiralty would never accept the American demand for twenty-one large cruisers; however, if the United States would consent to fifteen vessels, he would be willing to make a substantial concession in the number of lighter, 6-inch gun cruisers asked for in the British proposals. Whether the American delegation had already decided to revise their demands prior to this firm British declaration is uncertain; however, they probably recognized that some concession would be required to bring about an Anglo-American settlement.³³

If American diplomats could agree to lower their heavy cruiser figures to eighteen, their technical advisors could not. At a meeting on February 4, Admiral Jones reiterated his belief that the United States needed twenty-one large cruisers to operate any distance beyond Hawaii, while Admiral William V. Pratt thought the delegation could justify this concession only if the British would allow the United States five additional smaller ships. The delegation pored over technical details for days attempting to weigh the comparative values of the large and small cruisers, the ballistic data on the penetrating and explosive power of the 8-inch and 6-inch shells, and the technical aspects of cruising radius, armor, cost per ton, and seaworthiness. In the end the naval officers could not agree among themselves on the significance of these factors, but the majority favored the larger vessels with the heavier guns.³⁴

The diplomats were caught in a dilemma for not only did they have to contend with the technical arguments but they also had to consider, as the navy professional did not, the political implications of the various figures. Japan would have been alarmed at the United States' building 21 of these 10,000 ton vessels and would have demanded more heavy cruisers which would have, in turn, excited Australia and New Zealand.³⁵ With the necessity of decision before them, the delegation adhered the general assumption that diplomats, not naval officers, should make policy.

Stimson, on February 4, cabled to Hoover a general program for naval limitation. His proposal called for:

	United States	Great Britain	Japan
Cruiser tonnage	327,000	339,000	198,655
Destroyer tonnage	200,000	200,000	120,000
Submarine tonnage (if retained)	60,000	60,000	40,000
Battleship tonnage	462,400	472,550	266,070

Aircraft carriers would be charged against total tonnage permitted by the Washington Treaty.

Under the cruiser provision, the United States would be allowed eighteen 8-inch-gun cruisers, Great Britain fifteen, and Japan twelve; while the remaining tonnage could be devoted to ships bearing 6-inch guns. Battleships would be reduced immediately to conform with a unit total of 15-15-9. No new battleships were to be constructed until 1936, except for one ship to be built by the United States to offset Britain's two modern vessels.³⁶

Hoover replied that he heartily approved the plan. Learning on February 6 that garbled reports of his proposal had been leaked to press, Stimson hastily secured British and Japanese approval to release a generalized, but corrected version of the American plan. In England and American, the proposal was well received; even in Italy it was welcomed as an initial step.³⁷ Most disappointed of all were Japanese naval officers for they realized the American plan denied their claim for a 10-10-7 ratio.

MacDonald outlined his government's position in a memorandum released the following day. While again calling for reduction in battleships, the paper suggested that new capital

ship displacement be lowered from 35,000 to 25,000 tons, that its gun caliber be reduced from 16 inches to 12 inches, and that its age be increased from twenty to twenty-six years. Believing the battleship to be expensive and of questionable utility, the British urged agreement for eventual elimination of this class.

In the matter of cruisers, the British would allow 10,000-ton ships mounting 8-inch guns, but desired to have those bearing 6-inch guns limited to 6,000 or 7,000 tons. The serviceable age of cruisers would be fixed at twenty years. The paper restated MacDonald's demand for fifty ships totaling 339,000 tons on the condition that the size of the vessels was agreeable. The Admiralty considered destroyer tonnage to be directly tied to the nature of the submarine settlement. If submarines were abolished or restricted, then the need for 200,000 tons in destroyers would be lessened. In keeping with Britain's earlier stand, the memorandum asked for the abolition of submarines. Should this not prove feasible then they desired that their size and number be limited and their combat employment be restricted by treaty.³⁸

Stimson stood fast on the American plan regarding cruisers hoping his willingness to compromise on battleship replacements would win British approval of the United States' demand for eighteen large cruisers. When the conference adjourned on February 17 to allow the fallen French government to regroup, Stimson continued to press negotiations with MacDonald. The latter had come under fire from widely-divergent domestic groups which threatened to topple his cabinet. On the one hand, security-minded opponents vigorously attacked his lowering of cruiser tonnage while, on the other hand, advocates of disarmament denounced him for holding up a naval settlement. Added to this domestic harassment came threats from Australia and New Zealand to begin their own building programs if the Japanese ratio was too high.³⁹

In this chaotic atmosphere, Stimson and MacDonald came to tentative terms. Their agreement followed closely the figures outlined in America's February 4 plan with two minor qualifications: 1) the United States' request for a new battleship had been withdrawn in favor of authorization to modernize its old ones; and 2) the United States' cruiser figures were placed at 323,500 tons. Neither party emerged wholly satisfied, and both agreed to seek lower levels in their negotiations with the other delegations.

After a month of negotiations in London, together with the previous weeks of preliminary talks, most Anglo-American differences were resolved. The figures they had arrived at represented little in the way of actual reduction and even now these tentative terms had to be tested against Japanese and French demands.

Agreement with Japan. If the United States held that its prestige warranted naval parity with the British Empire, the Japanese argued on identical grounds for a 10-10-7 ratio in cruisers. However, logic in international affairs must often bow to political realities as the deliberations over Japanese naval terms proved. The negotiation of Japan's naval figures centered on two essential points. First, the creation of an Anglo-American "common front" to meet Japan's claims greatly reduced the latter's alternatives and exposed the rigidity of Japan's "three fundamental claims." If the Japanese wished to avoid increased naval expenditures and yet retain their current naval position, they would have to meet the Anglo-American formula. Second, the negotiations reopened the highly contentious technical-strategical issues, regarding the nature of national security, between diplomats and naval professionals of both Japan and the United States.

Throughout Anglo-American negotiations, both parties had realized that their final naval figures depended upon reaching satisfactory terms with Japan. Implicit in their tactics, therefore, lay the strategy of a common front to reduce Japanese demands. This "club" was the threat of an Anglo-American bilateral navy treaty. At two critical junctures during the London negotiations MacDonald agreed to accept a bilateral pact should it become necessary. This support bolstered considerably the United States' determination during March and April to bring the Japanese around to American terms.

Negotiations with the Japanese required patience and tenacity. Fortunately these qualities Senator David A. Reed, the American delegate assigned to treat with Ambassador Tsuneo Matsudaira, possessed in ample measure. The crux of the cruiser dispute with Japan centered around the latter's application of the ratio to numbers of ships vs. total tonnage. In terms of vessels, Japan would be allowed 12 heavy cruisers, by the Anglo-American figures, while in total tonnage it would be allowed 126,000 tons; but contention arose because of its four "intermediate" vessels which

currently gave Japan twelve 8-inch-gun cruisers at a tonnage of 108,444. Thus if Japan was being granted nearly a 10-10-7 ratio in numbers of heavy cruisers, its ratio in terms of total tonnage was nearer to 10-10-6.

While initial Japanese response indicated they still were insisting on the "three fundamental claims," civil officials in Tokyo were having second thoughts about the rigidity of their stand. Yet the American ambassador at Tokyo reported that the 70 per cent ratio "has become a political doctrine" among the Japanese public and that the United States' refusal to accept Japan's claim was being interpreted as an indication that the Americans considered a war possible. Given this public temperament, Japanese politicians warily approached the prospect of concession. Although Stimson informed the Japanese that he could see no reason to alter the original Washington ratio of 10-6, he refrained from pressing the issue in light of Japan's scheduled election.⁴⁰

Following the Japanese elections of February 20, which gave the government party a resounding endorsement, Senator Reed and Ambassador Matsudaira met to resolve their differences. In the spirit of concession, Reed offered to stagger American construction of the large cruisers to put off attainment of the 60 per cent ratio until the treaty expired in 1936. The Japanese countered by demanding 105,000 tons of destroyers as compared with 150,000 tons allotted to the United States and Great Britain, while the Americans believed that 90,000 tons should meet Japan's needs. Hoover endorsed the American concession if the Japanese would lower their demands to 52,000 tons of submarines, 90,000 tons of destroyers, and keep their 6-inch-gun cruisers within the American formula. This temporarily increased cruiser tonnage, Washington believed, "would still be greatly inferior to the American fleet and no national anxiety as to our dominance in the Pacific in case of controversy need be caused by it."⁴¹

Under American stimulation, the drafting of compromise terms culminated in the so-called "Root-Matsudaira Compromise" of mid-March, 1930. When Stimson let it be known that MacDonald had agreed to an alternate Anglo-American treaty, the Japanese delegation recommended the compromise plan to Tokyo. These figures would give Japan 108,400 tons of heavy cruisers; 100,450 tons of light cruisers; 105,500 tons of destroyers; and 52,700 tons of submarines. This settlement,

translated into ratios, meant that Japan would get, ultimately, 60 per cent of parity in 10,000-ton cruisers, 70 per cent in light cruisers and destroyers, and parity in submarines.⁴²

The "Root-Matsudaira Compromise" represented a diplomatic effort aimed at the political adjustment of a technical-strategical dispute; consequently, it left naval officers of both Japan and America greatly displeased. To angry Japanese officers the compromise, which Matsudaira had negotiated without consulting naval advisors, signaled a retreat from their minimum security requirements as formulated in two of the "three fundamental claims." For its figures meant the restriction of their 10,000-ton cruiser program to those built or building, and granting them only 2,000 tons of additional light cruisers; and reduction of their destroyer fleet by 17,000 tons; and the gradual reduction of their current submarine tonnage by one-third by 1936 through scrapping overage boats. Japanese officers, disappointed with the heavy cruiser settlement, particularly resented the submarine allotment with the agreed replacement age of thirteen years because it would prohibit their building a single underwater craft until 1936. They feared such inactivity would result in the loss of technical competence and experimentation, causing the Japanese navy to fall behind the United States and Great Britain.⁴³

American naval advisors responded with equal displeasure to the Compromise for the 60 per cent ratio in 8-inch cruisers would only be reached by 1936 due to the staggered construction of the last three ships. Nor were they happy to find themselves ignored by their diplomats during the final stage of the negotiations. In the main, these officers objected to the lowering of the United States' demand for twenty-one heavy cruisers to eighteen. Without this larger number, they felt the United States navy could not defend the Philippines.⁴⁴

The defense of the Philippines posed a knotty problem of strategy and politics to the United States. American naval planners, on the assumption that this task constituted one of their main duties, had long desired a navy comparable to the challenge. They believed a fleet of two-to-one or, at a minimum, of three-to-two superiority with adequate support facilities would allow them to operate successfully in the western Pacific. Thus they had opposed the Five Power agreement, particularly the nonfortification clause,

as seriously damaging to their "offensive-defensive" strategy.

Whether or not even a two-to-one advantage would have guaranteed the defense of the Philippines, American diplomats recognized that insistence upon a fleet capable of meeting the Japanese in their home waters would be viewed by Japan as intimidating. Certainly such United States' demand for such forces would have ruled out any naval limitation agreement. Thus the Navy and State departments viewed the Philippines from different policy tangents.

Repercussions from the compromise severely shook the Japanese political scene. Although former Premier Reijiro Watatsuki, the chief delegate at London, agreed to transmit the proposal to Tokyo, he had grave misgivings about the navy's response. In asking his government for instructions regarding the Compromise, Wakatsuki emphasized that he could gain no further concessions from the United States. The Foreign Office, under the direction of Baron Shidehara, urged prompt acceptance of the proposal in the interest of bringing the conference to a successful conclusion and of promoting Japanese-American harmony. Naval officers, led by Admiral Kanji Kato, Chief of the Naval General Staff, strenuously objected to the draft agreement because they believed it failed to meet the strategic requirements of the Imperial navy as set down by professional naval authorities. Yet these officers could not agree on alternatives that might gain a hearing at the conference table.

As the confrontation of views sharpened, Premier Hamaguchi sought to bring unity to the government. While he listened to the navy's case on March 27, the Premier made it clear that he believed naval limitation was necessary to reduce the financial burden and to prevent a naval arms race which might ensue if the conference collapsed. Kato rejected the belief that failure at London would result in naval competition and challenged the civilian government's authority to make agreements affecting the military strength of the nation without the endorsement of the supreme command, i.e., the chief of the Naval Staff. Such action, he argued, would create a serious constitutional issue. Throughout subsequent meetings, he stuck to his position that the draft agreement impaired Japan's naval strategy and violated constitution precedent. Hamaguchi persisted and ultimately carried the day, despite Admiral Kato's direct appeal to the Emperor. On April 1, instructions

went out to Wakatsaki in London and within a week the details were resolved. A three-power treaty, at least, had emerged.⁴⁵

France vs. Italy. During the initial four weeks of the conference, while the Anglo-American understanding was being hammered out, France remained a spectator and Italy a shadow. Neither nation had revealed a willingness to concede on their major demands, yet neither had they attempted to deadlock the talks. While the Americans sought to arrange terms with the Japanese, the British assumed a similar role with the French and Italians. But when the French sought to broaden the Kellogg-Briand treaty into a "consultative" pact, the Americans became involved in these frustrating negotiations.

The Anglo-Saxon and Latin conferees were divided by divergent concepts of "security" and "disarmament." First, the French held that disarmament was dependent upon political security guarantees (i.e., mutual assistance against aggression) and that once security had been achieved, disarmament would naturally follow. The Americans and British reversed this order of significance and argued that as disarmament became a reality, the security of each nation would increase. Second, at London, the Anglo-Saxon governments, due to domestic pressures, sought to divorce the quantitative mechanics of limitation from political questions. Time and again their delegates informed the French that purchase of a naval agreement at the cost of a political accord was out of the question. No one made the point more bluntly than America's Senator Robinson who, upon embarking for London, told the press that "this conference would avoid diplomacy and deal only with disarmament."⁴⁶

France placed its naval proposals before the conference on February 12. As their fleet was now smaller than in 1914 and as they had not built the 70,000 tons of capital ships allowed under the Washington treaty, the French estimated their current needs in auxiliary ships as:

	<u>Tons</u>
Cruisers having 8-inch guns	100,000
Old cruisers having guns over 6.1 inches	24,850
Cruisers and destroyers having guns less than 6.1 inches	258,597
Submarines	99,629

The French delegation did leave the door ajar to the possibility of naval reduction. France, they noted, stood "ready to examine, favorably, any formula of mutual guarantees for security" which would lower its naval requirements.⁴⁷

British delegates immediately objected to the French proposal. In a private conversation Robert Craige informed French delegates that their naval figures were "far too high." How could the British delegation suggest to their public and to parliament that their fleet should be reduced, while at the same time endorsing French naval expansion? MacDonald found upon examination of the French plan--particularly their desire to utilize nonallocated battleship tonnage to match German cruiser* construction--that France would possess in 1936 ten 8-inch-gun cruisers and two 7.5-inch-gun ships. This, he pointed out, would mean twelve heavy cruisers to Great Britain's fifteen, "a proportion the United Kingdom Delegation would find very difficult to justify." He thought France's naval requirements could be met by scrapping its old cruisers and building seven modern 10,000 ton vessels by 1936.⁴⁸

French diplomats insisted that their naval program was not directed against Great Britain, but at German and Italian construction. Rene Massigli confided that "the crux of the whole situation" was Italian activity in the Mediterranean. To the British, however, "a large French programme was far more likely to stir up Italy to adopt a serious building programme than was a moderate French programme, and that Franco-Italian difficulty could certainly not be solved on those lines." When the French suggested a Mediterranean Pact to augment security against aggression in that region, Craige recommended that the French study the text of the Four Power Pacific Treaty. He informed Massigli that, frankly, the British Government was "not anxious" to conclude any agreement of this type, but that they were willing to discuss the issue fully in the interests of developing a naval limitation treaty.⁴⁹

Although Morrow, who had been delegated by Stimson to deal with the French, found that France's interest in a Mediterranean pact stemmed from that government's concern with the

* The French were disturbed by Germany's laying down of a 10,000 "pocket-battleship" which combined the speed and displacement of the cruiser with the firepower of a battle cruiser.

growing isolationist feeling in Great Britain. Given the vagueness of the League Covenant and the Locarno treaties, the French questioned whether, if a crisis arose, England would interpret its obligations broadly. Apparently, Morrow reported on February 14, the French hoped to pin Great Britain down to a definite commitment in the Mediterranean in exchange for a naval treaty.⁵⁰ But before this occurred, formal talks with the French were interrupted, on February 17, when the Tardieu government fell over a financial issue and the conference was adjourned.

Meanwhile, Italy's delegation reiterated their naval requirements. In a formal statement on February 19, the Italians pledged their support for the reduction of naval armaments, "because, as a member of the League of Nations, and as one of the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Italy considers such a reduction as the natural outcome of those treaties." They thought armaments should be considered exclusively for defensive purposes and as such should be reduced to the lowest possible level. Although it had an unallocated capital ship tonnage of 105,000, the Italians suggested a ban on battleship construction during the treaty period. Indeed, they favored the abolition of capital ships, a move made more agreeable in that they would achieve parity with France without financial burden. Italian policy also favored either the abolition or a substantial reduction of submarines.⁵¹

If conciliatory on reductions, the Italians emphasized their demand for parity with France. They pointed to Italy's unfavorable geographical position, in that she possessed no ocean frontier, to its vulnerable overseas supply lines and to its commitment, under the Locarno treaties, to the peace of continental Europe. Thus, the Italian delegation restated its position "that Italy is prepared 'a priori' to accept as limit for her armaments any figure, no matter how low, provided it be not exceeded by any other Continental European Power."⁵²

The Italians remained in the background throughout most of the negotiations. Stimson, on one occasion, complained that they offered no positive program except repetition of the slogan "Parity with France."⁵³ If Italy's policies were less complex than France's, they were no less firmly implanted. Their demand for parity with France they felt to be justified by the precedent established in the Anglo-American settlement. Their joining of this demand with

general reduction placed them in a strong bargaining position; yet their limited financial resources would hardly have allowed them to build competitively against France.

On February 17 Stimson assessed the political nature of French security demands for President Hoover. French delegates, he wrote, have begun "to talk about security and there is running in the background a possible Mediterranean Pact or our long-thought-of amendment to the Kellogg-Briand Pact." Although neither issue had yet "entered directly" into the talks, the secretary recalled that Briand had mentioned that he would like sometime to discuss amending the Peace Pact. "Nevertheless, I should not be surprised," Stimson prophesied, "if he brought it in finally as quid pro quo for naval reduction." This seemed likely because France had shown little interest in a Mediterranean pact based upon the Pacific Four-Power agreement and because Britain had recoiled from extending a more substantive guarantee.⁵⁴

Meanwhile certain members of the press, both European and American, claimed that success or failure of the negotiations now depended upon Hoover's ability to meet the political necessities of naval limitation. Peace groups consequently took up the cry that the President must "save" the conference. Hoover believed that this pressure was "wholly French propaganda intended in the first place to see if it is possible to secure some American political assurances and in the second place to throw on the President or on the United States responsibility for failure."⁵⁵

Although Hoover ignored the domestic clamor, he became upset over press reports that Stimson personally favored "expanding the Kellogg Pact by a Presidential declaration." While he did not believe these accounts, the President lectured Stimson that "From the beginning our assumption was that the Kellogg Peace Treaty marked a new era in international relations and that the provisions of this treaty warranted a reduction in strength by the naval powers of the world." Moreover, he believed further political agreements would repudiate the whole meaning and significance of the Pact. Under current circumstances an executive declaration of what the United States believed to be "the logical procedure" under the Peace Pact, Hoover said, could only bring on "the most embarrassing and dangerous consequences." An amendment might be considered in the future, but not in context with naval reduction.⁵⁶

Tardieu and Briand were returning to the conference after resolving a domestic political crisis; Stimson cabled the President on March 4, but, he warned that they will not settle without a political pact. Earlier, the French ambassador at London had informed Morrow that France would not care if England expanded her fleet two or three times its current strength. The problem as Morrow saw it boiled down to this: "If they could get a positive undertaking of some kind from England to intervene in the event of an attack upon them, it would be quite simple to work out the question of armament." But failing to obtain such an agreement, he did not think any public figure in France could reduce Tardieu's naval program.⁵⁷

The British, Stimson still hoped, would accommodate French desires as MacDonald agreed to explore a Mediterranean or North Sea pact based upon anything short of military guarantees. Even so, he acknowledged discouragingly, France would probably not be satisfied. Briand had discussed amending the Kellogg Pact with his Foreign Secretary, MacDonald said, and had gotten Arthur Henderson to discuss amending the Pact to include sanctions of force. "I told him," Stimson relates in his diary, "if it did that, out would go America." On February 28 Stimson had informed Henderson that American public opinion "regarded the Kellogg Pact as one side of a watershed and the League Covenant as the other, the line of division being that the Kellogg Pact relied solely on the sanction of public opinion while the League Pact depended upon compulsion of enforced peace." And this opinion, he stressed, had "crystallized more and more strongly against any entanglement" which would commit its military forces.⁵⁸

March proved a frustrating month for the delegates and a confusing one for the American public. While Briand went back and forth between the British and American delegations trying to extract a political commitment, the French continued to prod the Hoover administration. Journalists with "inside" contacts in London and Paris continued wiring home reports that France might agree to a tonnage reduction in exchange for a consultative pact. As these proposals would seemingly achieve naval reductions without an American military commitment, several journals and public figures urged its adoption. Throughout this domestic controversy, those who urged American acceptance of the consultative pact labored under a grave misunderstanding: the French were never ready to junk their naval program for another "paper" pledge.

While Stimson fended off moves by Briand to interject the Kellogg Pact into the talks, MacDonald threw cold water on the secretary's private hope that the British and French would come to terms. The Prime Minister informed Briand that his government absolutely could not give a military guarantee.⁵⁹ The temper of the House of Commons was that England had undertaken all the commitments it could maintain.

To Stimson the idea of signing an additional consultative pact was not particularly upsetting. "The reason against this proposal," he wrote Hoover, "is simply that if we should sell such a pact to France in exchange for a certain number of war material--cruisers, destroyers, and submarines which she gave up--we should inevitably be confronted in emergency hereafter by her claim that the consultative pact was worth military defense and we should be called upon to render its value in such material."⁶⁰ Stimson questioned whether under the consultative pact the United States, in a future European war, might not find itself tied to a moral obligation to render aid.

Negotiations during the remainder of March divided into comedy and tragedy. The former centered around the Hoover administration's erratic attempts to convince the American public that its stand on a consultative pact was not blocking a naval settlement. An uninformed American press, constantly hammering at the administration to "do something" to save the conference, had an unsettling effect on the President. All of this uproar, Stimson was informed, "is assuming considerable seriousness over here, and the President is bothered."⁶⁵

To relieve the pressure at home, Stimson undertook on March 25 to set straight America's position. In a hasty midnight release, the secretary charged certain newsmen with distorting the consultative pact issue and restated the administration's attitude. Noting that the French demanded security before disarming, he concluded with: "If, however, this demand for security could be satisfied in some other way, then the danger of misunderstanding a consultative pact would be eliminated and in such case the question would be approached from an entirely different standpoint." This statement, if it quieted the internationalists, outraged the isolationists in the Capitol. What Stimson must have meant by "some other way" was an Anglo-French pact; therefore, Senators Borah, Henrik Shipstead, Walter George, James Watson, Claude Swanson, and Hiram Johnson, among others, blasted the President for considering a "political" accord. Of course, Hoover had no such intention, but confusion was not the property of any group. Stimson's error lay in his failure to establish the French demands in their proper light.⁶²

Tragically, President Hoover failed to comprehend the politics of disarmament. In a personal note for the French delegates, sent via Stimson on March 31, Hoover asserted that he appreciated "fully the logic" of their fundamental position as outlined in their note of December 20. While acknowledging the validity of France's objections to the ineffectiveness of the Kellogg Pact and its desire to establish effective methodical procedures of pacific settlement, the President declared that "the American mind has not come to the point of accepting any general plan of methodical procedure for the pacific settlement of international disputes and particularly, it is not ready to commit itself to any plan in cases of violation of the Pact of Paris or as to action in cases of aggression." Disarmament was another matter, the President thought: "That is a simple proposal consonant with our traditional principles and acceptable to the American mind." Pointing to the current negotiations, he said that the reduction of the British fleet by some 300,000 or 400,000 tons, the American fleet by some 200,000 tons, and substantial reduction of the Japanese fleet should "add materially to the security of France and the world."⁶³ Hoover may have appreciated the logic of the French argument, but an examination of his note indicates rather conclusively that he as yet did not understand it.

But at the same time he was preaching to the French, the President privately cabled Stimson that if a five-power agreement was not immediately forthcoming, it would be best to draw the conference to a close on a three-power level. Feeling that an agreement between Japan, Great Britain and the United States would be a "great advance in world stabilization," Hoover pointed out that any misgivings the British had could be overcome by inserting provisions allowing them to meet any competitive naval building in Europe. In his Memoirs, Hoover relates a much blunter reaction to the French stalling of the conference. "I instructed our delegation," he recalled, "that we did not care whether the French limited their inferior navy or not and our major purpose of parity with Britain and the extension of the 5-3 ratio with Japan would be accomplished even if France and Italy stayed out of the agreement."⁶⁴ Certainly this attitude reflects the rigidly technical nature of the President's disarmament policies.

Chapter 15 -- Footnotes

¹ See U.S., Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, Doc. #55, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., (1928); P. J. Nowell-Baker, Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference (1927); Roland A. Chaput, Disarmament in British Foreign Policy (1935); L. Ethan Ellis, Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 1925-1929 (1962); Robert H. Ferrell, Frank B. Kellogg-Henry L. Stimson, Vol. XI in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (1963); Ben Scott Custer, "The Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, 1927", unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Georgetown University, 1948).

² F.R., 1929, I, 11-12, 16.

³ General Board No. 438 (Ser. No. 1347-1 (a)), April 21, 1927, in Custer, "The Geneva Conference," p. 57.

⁴ Records of the Conference, pp. 26-27.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 28-29.

⁶ F.R., 1929, I. 50, 76-77.

⁷ Viscount Robert Cecil, A Great Experiment: An Autobiography (1941), p. 96.

⁸ Benjamin Williams, The United States and Disarmament (1931).

⁹ Richard Hooker, "The Geneva Naval Conference," Yale Review (Jan., 1928), pp. 279-80.

¹⁰ Ellis, Kellogg, pp. 191-192.

¹¹ United States Statutes, XLV, Public Act. No. 726, 70th. Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1165.

¹² The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933 (1952), II, 340; also see F.R., 1929, I, 78-85.

¹³ F.R., 1929, I, 91-96.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 96-97. The press in the United States, Great Britain, and Japan enthusiastically welcomed Hoover's message. Even in France the reception was much warmer than might have

been expected; only in Italy did the press respond with government-censored articles sarcastic to the new proposals. See Raymond G. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930 (1962), pp. 26-27.

¹⁵ D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, I, 3-7; also see Elaine Windrich, British Labour's Foreign Policy (1952), pp. 87-89.

¹⁶ See Charles G. Dawes, Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain (1939), pp. 17-18.

¹⁷ Raymond G. O'Connor, "The 'Yardstick' and Naval Disarmament in the 1920's," Mississippi Valley Historical Review (Dec., 1958), pp. 450-55.

¹⁸ F.R., 1929, I, 164-66.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 169-73, 177, 187.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 214; Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-31 (1963), pp. 163-64.

²¹ F.R., 1929, I, 241, 254.

²² O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, pp. 43-44.

²³ F.R., 1929, I, 60-61; D.B.E.P., Ser. 2, I, 185-86; Henry K. Norton, "The Perils of Parity," Outlook and Independent (Jan. 29, 1930), pp. 173, 197.

²⁴ D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, I, 174-77. The British reply is on pp. 195-98.

²⁵ John Burrell Oliver, "Japan's Role in the Origins of the London Naval Treaty of 1930: A Study in Diplomatic History," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Duke University, 1954) pp. 13-31.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 46-47, 60-69. The confusion in official Japanese circles over policy can be illustrated by pointing that when Dawes approached the Japanese Ambassador in London in June, 1929, at the outset of the former's "preliminary discussion" with British officials, the Japanese ambassador still was without official instructions or even comment on naval matters from Tokyo. Ibid., p. 117 ff.

27 This group consisted largely of the younger naval officers who dreamed of an expanding Japanese empire and who rebelled at the treaties which tended to limit Japan's freedom of action in the Far East. The so-called "shore clique" was made up mainly of the older admirals who advocated Japan's living up to her international agreements.

28 Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (1935), p. 288; for the best discussion of Japan's naval policy, see Oliver, "Japan's Role in...the London Treaty," pp. 141-48.

29 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 285, 312.

30 See U.S., Dept. of State, Conference Series, No. 6 Proceedings of the London Conference of 1930 and Supplementary (1931); G. B., Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1930 (1930); O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium; Ferrell, Kellogg-Stimson; Charles Howland, Survey of American Foreign Relations, 1931 (1931).

31 New York Times, Jan. 16, 1930, Hoover in his Armistice Day speech also mentioned eliminating battleships; O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, p. 71.

32 Stimson Diary, Jan. 20, 24, 1930.

33 Proceedings of the London Conference, pp. 66-70; O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, p. 70.

34 Stimson Diary, Feb. 2, 3, 1930; Dawes, Journal, pp. 140-41; O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, p. 70.

35 F.R., 1930, I, 18.

36 Ibid., pp. 13-17. This agreement, it should be noted, was arrived at without the endorsement of American naval advisors or the Japanese delegation, a point emphasized by Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, pp. 172-73.

37 Not all American responses were favorable, however, see F.R., 1930, I, 21-24.

38 D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, I, 205-09.

39 F.R., 1930, I, 23-24; O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, p. 73.

49 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 290; F.R., 1930, I, 24, 26.

41 F.R., 1930, I, 57-59.

42 Ibid., p. 61.

43 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 293; Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 64-65.

44 Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, p. 174; O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium, pp. 81-82.

45 A good account of these momentous days is in Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (1963), pp. 65-70, and Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, ch. 25.

46 Quoted in James T. Shotwell, "Drifting into Fog," Outlook and Independent, (Feb. 5, 1930), p. 219.

47 Doc. of the London Conference. pp. 515-18, 522. The French program called for the overall construction in all classes, of 240,000 tons by 1936 to a total navy tonnage of 724,000. Eighty per cent of the construction was to be classified as "replacement" and only the remaining 20 per cent as "expansion."

48 D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, I, 209-210, 221-25.

49 Ibid., pp. 210-11.

50 Harold Nicolson, Dwight Morrow (1935), pp. 366-67; Stimson Diary, Feb. 14, 1930.

51 Docs of the London Conference, pp. 527-30.

52 Ibid. This formula had crystalized in their note of October 6, 1928, on the abortive "Anglo-French Naval Compromise." From that time on they clung to this formula as a governing principle in all armament questions. For an Italian apologia, see Giovanni Engely, The Politics of Naval Disarmament, trans. by H. V. Rhodes (1932).

53 Stimson Diary, Feb. 17, 1930.

54 See Ibid., and F.R., 1929, I, 59ff, II, 243.

55 F.R., 1930, I, 32-33.

56 Ibid., 40-41.

57 Stimson Diary, Feb. 24, 27, 1930; F.R., 1930, I, 45-46.

58 Ibid., Feb. 28, Mar. 5, 1930.

59 Ibid., Mar. 10, 1930; F.R., 1930, I, 55.

60 Ibid., Mar. 11, 1930.

61 F.R., 1930, I, 81-82.

62 Ibid., 83.

63 Ibid., 96-97.

64 Memoirs of Hoover, II, 348-49.

Chapter 16

THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY, 1930:

Assessment

Considered evaluations of the London naval pact have varied greatly. With circumspection, a Yale professor concluded in 1931 that:

Judged in the light of the abortive Geneva Naval Conference of 1927, the work of the London Conference is a distinct gain; judged in the light of the Washington Conference accomplishments, the work of the London Conference completes the difficult process of limiting all the categories of the three greatest naval fleets; judged in the light of the Hallane mission to Germany in 1912 to come to some agreement for ending the deadly naval competition between Great Britain and Germany, the London agreement must be regarded as a miracle.¹

An another contemporary judgment British historian Arnold J. Toynbee called the agreement--particularly the establishment of ratios for auxiliary warships--"a notable achievement." He reasoned that, as a result of the naval treaty, "the problem of disarmament and security in the Pacific was relieved of its gravest dangers and was reduced to manageable proportions; and this effect on the international transaction that took place in London in the early part of the year has reinforced, towards the end of the year, the remarkable improvement in the internal situation in China."²

Nonetheless, the pact increasingly came under fire as a disadvantageous arrangement for the United States and Great Britain. George T. Davis concluded in 1940 that Japan had been the victor at London for "the strategic benefits which she had gained at Washington were tilted

further to her advantage." He attributed this to the increased Japanese ratio. Lord Chatfield's analysis in 1947 was even more blunt: "by the London Treaty our naval position was placed in jeopardy, that led the sea-security of the Empire to its most dangerous point for 150 years."³

Hindsight may have blinded the London naval pact's post-1941 critics--even the more objective ones--by tilting out of focus the cause and effect relationships of the nineteen-thirties and forties. For having viewed the accumulated, and surely devastating, consequences of diplomacy during the interwar years, these scholars have concluded that the "democracies" needed more power, not less. For example, Raymond O'Connor sees the treaty as putting "the control of weapons in the wrong sequence on the road to security. The issue which confronted the statesmen was whether disarmament and world order were to be based on the moral force of the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the military implications of the League Covenant. The equilibrium of naval power created at London was not only deceptive, but it was erected on an illusory foundation."⁴ And Robert Ferrell writes that "one could conclude that the London meeting was a failure so far as concerned anything really new, and a very pronounced failure in that it aggravated old issues. It gave Japan respite from Anglo-American competition and a head start in the naval race which began in 1935 when the Japanese denounced the treaty and refused compromise at another London Conference. Perhaps the conference of 1930 had a certain moral value, being an affirmation of faith in the limiting of armaments. Such affirmation was of more than doubtful utility at the beginning of so hectic a decade as the 1930's."⁵

It is obvious that the London naval pact fell short of creating permanent peace among the major seapowers, as the advent of the Second World War attests; however, the naval treaty did not provide the Japanese with an advantage in the coming conflict. Analysis of the 1930 settlement reveals that Great Britain and the United States had designed their compromises with a cautious eye toward Japan; that the naval pact represented a diplomatic defeat for Japanese militarists; and that it restricted Japanese construction of auxiliaries while granting the United States a sorely-needed opportunity to regain its naval supremacy in the Far East.

The negotiations between the Anglo-Saxon nations reveal that they were able to reach a tentative understanding among themselves only after they had considered it vis-a-vis Japan. English leaders had shown anxiety about Japanese demands and had insisted that any Anglo-American settlement was dependent on keeping Japan's terms at a level acceptable to the Dominions. That this was accomplished necessarily meant that the treaty represented a diplomatic defeat for Japan. Its envoys had carried to London three "unconditional" demands: 1) the right to build to 70 per cent of the total strength of the American, or British, fleet in auxiliary warships; 2) the right to maintain a 70 per cent ratio in heavy cruisers with the Anglo-Saxon fleet that had the largest tonnage in this class; and 3) the prevention of any quantitative limits on the construction of submarines. "None of these demands was realized," Oliver points out. "Japan received slightly under 70 per cent in over-all auxiliaries, 60 per cent in large cruisers, and parity with the United States and Great Britain in submarines, at a level substantially below her existing tonnage."⁶

Finally, it should be noted that the London treaty halted Japanese construction of heavy cruisers and submarines for the duration of the pact. Both results met with disfavor among officers of the Imperial Navy as Japan was currently almost at cruiser parity with the United States. Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura later complained that this pact had forced Japan "to mark time" in the construction of 10,000-ton cruisers, indeed, "to come down to a 6:10 ratio."⁷ Statistics show how elusive American superiority in heavy cruisers actually was in 1930.

10,000-ton, 8-inch Cruisers--1930

	<u>Pre-1922</u>	<u>Post-1922</u>	<u>Building</u>
United States	2	6	9
Japan	7	8	4

Source: Great Britain. Admiralty. "Fleets--The British Empire and Foreign Countries," Accounts and Papers (London, 1931), Cmd. 3805.

That the United States failed to regain its newly recognized supremacy--and hence fell behind after 1935--was due to the failure of the Hoover administration to begin building to treaty limits.

NAVIES OF THE WORLD*				Building and appropriated for ²				Permitted by treaty before Dec. 31, 1936	
Total Built		Total Built Under Age ¹		No. Tons		No. Tons		No. Tons	
UNITED STATES									
Capital ships	15	464,300	12	384,200	--	--	54,500	000	000
Aircraft carriers	4	92,000	3	80,500	3	30,000	000	000	000
Cruisers (a)	16	149,775	15	142,425	3	90,000	000	000	000
Cruisers (b)	10	70,500	10	70,500	9	87,050	51,765	000	000
Destroyers	211	238,315	6	8,285	55	21,600	19,160	000	000
Submarines	84	70,020	43	45,600	16	21,600	19,160	000	000
TOTAL	340	1,084,910	89	731,510	86	283,150	70,925	000	000
BRITISH EMPIRE									
Capital ships	15	474,750	15	474,750	--	--	15,000	19,100	3
Aircraft carriers	6	115,350	6	115,350	1	113,800	000	000	000
Cruisers (a)	19	183,396	18	173,400	--	--	28,160	000	000
Cruisers (b)	33	166,210	17	96,390	15	43,690	39,282	000	000
Destroyers	165	192,369	56	75,394	32	10,905	4,081	000	000
Submarines	56	56,209	36	44,954	10	10,905	4,081	000	000
TOTAL	294	1,188,284	148	980,238	58	183,395	30,623	000	000
JAPAN									
Capital ships	9	272,070	8	242,740	--	--	20,050	000	000
Aircraft carriers	4	68,370	4	68,370	2	20,050	50	000	000
Cruisers (a)	14	123,520	12	107,800	--	--	000	000	000
Cruisers (b)	20	93,375	17	81,455	6	51,000	000	000	000
Destroyers	102	123,313	63	86,213	20	28,957	1,500	4	1,500
Submarines	57	68,349	49	61,837	13	17,700	528	000	000
TOTAL	206	748,997	153	648,415	41	117,707	2,078	000	000

*Source: Office of Naval Intelligence, July 24, 1935.

- 1) Age as at the end of 1934 (December 31, 1934).
- 2) All tonnages under column Building and Appropriated For are estimated.
- 3) May also replace Furious, Eagle, and Hermes (experimental ships).
- 4) Available to replace Miyuki sunk about July 1, 1934.

NAVIES OF THE WORLD (con't)

		<u>Total Built</u>	<u>Total Built Under Age I</u>	<u>Building and appropriated for 2</u>	<u>Permitted by treaty before Dec. 31, 1936</u>	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
FRANCE						
Capital ships	9	185,925	3	66,567	4	123,000
Aircraft carriers	1	22,146	1	22,146	--	--
Cruisers (a)	10	105,923	7	70,000	--	--
Cruisers (b)	8	51,814	6	38,902	6	45,600
Destroyers	80	123,219	56	105,431	18	20,435
Submarines	97	83,890	69	64,183	14	14,556
TOTAL	205	572,917	142	367,229	42	203,591
ITALY						
Capital ships	4	86,532	3	64,714	2	70,000
Aircraft carriers	0	000	0	000	--	--
Cruisers (a)	11	103,641	7	70,000	--	--
Cruisers (b)	16	71,183	12	59,067	3	22,539
Destroyers	88	81,488	55	63,475	10	8,778
Submarines	69	45,720	48	37,550	8	8,917
TOTAL	188	398,564	125	294,806	29	110,234
GERMANY						
Capital ships	8	98,084	2	20,000	3	62,000
Aircraft carriers	--	--	--	--	--	--
Cruisers (a)	--	--	--	--	2	20,000
Cruisers (b)	8	40,040	5	30,000	1	6,000
Destroyers	32	23,091	12	9,600	16	26,000
Submarines	1	500	1	500	27	9,000
TOTAL	49	161,715	20	60,100	49	123,000

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By agreement
limited to 35%

of aggregate

tonnage of

British

The most damaging weakness of the London accord was its failure to adjust political differences. As late as 1947 Stimson believed that the 1930 pact was beneficial because it ended "a significant rift between Great Britain and America, while at the same time it improved the political relations between the United States and Japan. It was not the London Treaty that was a failure. The failure was that the leaders in Japan and on the continent of Europe who so quickly turned away from the peaceful path on which the treaty was a milestone." Anglo-American relations improved as a result of the treaty but the political situation in the Pacific did not benefit; in fact the London Treaty provided the impetus that virtually ended civilian government and brought military leaders to power in Japan. And too it left a festering legacy of discord between France and Italy and between France and Britain which directly affected continental politics.

That the 1930 naval treaty failed to survive indicates less an indictment of the pact per se than an acknowledgement that it could not surmount the political climate of its era; The naval treaty may have reinforced the popular naivete of the nineteen-thirties toward the harsh realities of international politics as has been charged or its deficiencies may have reflected the sterility of attitudes and policies already prevalent among the democracies in which case it would hardly have further weakened them.

Treaty Provisions

The London Naval Treaty completed the process of limiting naval armaments begun eight years earlier at Washington. Five nations--the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy--agreed to Parts I, II, IV, and V of the treaty. France's refusal to participate in the limitation of auxiliary warships led Italy to follow suit and thus Part III of the treaty, which constituted the "heart" of the agreement for it established construction limits on cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, applied to only the Big Three--America, Britain, and Japan. Nevertheless the results of this latest pact had substantial technical and political significance as the major seapowers were for the first time in history limited, quantitatively and qualitatively, by international arrangement.

Part I of the London Treaty reaffirmed and refined the general provision of the Washington Five Power Naval Pact governing capital ships and aircraft carriers. All five nations agreed "not to exercise their rights" to lay down capital ship replacement tonnage (as provided for in Chapter II, Part 3 of the Five Power Naval Treaty, 1922) between the years 1931 to 1936. This so-called "holiday" applied to the ten ships each which Britain and America were free to build; the six which Japan might have constructed; and the three each which France and Italy could have built. These latter two nations, however, received authorization to construct 70,000 tons each of capital ships as replacements under their Washington Treaty allotments for the years 1927 and 1929. This tonnage extension allowed France to answer the German Ersatz-Prussian type vessel then currently under construction.

The economic implications of the decision to forego the replacement construction of battleships were great. The estimated savings to the United States, Great Britain and Japan were in excess of one billion dollars by 1936. Hoover calculated that the savings to the United States alone was about 400 million dollars; whether this was "net" may be questioned however.⁸

In addition to the "holiday" the Big Three agreed to scrap nine capital ships within thirty months after the treaty became effective. This would leave the United States, in 1936, with eighteen battleships (462,400 tons); Great Britain also with eighteen capital ships (474,750 tons); and Japan with nine heavy warships (266,070 tons). The new capital ship ratio, in vessels, would be 10-10-5 and in tonnage, 10-10.3-5.8. However under the terms of the Washington treaty, the serviceable age limit of a capital ship was fixed at twenty years. Under this formula, thirty-one battle ships of the Big Three would be technically obsolete in 1936--sixteen British, ten American, and five Japanese.

Aircraft carrier tonnage did not change as the American delegation successfully withstood British and Japanese efforts to lower carrier tonnage from 135,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain to 100,000 tons, even with a corresponding reduction for the other naval powers. The United States also resisted British suggestions to lower the maximum size of this type ship from 27,000 to 25,000 tons. The Americans objected to the lowering of their

total tonnage mainly because their navy had 66,000 tons invested in the Lexington and Saratoga. Admiral William A. Moffett, chief of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics explained that the British had only built 45,000 tons of carriers, while the United States had used 66,000 tons, and could, under the 100,000 ton limit, always have "two more aircraft carriers...than we have."⁹ Furthermore, the British had urged the inclusion of aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons in the maximum tonnage allotment. These smaller "landing platforms," had been ignored in the Washington treaty when it was decided to classify only those vessels of 10,000 or over as part of the aircraft carrier tonnage.

Although the new treaty specified that no aircraft carrier "of 10,000 tons or less standard displacement mounting a gun above 6.1-inch calibre" could be constructed, an exception was allowed so that up to twenty-five per cent of the total cruiser tonnage could "be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck for aircraft." Thus, in effect, a nation could expand its carrier fleet if it so desired.

Part III of the London Treaty established limits on auxiliary warships. Article 16 lists the constructed tonnage in these categories which was not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936.

	<u>United States</u>	<u>British Empire</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>Ratios</u>
Cruisers (tons)				
a. With guns of more than 6.1-inch calibre	180,000	146,800	108,400	10-8.1-6
b. With guns of less than 6.1-inch calibre	143,500	192,200	100,450	10-13.4-7
Destroyers (tons)	150,000	150,000	105,500	10-10-7
Submarines (tons)	<u>52,700</u>	<u>52,700</u>	<u>52,700</u>	10-10-10
Total	526,200	541,700	367,050	

The maximum number of 10,000 ton cruisers mounting 8-inch guns was specifically set out as follows: Great Britain, fifteen; the United States, eighteen; Japan, twelve. Additionally, the United States was prohibited from laying

down its sixteenth heavy cruiser before 1933 and completing construction prior to 1936; laying down its seventeenth before 1934 and completing it prior to 1937; and laying down its eighteenth before 1935 and completing it before 1938. Thus the ratios are somewhat misleading for the United States would not achieve its full cruiser strength until 1938.

Failure to bring France and Italy into the agreement prompted the British delegation to insist on a "safety valve" clause which would allow that nation to maintain her two-Power standard (i.e., a navy equal to the combined France-Italian fleets) regarding continental Europe. With American resistance to no avail (they feared it might incur Senatorial wrath), Article XXI declared:

If, during the terms of the present Treaty, the requirements of the national security of any High Contracting Party in respect of vessels of war limited by Part III of the present Treaty are in the opinion of that Party materially affected by new construction of any Power other than those who have joined in Part III of this Treaty, that High Contracting Party will notify the other Parties to Part III as to the increase required to be made in its own tonnages within one or more of the categories of such vessels of war, specifying particularly the proposed increases and the reasons therefore, and shall be entitled to make such increase. Thereupon the other Parties to Part III of this Treaty shall be entitled to make a proportionate increase in the category of categories specified; and the said other Parties shall promptly advise with each other through diplomatic channels as to the situation this presented.

The British Admiralty's demand for this relief seems to have been tied to the shift in French naval strategy since 1914. Prior to World War One, when Germany had a sizeable and potent fleet in northern waters, the French had been content to leave their fleet in the Mediterranean leaving their western and northern coasts unprotected. Since the war, or more precisely since the Peace Conference, they insistently pressed claims for a navy not only equal to Italy in the Mediterranean, but also sufficiently large enough to defend France's western and northern shores.

While the British foreign office might evaluate this demand as a political tactic aimed at augmenting England's interest in continental matters, the Admiralty was unwilling to assume the risks such tactics incurred. Consequently, the London tonnage figures, particularly as regarded auxiliary vessels, would remain valid only so long as the two-power standard stood unchallenged by French and Italian construction programs.

Regulating Submarine Warfare, 1921-41

Part IV of the 1930 London treaty initially established regulations governing submarine warfare as an integral provision of a naval limitation agreement. This was neither the first nor the last time these rules appeared: in 1922 the Washington Conference adopted a five-power treaty "Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Cases in Warfare;" and in 1936, a procès-verbal extended life on the 1930 "rules of submarine warfare." The former accord was never ratified, but the latter protocol lasted until the outbreak of World War Two.

Early initiatives directed at controlling submarines sought more drastic measures: their total abolition. At the Hague Conference of 1899, Russia, Great Britain, and Germany signified their willingness, on the condition of unanimity, to accept the prohibition of underwater warships. Strong opposition from the United States and France, however, negotiated efforts to reach an agreement for both nations looked to the torpedo as the cheapest means of breaking British naval supremacy. Outrage at submarine tactics against merchant shipping during the World War prompted Britain, and now America, to again urge their abolition at the Paris Peace Conference. But while Lloyd George and Wilson, together with their naval experts, declared themselves in favor of the outright abolition of submarines, the French opposed such action. Indeed, French naval officers insisted, successfully, that they be given their rightful share of interned German U-boats so they could catch up on submarine technology, an area in which they were woefully weak.

Interwar efforts to regulate the tactics of underwater warships centered on two essential points. First, the submarine code resulted as a compromise between those nations who wished to abolish U-boats and those who insisted upon

retention of the submarine as a defensive weapon. Second, the code failed to prevent unrestricted submarine warfare during World War Two because each belligerent believed its opponents would ignore the rules and because their admiralties insisted upon using fully all means at their disposal, including submarines, to defeat their foes.

Developing the Rules, 1921-36. The role of the submarine was a contentious point throughout efforts to limit naval armaments. During the 1920's, Great Britain vigorously pressed the abolition of submarines because of their "immoral and piratical" attacks against merchant shipping, but gradually lessened their opposition during the 1930's because they wished to avoid antagonizing the lesser seapowers who had come to champion the submarine and because they believed technological innovations, such as Asdic (radar) and long-range aerial patrols, had "mastered" the U-boat threat.¹⁰ The United States initially supported abolition in 1919, but wobbled in 1922 when it leaned toward regulation of underwater warfare. Thereafter, the Americans unqualifiedly endorsed abolition as their first priority, although they did reluctantly accept continuation of the submarine rules rather than no controls. The Germans, too, agreed with abolition of the U-boat in 1935 and, when this proved impossible, settled for endorsing the rules of submarine warfare.

France, Italy and Japan insisted on retention of the submarine for strategic and economic reasons; but Italy did weaken in 1930 when it offered to trade its support of abolition for substantial arms reduction. They argued that the submarine was a defensive weapon, excellent for surprising larger enemy warships, for scouting and blockading duties, and for boarding and searching merchant vessels, and that it was an inexpensive counter-poise to the larger seapowers. Indeed, French affection for the submarine reached its zenith in 1929 when Le Temps lyrically extolled "le sous-marin" as the "arme populaire et sympathique aux democracies."¹¹

When the major seapowers met at Washington in 1921-22 for their initial debate over naval limitations, America's proposal of November 12, 1921, reversed the Wilson Administration's earlier attitude toward submarines. American admirals now offered two suggestions: first, that submarine tonnage be stabilized, rather than abolished, among the seapowers; and second, that the rules for submarine

warfare be clarified. In their opinion submarines were legitimate and effective weapons as long as they conducted themselves according the same regulations that governed surface warships. The Advisory Committee of Twenty-One, appointed by President Harding, concurred with the admirals. "Unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed," they reported, and "laws should be drawn up prescribing the methods of procedures of submarines against merchant ships both neutral and belligerent."¹²

Lord Balfour pressed for abolition but was pessimistic from the start. "I fear France, Italy and the smaller powers will combine against this policy in which case, it must fail," he wrote on November 24, 1921. "I shall then try to mitigate what I cannot cure."¹³ On December 22 Lord Lee, Britain's First Sea Lord, sought to generate support for abolition only to find the United States aloof and France, Italy and Japan adamantly opposed. The French held that submarines were the only means of defense a lesser seapower possessed against a nation abundantly supplied with capital ships; they would, however, accept formal regulation of underwater warfare. The Italians and Japanese supported the French thesis and were favorable to the extension of international law to govern submarine tactics.

After this brief, but heated, exchange the attention of the delegates centered on the drafting of a submarine code. On December 28 the United States, with Elihu Root as its chief spokesman, introduced a series of resolutions designed to make the submarine comply with the same rules of visit and search of merchant ships that governed a surface raider. If the submarine commander refused to surface and challenge a commercial vessel and, instead, was to attack without warning, he would be branded a pirate and subject to trial as such if apprehended.¹⁴

In essence the Root proposals virtually prohibited the U-boat operating as a commerce raider, which would please the British who did not fear this weapon opposing their battle fleets, and would satisfy the reluctant Japanese who planned to use it only against enemy warships. The traditional rules of maritime warfare, with its concern for the safety of passengers and crews, obviously had been drastically altered by the advent of the submarine. However, finely-spun legal theories could not obviate the nature and vulnerability of the U-boats; indeed, instruments of war seem to have a law of their own, that is, the way they may be used is frequently determined by the way they can be used.¹⁵

Root's provisions were found faulty in various details by the delegates; but the major criticism was that no distinction had been drawn between armed and unarmed merchant ships. Skirting this question, Root insisted that merchant ships had the right to arm but would not enter into the controversy over whether they lost their immunities in so doing.¹⁶ The British, too, were noticeably cool to any attempts at further clarification. Nevertheless, the American's persistence, shown in his thwarting French, Italian, and Japanese efforts to either shelve or substantially modify the resolutions, resulted in a treaty that called for: 1) merchant vessels must be ordered to submit to search and seizure; 2) merchant ships could not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers were first placed in safety; 3) if these rules could not be observed, the merchant ships must be allowed to pass unharmed; and 4) any person violating these rules shall be held liable for an act of piracy.¹⁷

To facilitate the incorporation of the submarine code into the principles of international law, Balfour amended the resolutions to provide of universal assent. With this addition, the document passed preliminary approval. Later additional articles were added on the use of poisonous gases and the combined treaty was formally signed on February 6, 1922.

France's refusal to ratify the submarine code brought the entire issue, again, before the London Naval Conference of 1930. At London, as at Washington, the British led off by urging that U-boats be totally abolished. America, meanwhile, had shifted its policy in 1928 to side with Britain. On February 4, the Secretary of State informed Congress that the United States would be willing to join in a universal prohibition of submarines. This reversal of policy may be attributed to two factors: that American public opinion demonstrated in 1922 and after that it preferred abolition over regulation; and that the naval professionals came to believe that the fewer submarines other nations possessed, particularly Japan, the more powerful their own fleet became.¹⁸ At the conference, the American delegates chose somewhat different grounds to justify their attitude: that the submarine was expensive and it substantially increased the need for costly counter-weapons; and that a recurrence of the fearful torpedoing of

merchant and passenger ships, as witnessed during the war, must be prevented.

Ever since Balfour argued that submarines ought to be abolished because it was "inconsistent with the laws of war and the dictates of humanity," British policy pursued the suppression of this weapon. In the main, they argued that the submarine could only be used effectively as a commerce raider. In the London debates, the British delegation summarized its case for abolition on the following grounds:¹⁹

- 1) It would serve the best interests of all humanity.
- 2) The primarily offensive nature of this vessel.
- 3) The substantial advancement of disarmament and peace that abolition would bring.
- 4) The financial savings that would result.
- 5) The removal of undue risks to submarine personnel with abolition.

If abolition should fail, the British proposed their rigid quantitative and qualitative limitations and the revival of the Washington submarines rules of warfare.

France remained convinced that the submarine constituted a relatively inexpensive "defensive" weapon. At London, as at Washington, its delegates insisted that the submarine had not been used successfully against only merchant ships; but that it had taken a substantial toll of the fighting fleets as well. In addition to its destructive power, the French view went on, the submarine immobilized combat ships for when these vessels left their bases, they necessarily had to operate continuously at high speeds thus tiring out both crews and engines. More specifically, the French delegation insisted that their nation relied on these vessels for:

- 1) The protection of the population and cities along the coast against enemy attacks in the absence of the high sea fleets, and the defense of distant dependencies while awaiting the arrival of supporting fleets.

- 2) The escort and protection of convoys transporting men and goods between the mother country and the colonies.
- 3) The guarding of lines of communication over long distances, when bases are lacking between the mother country and her colonies, or between the colonies themselves.
- 4) The scouting and protection of the high sea fleets. France, for these various tasks, cannot do without submarines; she also needs them because of the comparative weakness of her surface craft...France... considers the submarine as essentially a defensive weapon. In particular, she looks on the submarines, as all the lesser naval powers do, as her only protection against a long distance blockade by surface fleets.²⁰

Nor were the French content with utilitarian arguments for to the reproach that the underwater weapon was unchivalrous, they replied that this charge had been leveled at all new weapons--the crossbow and firearms. To the charge that the submarine was a barbarous instrument, they answered that all weapons could be used for criminal purposes and that this allegation had significance only when applied to those who so used it rather than to the instrument itself. Was the submarine more dangerous to the innocent and unsuspecting than floating mines which could not distinguish between belligerent and neutral ships, or aircraft which could wreak havoc over wide areas on land as well as the sea?

The French declared that while they could not accept the abolition of underwater warships, they were ready to join in establishing rules governing their use. And to this end, they urged preparation of an agreement restricting submarines to follow the rules observed by surface warships, either current or future, toward merchant ships.

Japan, while lining up with France, came to London with the demand for submarine parity with the Anglo-Saxon seapowers. This claim was based, in part, upon an Anglo-Japanese memorandum of July 18, 1927, in which the British reportedly agreed to Japanese demands. At the same time, Tokyo apparently had no objection to reviving the submarine code of 1922. Italy offered to negotiate its submarine policy: it would endorse abolition of underwater warships if this would lead to substantial reductions in armaments.²¹ Beyond this, the Italian's merely reiterated their demand for parity in submarine tonnage with France.

Gradually, the conference turned again to consideration of submarine rules of war. There were demands, however, for modifying the 1922 code. The French and American delegations called for subjecting the submarines to the same rules of war governing surface warships. Also France and Italy objected to holding submarine crews liable to charges of piracy in cases of violation. American legal officials concurred with this last criticism because, according to John Bassett Moore, it could not be justly or effectively executed and its enforcement under these circumstances might lead to reprisals. H.W. Maklin, British legal adviser, finally presented a compromise draft which became the basis of Part IV of the 1930 London treaty.²² It read:

The following are accepted as established rules of International Law:

- 1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.
- 2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose, the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety, unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

In 1936, the submarine code posed a minor legal question. Although Article 23 of the 1930 treaty declared that these rules were to "remain in force without limit of time," the basic treaty was about to expire. The British hit upon the idea of reconfirming this commitment--to which the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan were still found--and of extending it to the other seapowers by recasting Part IV as a separate instrument.²³

The British-sponsored procès-verbal, an identical restatement of Article 22, was agreed upon without any additional reservations or qualifications. Consequently, although the withdrawal of the Japanese delegation temporarily

disrupted negotiations, diplomatic representatives of the United States, France, Japan, Italy, Great Britain, and the British Dominions and India gathered in London on November 6, 1936 to affix their signatures to the new protocol. Through British bilateral efforts Germany signed on November 23 and Belgium on December 23, while Greece, Russia and Turkey adhered to the proces-verbal on January 11, February 16, and July 7, 1937. In all over thirty nations agreed to abide by these regulations on submarine warfare.²⁴

Assessment of the Submarine Code. The rules governing submarine warfare suffered an ephemeral, yet controversial, existence: it gained legal identity as the result of political compromise, only to become a victim of wartime realities. This effort to "humanize" submarine warfare gained few endorsements from civil or military observers.

This renewed effort to "humanize" submarine warfare gained few endorsements from civil or military observers. One contemporary journal commented that the code was vague and unworkable; but "the greatest weakness of the submarine code lies not in particular features but in its very nature. The code is simply another rule of war. Experience teaches that when the fighting grows desperate rules of war go up in smoke."²⁵ Admiral George C. Day (USN) told the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs that: "I think it is entirely worthless...It leaves definitions so indistinct, so indefinite, that no two belligerents will agree as to what happened on any given occasion." Moreover, the Admiral added, "What is 'persistent refusal to stop?' Is it one shot or a dozen shots? Or 'active resistance to visit and search?' What is active resistance to visit or search? Is it shooting the boat as she comes to the surface? Is it knocking a man on the head as he comes over the rail?"²⁶ To expect that the submarine code would be upheld during hostilities, Churchill declared in 1938, is "the acme of gullibility" for a nation at war makes the fullest use of it's best weapons. Earlier, Andre Gerand wrote that "In time of war, there is only one categorical imperative: to destroy the enemy."²⁷

Unsurprisingly, the submarine code was struck down precisely at the moment it became operational. At the outbreak of war in 1939 it was jeopardized by British decisions to arm merchant ships and to order them to radio positions of U-boats and violated by Germany submarine practices. In 1941, it was repudiated by the United States when it

authorized unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. A cursory examination of the sequence of events, beginning with the sinking of the British liner Athenia and terminating with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, reveals the tenuous acceptance of the protocol by naval professionals. For the initial violation of the procès-verbal set in motion a chain of measures and counter-measures that, while rooted in a willingness to attribute all conceivable barbarities to one's foes, were more often carried along by a mutual concept of "total war" which sought the destruction of the enemy's economic resources than by a desire for revenge.

When Germany's U-30 imprudently torpedoed the unarmed, but darkened, Athenia on September 4, 1939, with the loss of 122 lives, its captain, who mistakenly thought he had attacked an enemy auxiliary cruiser, had violated the protocol and his government's instructions.²⁸ Hitler had issued strict directives that German submarines were to abide by the international rule of war, despite insistent pleas from the German Naval Staff that all restrictions on attacking enemy shipping be removed. Political, not legal or moral, considerations guided Hitler's decisions for he hoped to isolate the so-called "Polish incident" and to arrive at terms with the Western nations once the Polish campaign ended; he therefore did not want to outrage popular opinion by indiscriminate sinkings. Thus the U-boats, in keeping with their Prize Regulations, were initially authorized only to attack armed merchantmen or those escorted by warships without warning; while all other ships were to be boarded and, only if carrying contraband, sunk.

The torpedoing of the Athenia stunned the Nazi government as it outraged the Western countries; as a consequence began the escalation of submarine warfare. The German position had not only been compromised by the sinking but, unfortunately for the submarine protocol, its intentions had become befogged in its own confusion. This resulted when the German skipper failed to notify his superiors of his error, as all submarines maintained strict radio silence when at sea, until he returned home during the closing days of September. Meanwhile, the Naval Staff, in the belief that none of its vessels were involved, advised the government to deny any responsibility and dismissed the British charges as propaganda. Although Oberleutnant Fritz Lemp, commander of the U-30, was later reprimanded and confined to quarters for his rashness, Josef Goebbels, Nazi Minister for Propaganda, had earlier placed the

blame for the sinking on Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, who alledgedly ordered the Athenia attacked so that atrocity charges could be brought against the Third Reich. From other fertile minds came a wide array of explanations--that a Soviet submarine had actually fired the lethal torpedoes, or that fanatical Irish terrorists had planted a time-bomb in the Athenia's hold.²⁹

The British Admiralty, in Professor Morison's words, "naturally took this attack as evidence that Admiral Karl Doenitz had no intention of respecting the treaty, and gave notice that British merchant vessels would be armed in self-defense."³⁰ That these professionals were saddened by the Athenia tragedy is not doubted, but they could hardly have been surprised. In anticipation of total naval warfare, the Admiralty had begun, in June 1939, "to plan and organize the defensive arming of the whole British Merchant Navy" without concern for its implications for the submarine code. To this end, "anti-submarine and anti-aircraft guns were collected and distributed, the ships were made ready to receive them, and naval reservists and Merchant Navy crews were trained in their use."³¹ According to one German admiral, some one thousand merchantmen were armed during the first three months of the war; while the British naval historian concludes that some 3,400 ships had been equipped with guns by the end of 1940. Other British regulations further complicated adherence to the submarine protocol: at the outbreak of war British ships were instructed to report by radio the position of any submarine sighted; on October 1, 1939 the Admiralty ordered merchant vessels to ram all hostile U-boats; and on May 8, 1940 the Admiralty announced that any ship found at night in the Skagerrak was to be summarily destroyed.³²

These counter-measures brought charges by the German Naval Staff that the British were, in fact, violating the protocol, and that their U-boats should commence sinking all British ships, merchant or otherwise, on sight. Gradually Hitler gave in to the urgings of his admiralty: at the end of September 1939 the German navy announced it was suspending its prize regulations--which corresponded to the protocol--for enemy shipping in the North Sea; by October 2 it authorized the attacking of all "blacked-out" vessels off British and French coast lines; and in mid-October its submarines were informed that identification of a merchantman under Allied colors was sufficient to justify attack. By August 17, 1940 the German government

had declared the British Isles under siege and resorted to unrestricted submarine warfare around that beleaguered nation.³³

For the United States, the decision to toss overboard "treaty and doctrine" came on the first day of war. Hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered his remaining units to "Execute unrestricted submarine and air warfare against Japan." Thus the American public's abhorrence of Germany's unrestricted submarine campaigns of 1917-1918 evaporated before the cry for revenge. "The enemy, by his calculated breach of treaties and international law at Pearl Harbor," so Samuel Elliot Morison explains, "had absolved the United States from observing any rule restricting methods of naval warfare unless dictated by self-interest or the danger of retaliation." But most certainly more than the desire for retribution prompted this unilateral action: "realistic thinking demanded recognition of the fact that a nation's economic forces and its fighting forces bear the inseparable relationship of Siamese twins. Any reduction of a nation's economic resources weakens its war potential. Sever the commercial arteries of a maritime nation and its industrial heart must fail, while the war effort expires with it." This matter-of-fact analysis by naval professionals concludes, "Therefore, it was not reprisal so much as military imperative that caused Washington to reverse its opinion on the already abrogated naval laws."³⁴

Interestingly, there were relatively few reports of Japanese "violations" of the submarine protocol; yet here again it was neither legal nor moral inhibitions that guided Nippon's submariners. Rather their behavior apparently was motivated by either a "faulty" strategy or by a warrior's scorn for taking such easy prey. The perplexed Morison notes that "instead of sending most of their boats [submarines] to raid merchant shipping, the Japanese persisted in trying to find warships. They had no scruples about unrestricted warfare, far from it; they simply failed to replace strategic notions. And this is the more difficult to explain because the U-boats that reached patrol areas off California and Oregon shortly after Pearl Harbor sank several merchant vessels."³⁵ Seemingly, the ancient Bushido code prevailed when more modern legal innovations failed.

Evaluation of the discarded submarine protocol may be directed at two levels, "legal" and "strategic." At the

Nuremberg trials, both Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and Fleet Admiral Karl Doenitz were charged with, among other offenses, deliberately violating "the international rules on submarine warfare." They protested their innocence on three principle counts: 1) that the sinking of the Athenia was an accident; 2) that technical changes complicated the legal situation, i.e., the development of anti-submarine devices such as electronic equipment and aircraft; and 3) that the United States also justified its utilization of unrestricted submarine warfare and much sooner than the Nazi government. Both men were subsequently cleared of these specific charges.³⁶

The strategy of submarine warfare was dictated by the necessities of "total war;" this was explicit in both the German and American applications and implicit in Britain's protest. Whatever the legalities might have directed, or public opinion may have authorized prior to the Second World War, both succumbed before arguments of military strategy. If this was true for serial bombardment, it was equally so for submarine warfare.³⁷

The Contemporary Verdict

The London agreement came under a searching analysis by skeptical citizens, legislators, and naval professionals in the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. More importantly, militant nationalists and naval officers pressed their opposition while the treaty moved through their respective ratification procedures. This increasing political awareness, particularly by navy professionals, presented a challenge to the prerogatives of civilian statesmen. Yet as prompt ratification evinced, the treaty found support from a substantial majority in each nation.

The similarity of opposition viewpoints was striking. Legislative opponents in the United States, Great Britain and Japan denounced the London Pact almost in identical phraseology:

Frederick Hale (before the U.S. Senate): "The British by the terms of this treaty have us hamstrung and hogtied and there will keep us as long as limitations of armaments are the order of the day."

Winston Churchill (before the House of Commons):
"I am astonished that any Admiralty board of naval officers could have been found to accept responsibility for such a ham-stringing stipulation."

T. Inukai, President of the Seiyukai, the leading opposition party (before the Diet): The government has "betrayed the country by entering into an agreement at the London Conference inadequate for Japan's defense needs."³⁸

Naval authorities of the three nations also denounced the treaty as jeopardizing their nation's security. Lord Chatfield (Royal Navy) concluded that not only was Britain's naval position placed in danger but that the "sea-security of the Empire" had been led "to its most dangerous point [in] 150 years." Captain J. K. Taussing (USN) told Senate Committee that the increased ratio granted Japan did not give us "a sporting chance for victory." Admiral Kato (IJN) insisted that "Japan has been roped up by Great Britain and the United States and thrown into prison."³⁹ That a three-power naval agreement was negotiated and ratified represented at least a temporary victory of civilian authorities over naval professionals in each nation.

The United States and Ratification. In expressing his pleasure at the successful conclusion of the London conference, Hoover said: "The most vital feature of its great accomplishments for peace is the final abolition of competition in naval arms between the greatest naval powers and the burial of the fears and suspicions which have been the constant product of rival warship construction." The single largest factor in the removing of this 'fear,' in the President's mind, was the granting of absolute parity to the United States by Great Britain. In his examination of the Treaty, Hoover was pleased to find (according to his calculations) that the United States would be able to save up "to \$1,000,000,000 in the next six years." Not only would America save, he pointed out, but Great Britain and Japan would as well. "The total saving to the world is perhaps \$2,500,000,000 below the Geneva basis to which the world was steadily drifting." "This sum," Hoover rejoiced, "devoted to reproductive enterprise will be a great stimulus to world prosperity."⁴⁰

Press response in the United States was mixed. Newspapers in the eastern states commented extensively on the

agreement and, except for the Hearst organs, were sympathetic. In the central and western states the press revealed an indifference and apathy in contrast to the enthusiasm accorded the Washington treaties. The most strident opposition was expressed by the Hearst-owned New York American and the Chicago Tribune. "The terms which are hailed as a triumph for Washington," The Tribune exercised, "fail in every respect to represent what our government was supposed to seek. What is offered us as parity is not parity. What is offered us as reduction is not reduction. The British fleet remains superior to ours. The terms represent further retreat in our relative naval position and the enormous saving in expense which the agreement is alleged to have secured is merely hypothetical."⁴¹ The New Republic was miffed by the tone of the conference. Its editors concluded that "real success cannot be achieved by mechanical or superficial formulas like yardsticks or parity, but only by settlement of the political issues which determine armament policies." In its survey, the Literary Digest concluded that "Newspaper editorial opinion is on the whole favorable, although not so unanimously enthusiastic. The idea that half a loaf is better than none is widely prevalent."⁴²

Hoover submitted the new naval treaty to the Senate on May 1, 1930. The President, worried about the hostile editorials, had energetically begun preparations for ratification upon learning that an agreement had been reached. His anxiety to gain public support may be seen in his instructions to Stimson that all press releases reflect "a clear note of exultation in our success," and each delegate express himself as "satisfied with the results and proud of it." Hoover did not want journalists to speculate on the treaty without the administration's guidance.⁴³

Opposition in the Senate to the London agreement immediately sprung up, motivated by widely divergent sentiment. Hale, a Republican from Maine, spear-headed the assault by the "big Navy" group; Borah, a Republican progressive, questioned the accord because it called for naval construction; Hiram Johnson, a Republican progressive from California, disliked the concessions granted Japan regarding the cruiser ratios and suspected the pact contained a confidential agreement with Britain; and Thomas Walsh, a Democrat from Montana, charged that the Administration had spent \$350,000 on a conference so ill-conceived that it did more damage than good to the prospects of world peace.⁴⁴

Partisanship, isolationism, anti-Japanese and anti-British sentiments, anti-militarism, and a desire for a large navy combined to present a spirited battle against ratification.

Senator Johnson insisted that the Administration turn over the transcripts of the preliminary talks with the British to ensure against any secret agreement. Stimson refused, with the strong backing of Hoover, pointing out that the treaty's terms were as precisely drawn as a contract. Publication of the earlier discussions could only embarrass the representatives of other nations. Johnson retorted that "we are back again, under this administration, with secret diplomacy" and maintained his clamor for the "secret documents."⁴⁵ Senators David Reed and Joseph Robinson answered opposition arguments, reaffirming the desirability of including prominent Senators in the negotiatory process. Both Reed and Robinson had been at London as delegates and in the Senate resisted any notion that they had been cheated by the smooth-operating foreigners.⁴⁶

American naval professionals aired their dissent during hearings conducted by the Senate's Committees on Foreign and Naval Affairs. The criticisms of navy witnesses touched on technical, tactical, and strategic matters. The admirals objected to the idea of "combat parity" utilized for determining the equality of fleets. Such a concept computed the striking power of the fleet and confined itself to guns, tons, and age of ships. The critics contended that true parity involved consideration of additional factors such as naval bases, merchant tonnage, fuel, resources, lines of communication, geographical position, etc. Behind their skepticism of combat parity lay the admirals' preference for 10,000-ton cruisers mounting 8-inch guns and their desire to make maximum use of this vessel. They complained that Great Britain still maintained higher cruiser tonnage and that British battleships, although now at parity in number, were faster than American vessels.

There was also resentment to the granting of submarine parity to Japan. Sticking to their premise that the fewer submarines Japan possessed the greater American security, they insisted any tonnage agreement should conform to the 5-3 ratio. A more realistic appraisal, however, came from Admiral H. E. Yarnell: "Japan entered the conference with a superiority of submarines, so that it was rather futile to talk to her about a reduction to 5-3 when she had these ships and we did not."⁴⁷

Professional naval opinion objected to Japan's increased cruiser ratio. Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol implied that the increase reduced the American navy ability to operate in Japanese waters. Under sharp questioning by Senator Reed, he admitted that Japan "could not bring war to us." Yet Bristol declared that while "our nation would be safe from an invasion but we would lose the war! You do not have to invade a country to be successful in war." Secretary of Senate Stimson looked upon the matter of concession from a more practical view:

Our problem was to ask Japan to stand still for six years and let us build past her until we had fifteen cruisers of the 8-inch variety in the water to her twelve...In respect to 6-inch gun cruisers, we had to ask her to stand still at an increase of only 2,000 tons--she had 98,000, the treaty gives her 100,000--while we build past her from 70,000 tons to 143,000 tons.⁴⁸

Rear Admiral Henry H. Hough summarized the navy's view of the treaty:

We gave up the right to build the type of ship we need. We abandoned the 5:5:3 ratio. We accepted subdivision of the cruiser category. We surrendered the principle of no replacements until 1936. We should have gotten one more capital ship. We did not press as hard as we might for actual parity. We gave up our superiority in destroyers. We granted parity in submarines for Japan. We did not insist on modification of the base and fortification clause of the Washington Treaty when granting an increase of ratio to Japan.⁴⁹

Hough believed Japan and Great Britain had won a diplomatic victory at London.

The struggle was finally resolved on July 21 when Hoover reconvened the Senate in a special session and threatened all-night sessions. In the mid-summer heat of Washington, D.C., opposition wilted and the treaty was endorsed by a 58 to 9 majority.

Great Britain and Ratification. In Great Britain, the naval pact encountered a mixed welcome but eventually gained endorsement. In moderate, cautiously measured tones, the Times summarized the practical results of the conference:

The supreme fact is that it has been found possible for the three greatest naval powers in the world to come to an agreement, acceptable to all three of them, as to the number and the type of warships of all kinds they will build during the next five years. And the programmes upon which they have agreed are very much smaller than anything which was contemplated at Washington, or even at Geneva three years ago. They have thus, as between themselves, extended and completed the work of the Washington Conference and abolished competition in naval armaments.

According to The Living Age, the new treaty "seemed to satisfy everybody" in the British Isles. Champions of Anglo-American friendship were happy to see another link in their chain of common interests. "The Tories, who had made up their minds in advance to be disappointed," it concluded, "have had a grand time railing at Mr. MacDonald and in the same breath have been able secretly to congratulate themselves on the 'escape clause' that frees Britain from any obligation to keep her fight fleet within certain limits."⁵⁰ The Outlook and Independent put the journalistic cap on the treaty: "Brilliant tricks can be done with disarmament figures, but, when the mathematical jousts are over, little reduction can be claimed for the conference at London...As a whole it may be said that the mountain labored at London and brought forth a mouse. A mouse is something, but nothing more than a mouse."⁵¹

Minority opposition to the agreement appeared in Parliament. In the House of Lords, three former First Lords of the Admiralty, Lords Bridgeman, Carson, and Wester-Weymss, and two distinguished Admirals, Lord Beatty and Earl Jellicoe, harshly scrutinized the cruiser agreement and the question of parity. Bridgeman found the cruiser agreement "the most alarming part of the Treaty" and questioned the government's sacrifice in reducing its demands from 70 to 50 cruisers. Furthermore, he rejected the mathematical approach to parity: "I would far prefer to see America not only have parity but having everything she wants above it, provided that we get the minimum that we think is necessary for our security."⁵²

Lord Carson's denunciation of the treaty was even more bitter. "Never has there been before an attempt to reduce the navy of this country so that to take away from it the mastery of the seas," he said, "which hitherto has been always considered essential to the absolute existence and

safety of this country." He objected to the use of naval limitations to bid for better relations with the United States. "Nobody can object to that so long as the price you pay is not too dear, but the whole thing depends upon that, and I object to being dictated to by America, or by any country, in what are the essentials which we require for the safety of our country."⁵³ The remarks by Wester-Weymss, Beatty, and Jellicoe were in the same vein. They condemned the sacrifice of 20 cruisers to purchase a temporary political success.

These debates in the House of Lords were not as profound as they seemed. While critics implied that Great Britain could remain indifferent to the American fleet, it was not possible, for each navy responded to the principle of "direct" effect. Every expansion of the American fleet would cause a corresponding increase in the Japanese fleet, and each Japanese expansion would cause Australia and New Zealand to demand an increase in the British fleet. The competitors may be interchanged without altering the net effect upon the British navy. As Howland has noted, "British indifference, therefore, toward the fleet of the United States was more theoretical than real. No member of the high seas group can build without disturbing the equilibrium of the group as a whole."⁵⁴

On May 15, Prime Minister MacDonald opened discussion in Commons on the London treaty by emphasizing its success in achieving reduction and stopping naval competition. In reply to the upper chamber, the Prime Minister stressed that the Admiralty had endorsed a minimum of 50 cruisers "for a strictly limited period" given the pacific nature of international conditions. In contrast to Hoover, MacDonald regarded his accomplishments modestly. "We have simply made a little nibble at the cherry. There is no use magnifying it and there is no use minimizing it."⁵⁵

Winston Churchill stood out as the treaty's most severe critic in Commons. He stressed three major points: first, that the treaty was not an extension of the Washington agreement but differed from it; second, that the treaty did not establish parity between Great Britain and the United States but left Britain an inferior sea power; and third, that the provision subsidiary to the treaty insured such inferiority.⁵⁶ The central thesis running through his arguments was that the Washington treaty granted parity only to the major battle elements of the respective fleets, while leaving "unfettered" England's right to provide any protection

deemed necessary against submarine warfare. Thus in Commons, as in the House of Lords, the doctrine of "absolute requirements" was again paraded forth: England needed 70 cruisers to meet its obligations regardless of the strength of other navies.

On June 2, the Conservative opposition introduced a motion to refer the treaty to a select committee for more thorough examination. Stanley Baldwin, who placed the motion, urged its acceptance on the grounds that the treaty was "full of technicalities which few of us are capable of being judges."⁵⁷ In putting forth this novel procedure, Baldwin argued that the United States Senate was similarly investigating the treaty. With the motion failing, the naval treaty was approved by Commons on July 24, 1930.

Japan and Ratification. Japanese attitudes toward the naval pact intensified the patterns being played out in Britain and America. Opposition appeared in the Diet, in the militant press, and from naval officers during the long, bitter struggle over ratification. And yet the government, backed by an apparent public majority, succeeded in successfully pressing formal sanction of the treaty.

Japanese public opinion seems to have swung from supporting the Admiralty's position during the negotiations to endorsing the Hamaguchi administration's desire to ratify the negotiated agreement. The naval officers and reservists' organizations launched a systematic effort to gain popular support for the 70 per cent ratio as the minimum adequate for national defense. Under the guise of acquainting the public with the progress of negotiations, a series of meetings were held during March 1-10, throughout the greater Tokyo area. Conducted in public halls and schools, the principal speakers elaborated the Admiralty's stand.⁵⁸

Effective counter efforts by peace groups and associations mounted slowly. Takeuchi noted that:

...all the societies and associations whose raison d'être was given opportunity for vindication and recognition failed to function at this most crucial moment. This fact of complete failure to give expression to their raison d'être was due, in large measure, to the apprehension so commonly held among the people that to express even a doubt as to the wisdom of the navy stand might be interpreted as 'disrupting the united opinion of the country.'

Yet, once the Hamaguchi cabinet agreed to the Reed-Matsudaira compromise, the liberal press began to urge support for a modification of the Admiralty program. Publication of the treaty further increased public endorsement of the civilian government, "the consensus of press opinion being that the treaty as concluded was the best obtainable under the circumstances." From this point on to ratification, the press lent "a decidedly vigorous support to the treaty."⁵⁹

Objection to the naval agreement in the Diet by the Seiyukai, the opposition party, stemmed from partisanship rather than principle. It may be recalled that the Washington treaties had been endorsed by a Seiyukai administration and that Premier Tanaka's Seiyukai cabinet sought a naval limitation treaty at Geneva in 1927. However, with Minseito in power in 1930 the Seiyukai served notice early that they would support the Navy's program. On January 21, 1930 the party's leader, Inukai, introduced a resolution calling upon the Japanese delegation in London to insist upon the "three fundamental claims." This maneuver was frustrated when the House dissolved itself the same day. In the general election which followed, the naval conference became an issue. On February 20 the polls recorded an overwhelming victory for Premier Osayuki Hamaguchi's Minseito party and gave the administration a clear majority in the Lower House.⁶⁰

With the treaty concluded, Foreign Minister Shidehara asked the Diet's support for ratification in an address on April 25. To those who feared for the nation's security, he declared: "None but extreme pessimists could possibly contend that the amount of strength to be allotted to Japan during the period ending in 1936 will prove fatally short of the needs of our national security. Taking fully into consideration the views of naval experts, we have finally adopted with firm conviction the decision to join in the present Treaty." In seeking to assuage the apprehension that the Japanese delegation had been pressured by Britain and America into settling for fewer ships than they rightly needed, Shidehara concluded:

Having carefully weighed all considerations, not only of foreign policy, but also of naval, financial, economic, and all the other factors of national strength, upon which the security of a nation must, in the final analysis, depend, we were brought to the conclusion that, in accepting the terms of the agreement arrived at, we would decidedly be serving the real interests of this Empire."⁶¹

With the government's position stated, the parliamentary struggle commenced in earnest. The Seiyukai, smarting under its February election defeat, chose to exploit the strained relationship between the civilian cabinet and naval officials to embarrass Premier Hamaguchi. The key to Seiyukai strategy lay in joining forces with the conservative members in the Upper House of the Diet, frustrated military and naval leaders, and sympathetic influential elements of the Privy Council. If the Upper House and the Privy Council could be persuaded to reject the treaty, the Hamaguchi ministry would fall.

Inuaki immediately challenged the compatibility of the treaty to the Nation's security. He charged that the government had disregarded the advice of the admiralty, which was charged with evaluating national defense needs, and had allowed politicians to usurp constitutional powers in order to sign an agreement in defiance of naval advice. In the debates that followed, constitutional subtleties took on increasing significance. The issue at stake was whether the government had the right to agree to the London treaty without first receiving the consent of the Naval General Staff. On April 30 several Seiyukai representatives pressed Hamaguchi to delineate the constitutional authority governing his decision to accept the Reed-Matsudaira compromise. These critics argued that attempts by civilian statesmen to resolve issues involving national defense and strategy infringed upon the responsibilities of the army and navy.⁶²

While evading direct confrontation with the issue in the Parliamentary debate, Hamaguchi vigorously rejected the contention that his action had violated the Constitution. The Premier stated that the government took full responsibility for its action and that its instructions to the London delegation constituted cabinet policy, not simply a foreign office position or an admiralty position. He came near to asserting the doctrine of responsible government. Most of the leading Japanese constitutional jurists, as well as the press, upheld the actions of the Hamaguchi government. The forthright liberal Tokyo Asahi condemned the Seiyukai party for its partisan treatment of the naval treaty and, even more strongly, for its creation of a constitutional issue for popular advantage.⁶³

Concomitant with the parliamentary struggle, and intermingled with it, was the open rupture between the government and the Naval General Staff. This argument over

whether civil or military authorities should have the final voice in armament matters comprised an extension of the intricate legal dispute over the interpretation of the Constitution. To "constitutionalist" jurists, the civil government had the right and duty to prescribe military needs in time of peace; to ultranationalistic jurists, military affairs could be directed only by the Minister of War and Navy.⁶⁴ The Navy asserted that the Hamaguchi cabinet had signed the London naval agreement in "violation of the imperial prerogative of supreme command." Under the guise of defending the nation's security against the encroachment of a bureaucratic, political government, military officers boined the phrase--prerogative of supreme command--which subsequently provided them a moral sanctuary for evading the responsibility of their arbitrary activities.

When the struggle between civil and naval authorities reached the Supreme War Council, Admiral Kato, chief of the naval staff, led the opposition to ratification. He asked the government of answer, in the affirmative or negative without qualifications, the simple question: "Is the London Treaty defective from the standpoint of national defense and naval strategy?" This obvious attempt to embarrass the naval minister, Admiral Takarabe, and consequently the cabinet, was rebuffed. At a subsequent meeting of the Council, the military adopted a report charging that the treaty was, indeed, defective because it failed to provide for the nation's defense.⁶⁵ The report lent weight to arguments of opposition forces when the treaty came to its final hurdle--the Privy Council.

When the naval pact reached the Privy Council for "advice" on ratification in September, the issue of responsibility for supreme command came to be discussed at the highest level. Miyaji Ito, as chairman of the Treaty Examination Committee, packed his body with members of the Privy Council who supported the Admiralty position and deliberately ignored members, such as Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, who were known to favor the agreement. To embarrass the cabinet, the committee asked that Admiral Kato be allowed to testify before the Council and that it should have access to the data submitted to the Emperor on Japan's naval strength. Hamaguchi firmly rejected the committee's proposals and threatened to appeal directly to the throne if that body persisted in its obstructionist behavior. There can be little doubt but that the Premier acted with the knowledge that his policy had the Emperor's support.

Meanwhile, several Japanese leaders lent their support to the government. Prince Saionji, the surviving elder statesman, Count Makino, the Lord Privy Seal, and Admiral Suzuki, the Grand Chamberlain, worked hard behind the scene to secure favorable action on the Treaty. Even more significant, was the vital role played by Admiral Keisuke Okada who had used his close personal ties among naval officers to counter Kato's criticisms.⁶⁶

Faced with Hamaguchi's strong position in the Lower House of the Diet, the mounting popular support in the liberal press, and the Emperor's favor, the Privy Council reconsidered its attitude. The Council unconditionally approved ratification of the London treaty on October 1, 1930, and the Emperor formally signed the pact the following day.

In the moment of victory, many observers looked upon the ratification of the London treaty as signaling a long heralded arrival of responsible constitutional government in Japan. While it was true that the prestige of the cabinet rose and that of the military declined, the dominance of civil authority proved ephemeral. Although Admiral Kato and his leading supporters were eased out of office, within a year an explosion--known as the Muken Incident--signaled the up-swing of military dominance.

Chapter 16 -- Footnotes

¹ Charles Howland, Survey of American Foreign Relations, 1931 (1931), p. 366.

² S.I.A., 1930, pp. 1-2.

³ George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None (1940), pp. 344-45; Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again (1947), p. 44.

⁴ Raymond G. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium (1962), p. 128.

⁵ Robert Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (1957), pp. 104-05. His subsequent study of Stimson and the Naval Conference, Vol. XI in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy is less critical on this point, see p. 197.

⁶ John B. Oliver, "Japan's Role in the Origins of the London Naval Treaty of 1930," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Duke University, 1954), pp. 494-95.

⁷ Nomura claimed that Japan had eight completed and four underway in 1930, while the United States had only one in service and "a few under construction." "Japan's Demand for Naval Equality," Foreign Affairs, (January, 1935), p. 197.

⁸ Howland, Survey..., 1931, pp. 367-68.

⁹ Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs, "London Naval Treaty of 1930," 71st Cong 2nd Sess., p. 284.

¹⁰ Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (1961) p. 416.

¹¹ Le Temps, Feb. 18, 1929.

¹² Thomas H. Buckley, "The U.S. and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Indiana University, 1961), pp. 168-69; Senate, Report of the American Delegation, Doc. #125, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1922), pp. 34-35.

¹³ D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, XIV, 504.

¹⁴ Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (1922), p. 596; Phillip Jessup, Elihu Root (1930), II, 453ff.

¹⁵ For a critique of Root's proposals, see Morris Cooper, Jr., "The Future of the Submarine in International Law," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (March, 1922), pp. 337-46; for an over-all view of the submarine, see Comdr. D. D. Lewis (USN), The Fight for the Sea: The Past, Present, and Future of Submarine Warfare in the Atlantic (1961).

¹⁶ Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 456; D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, XIV, 598-99.

¹⁷ Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Novious Gases in Warfare, Feb 6, 1922, F.R., 1922, I, 267-70.

¹⁸ Roland A. Chaput, Disarmament in British Foreign Policy (1935), p. 167.

¹⁹ Foreign Office, Documents of the London Conference, 1930 (1930), p. 188.

²⁰ ibid., p. 194; Howland, Survey..., 1931, pp. 353-54.

²¹ Chaput, Disarmament, p. 170; U.S. Department of State, Proceedings of the London Conference of 1930 and Supplementary (1931), p. 91.

²² F.R., 1930, I, 33-34, 54, 59, 68.

²³ F.R., 1935, I, 122; F.R., 1936, I, 33, 160-63.

²⁴ During 1937 the following states signed:
Afghanistan, May 25; Albania, March 3; Austria, April 1;
Brazil, December 31; Bulgaria, March 1; Costa Rica, July 7;
Czechoslovakia, September 14; Denmark, April 21; Egypt,
June 23; Estonia, June 26; Finland, February 18; Guatemala,
April 21; Haiti, January 23; Hungary, December 8; Iraq,
December 27; Yugoslavia, April 19; Nepal, January 27;
Netherlands, September 30; Norway, May 21; Panama,
February 26; Peru, June 3; Poland, July 21; Salvador,
November 24; Saudi Arabia, June 11; Sweden, February 15;

Switzerland, May 22; and the Vatican, March 16. D.I.A., 1937, p. 844.

During 1938 and 1939 five other nations added their signatures: Latvia, March 7; Lithuania, January 27; Mexico, January 3; and Siam, January 12, 1938; Iran, January 21, 1939. League of Nations Treaty Series.

25 Outlook and Independent (Apr. 23, 1930), p. 652.

26 Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs, pp. 342-43.

27 Winston Churchill, While England Slept (1938), pp. 217-18; André Gérard, "France and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty," Foreign Affairs (Oct., 1935), p. 56.

28 Lewis, Fight for the Sea, pp. 88-80; Thaddeus V. Tuleja, Eclipse of the German Navy (1958), pp. 37-41; and Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Sea Warfare, 1939-1945, A German Viewpoint (1957), pp. 45-56.

29 Tuleja, Eclipse of the German Navy, p. 40; Lewis, Fight for the Sea, p. 78.

30 S. E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1943, rev. ed. (1955), I, 9.

31 Stephen W. Roskill, War At Sea, 1939-1940 (1954-61), I, 22-22.

32 Ibid., p. 22; Sea Warfare, 1939-1945, p. 48; Lewis, Fight for the Sea, pp. 78-79; Also see Trial of the Major War Criminals at the International Military Tribunal (1948), XL, pp. 87-91. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 425.

33 Lewis, Fight for the Sea, pp. 78779; Ruge, Sea Warfare, p. 48.

34 Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May-August, 1942 (1950), pp. 18-19; for a statement by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, see International Military Tribunal, XL, pp. 108-11.

35 Morison, Coral Sea, pp. 189-90.

³⁶ International Military Tribunal, I, 312-13; XIII, 248-368; XIV, 88-81, 196-210, 237-38, 340-41; Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, My Life (1960), p. 295.

³⁷ See George E. Hopkins, "Bombing and the American Conscience during World War II," The Historian (May, 1966), pp. 451-73.

³⁸ U.S., Cong. Rec., 71st Cong Special Sess. (1930), p. 106; G. B., H.C. Debs, CCXXXVIII, c. 2114; New York Times, Apr. 16, 1930.

³⁹ Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 44; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Limitation of Naval Armaments (1930), p. 320; Oliver, "Japan's Role...In the London Treaty," p. 491.

⁴⁰ See Ray Lyman Wilbur and Arthur M. Hyde, The Hoover Policies (1937), pp. 592-97.

⁴¹ Eleanor Typper and George E. McReynolds, Japan in American Public Opinion (1937), pp. 254-63; Literary Digest (Apr. 26, 1930), p. 9.

⁴² New Republic (Apr. 30, 1930), p. 286; Literary Digest (Apr. 26, 1930), pp. 8-9; (May 3, 1930), p. 10. Tupper & McReynolds are in agreement with this evaluation, Japan in American Public Opinion, p. 262.

⁴³ Tel. of Apr. 11, 1930, in O'Connor, "The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Stanford University 1957), p. 229.

⁴⁴ U.S., Cong. Rec., 71st Cong., Special Sess., p. 103; Litr., May 19, 1930, Borah Papers, Box 210, Library of Congress; Frank H. Simonds, "What Was Wrong at the London Conference?" The Review of Reviews (May, 1930), p. 44; New York Times, Apr. 1, 1930.

⁴⁵ New York Times, Jun. 14, 1930; Ltr., June 16, 1930, George W. Norris Papers, Library of Congress; U.S., Cong. Rec., 71st Cong., Sepcial Sess., p. 114.

⁴⁶ Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (1948), p. 173.

⁴⁷ U.S., Senate, Abstract of Testimony on Certain Salient Questions of the London Naval Treaty Given Before

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pp. 316-20.

51 "The Arms Conference," Outlook and Independent
Apr. 23, 1930, p. 652.

52 G. B., H.L. Debs., LXXVII, c. 442.

53 Ibid., c. 444.

54 Howland, Survey..., 1931, p. 389.

55 G. B., H.C. Debs., CCXXVIII, c. 2095-2100.

56 Ibid., c. 2102.

57 Ibid., c. 1795-96.

58 Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (1935), p. 303.

59 Ibid., pp. 304-05.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., pp. 305-06.

62 Ibid., pp. 308-09.

63 Ibid., pp. 310-11.

64 Takehiko Yoshihasi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (1963), pp. 71-74; Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 310-11; Kenneth W. Colegrove, Militarism in Japan (1936), p. 18ff.

65 Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 321.

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Chapter 17

NAVAL LIMITATION IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN, AEGEAN, & BLACK SEAS

The Oceanic seapowers were not the only nations to concern themselves with naval limitation and controls between 1930 and 1935. On October 30, 1930 the Turks and Greeks signed an agreement to preserve the status quo of naval forces in Near Eastern waters and on March 7, 1931, Turkey and the Soviet Union signed a similar accord. Affecting these Near Eastern protocols indirectly, if not directly, were the French-Italian naval negotiations carried on following the London Naval Conference. While Greece, Turkey and the Soviet Union were able to reach bilateral agreements on naval controls, French-Italian differences remained unresolved throughout the period 1930-1935.

Overall, these post-London negotiations reveal several relevant aspects of naval limitation. First, these Near Eastern agreements were essentially concerned with establishing controls and stability, rather than with the reduction of naval armaments. Second, the Near Eastern protocols departed from the quantitative concepts which formed the basis of the Washington naval "systems" and substituted a much less complex control mechanism. Rather than attempting to equate warships and tonnage of the various fleets, either singly or by classes, these accords placed their emphasis upon an exchange of construction information. Third, these agreements did, however, retain the concept of relative security tied to existing naval forces. Fourth, the Near Eastern protocols revealed once more the significant role that economic considerations played in naval limitation, while the continuing Franco-Italian dispute emphasized the price "national pride" can extract. And fifth, the agreements again demonstrated that, with a minimum of controls, the naval limitation agreements were essentially honored by their signatory states.

Franco-Italian Naval Issues, 1930-1935

When the London Naval Conference terminated on April 22, 1930, France and Italy had not reconciled their differences. Naval parity with France had become, at least publicly, the idée fixe of Italian foreign policy for the past decade. The Five Power Naval pact (1922) had accorded Italy equality in capital ships; and subsequent Italian diplomacy sought to extend this parity to auxiliary vessels. With the Italians the question of parity was a matter of prestige and ambition. Combining both emotions, Prime Minister Benito Mussolini argued that only with parity would the Italians avoid "remaining prisoners in a sea that once belonged to Rome."¹

France contended that the relative strengths of both navies must be computed on the basis of national needs. Pointing to their Atlantic seaboard, Mediterranean coast, Far East possessions, and North African territories, French leaders believed that parity would mean either local inferiority or a denuded empire.² Then, too, they later became increasingly anxious over the combined tonnage of Italy and Germany--two potential opponents. French diplomats offered, during the London conclave, to consider parity if they would be compensated by either a Mediterranean pact or a consultative agreement, both of which were refused. Thus, conflicting national policies and considerations of prestige accentuated the Franco-Italian rift.

The failure of France and Italy to agree to a comprehensive limitation of auxiliary vessels at the London Naval Conference posed serious considerations for the British government. Since British naval policy was anchored to continental building programs, the Admiralty had insisted on an escape clause in the 1930 treaty. While the escalator clause served as a legal and technical safe-guard, the political ramifications of its invocation would have obvious distasteful effects. Consequently, the British undertook the role of mediator in the Franco-Italian dispute after the naval conclave adjourned on April 30.³

Attempts during the remainder of 1930 to find a solution to the naval question proved abortive. During this phase, the Italian government seized the initiative in a series of gestures which appeared alternately provocative and conciliatory. While Mussolini on a May speaking tour developed as his theme Machiavelli's warning "that prophets without arms are due to perish," his foreign minister, Count Dino Grandi, provided a contrasting melody. In a speech before the Senate on June 30,

1930, Grandi announced that, although Italy's naval program for 1930-31 was tailored to Franco-Italian "equivalence" his government would accept a suspension of naval construction "on condition that the French Government would do the like in respect to the French programme which had been voted for the same year."⁴

The French government maintained a steady policy "of courteous obstinacy." Thus, Grandi's offer of a naval holiday stood unanswered until July 7, 1930 when Briand announced that no further French keels would be laid down prior to December in anticipation of Franco-Italian negotiations. Acknowledging Briand's note four days later, the Italian foreign ministry urged observing the proposed naval holiday for the duration of the conversations. However, it came out that same day in the French Chamber that French ship yards had succeeded by July 7, in laying down all the construction it intended to begin by December 1. This action, together with their construction plans for 1931, indicated that the French still planned on "insuring unquestioned control of the western end of the Mediterranean."⁵

United States Becomes Involved. American officials could not remain aloof from the Franco-Italian disputes for they realized that unregulated naval competition in the Mediterranean might cause the British to invoke the escalator clause. This would increase the amount of American construction necessary to achieve actual parity and might jeopardize chances of additional reductions at the anticipated World Disarmament Conference. Premier André Tardieu, in discussions with the American ambassador on October 8, 1930 declared that "the position of no country on any question could be clearer and more unassailable than France's position on the question of naval disarmament." Both United States and Great Britain were free, he said,

so far as France was concerned, to build as many thousand tons as they desired, but he did not see why the mere fact of the United States and Great Britain having agreed between themselves upon a certain maximum tonnage should serve as a basis for establishing an arbitrary figure as representing the needs of France.

The Premier also remarked that, as the result of the Washington Conference, the impression seemed to be widespread that France would accept parity with Italy. "This," he emphasized,

Franco-Italian Navies, 1930¹

		<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>		
<u>Cruisers</u>		<u>No.</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Built	12	101,125	10	52,565	
Building	3	30,480	10	70,718	
Authorized	1	10,160	--	--	
Total	16	141,765	20	123,283	
Average*	5	56,934	3	24,680	
Grand Total	21	198,699	23	147,963	

Destroyers, etc.

Built	61	71,870	74	73,299
Building	21	45,585	11	14,854
Authorized	6	15,660	--	--
Total	88	133,115	85	88,153
Average	7	3,820	7	3,944
Grand Total	95	136,935	92	92,097

Submarines

Built	44	32,496	36	25,693
Building	47	50,580	14	9,982
Authorized	11	11,405	--	--
Total	102	94,481	50	35,675
Average	8	4,960	9	2,594
Grand Total	110	99,441	59	38,269

*Average: Cruisers completed before 1910; destroyers before 1914, and submarines before 1917.

¹Howland, American Foreign Relations, 1931, p. 339.

"was most emphatically not the case." Tardieu blamed the current Franco-Italian embroilment on the Anglo-Saxon powers. If their delegates had "put it up squarely" to the Italians that they must back down from their "impossible position," he believed that a complete treaty would have emerged from the London meeting.⁶

Stimson enlisted British and Japanese diplomatic aid in urging the disputants to find a compromise formula. He personally undertook, though conversations with the envoys in Washington and Hugh Gibson's visits to Paris and Rome, to stress the desirability of a settlement. Stimson told the French ambassador that if France and Italy did not halt their naval competition, "the British almost certainly would have to invoke the escalator clause of the Naval Treaty, a step which would have a profound effect on world public opinion and would discredit all efforts to reduce naval armament. The blame for any such alternatives, furthermore, naturally would fall upon France and Italy." Stimson suggested that, if the two nations could not resolve their differences in a contractual agreement, perhaps, "it might be possible for each country to make a unilateral declaration of a reasonable and nonprovocative program of naval construction up to 1936, reserving until that date, with full liberty of action, the theoretical questions which had brought about a deadlock."⁷

Throughout the remaining months of 1930, the American government repeatedly urged the use of "a unilateral declaration" as the best means of bringing the dispute to an end. It should be noted, as the French reminded the Americans, that Briand had suggested informally precisely this during the London conclave and that the British had shown little enthusiasm for this maneuver. The American government did not conceal its belief that the Italian displayed "a more conciliatory disposition" than the French.⁸

The "Basis of Agreement." Not until British mediation efforts in February and March 1931 did the gulf between France and Italy begin to narrow. Yet time was not on the side of compromise for on February 19, France announced that its forthcoming naval program would include a 23,333-ton battle cruiser (the Dunkerque) as a reply to Germany's construction of a "pocket" battleship. If negotiations were to produce a harvest, they must be reaped at once. If, in meeting the German challenge, France began constructing a new class of warship before arriving at a comprehensive agreement with Britain and Italy, prospects for limitation would become

remote. Consequently in February, 1931, British Foreign Minister, Arthur Henderson, accompanied by the First Lord of the Admiralty, visited Paris and Rome. The ensuing discussions produced a "basis of agreement" on March 1, 1931.⁹

An examination of the terms contained in the "basis of agreement" and the unofficial figures published at that time indicate the compromise centered on four points. First, France and Italy agree that in exchange prior to December 31, 1936 each might complete two capital ships not to exceed 23,333 tons nor armed with guns above a calibre of 12-inches.¹⁰ Second, during the same period French submarines in commission would not exceed 81,989 tons. Third, neither France nor Italy were to construct, before December 31, 1936, additional cruisers mounting guns of more than 6.1-inch calibre, once they had completed their 1930 programs. Fourth, a considerable portion of French light cruisers and destroyers (approximately 17.5%) were to consist on December 31, 1936 of over-age vessels while the Italian auxiliary fleet would be composed mostly of under-age ships.¹¹

This arrangement represented concessions by all three powers. France reduced its demands originally put forward during the London conference for cruiser, destroyer, and submarine tonnage. Paris now accepted seven 10,000-ton, 8-inch gun cruisers, instead of its original claim for twelve. In all, the French appeared to endorse a reduction in auxiliary vessels of 78,000 tons. The British government accepted a French submarine tonnage of 81,989, although the Admiralty considered this figure excessive when compared with the limits established in the London treaty. Also, the British granted the French a larger amount of underage light cruiser and destroyer tonnage than they previously had been willing to concede. Italy tactfully suspended, for nearly six years, its demand for parity with France. While authorized to lay down the same tonnage as France, this would in effect merely preserve the existing differences between the two fleets. (See table of projected fleet figures.) This arrangement, the Italians insisted, established "no permanent ratio in any category of ship" among the three parties and "no precedent" for the final solution of the naval issue.

The provisional agreement of March 1, 1931, however, was never effectuated due to French-Italian differences over the number of overage ships in the projected fleets. But briefly,

Projected Fleets for Dec. 31, 1936
 (computed on the "basis of agreement")¹

	Under-age tonnage	whose life has been prolonged	Over-age tonnage	Total tonnage	New con- struction which could be completed before 31-12-36
France					
Capital ships					
Under-age	179,800	-	-	179,800	46,666
"Diderots"	-	-	17,597	17,597	-
Aircraft carriers	56,146	-	-	56,146	34,000
Category (a):					
Cruisers	70,000	-	24,851	94,851	-
Category (b):					
Cruisers and					
Destroyers	197,431	802	42,107	240,340	51,331
Submarines	81,989	-	-	81,989	4,441
	585,366	802	84,555	670,723	136,438

Italy

Capital ships	133,193	-	-	133,193	46,666
Aircraft carriers	34,000	-	-	34,000	34,000
Category (a):					
Cruisers	70,000	-	-	70,000	-
Category (b):					
Cruisers and					
Destroyers	143,342	8,021	-	151,363	46,15 ^o
Submarines	47,390	-	5,310	52,700	2,791
	427,925	8,021	5,310	441,256	129,615

¹ These figures were published in the French press by a reportedly "official source." See S.I.A., 1931, p. 266.

Italy's acceptance of the March 1 terms had been on the understanding that the French margin of superiority in this category would comprise over-age vessels and that this superiority would not be increased during the agreement. France, on the other hand, desired the right to lay down, prior to December 31, 1935, sufficient replacement tonnage to take the place of over-age ships when the treaty ended.¹²

Collapse of Franco-Italian Accord. British diplomats continued pressing both disputants for an acceptable compromise. Throughout the discussions, British policy was motivated by two considerations: to maintain a navy equal to any two European powers; and to accomplish this by a limitation treaty rather than by invoking the escalator clause.¹³ But repeated efforts to breathe life back into the stillborn "basis of agreement" failed. As one British diplomat noted, on March 27, 1931, the

Italian Government went to extreme limit of concession to secure agreement believing that general political considerations urged by you /Henderson/ justified them in overriding advice of their technical experts. Actual agreement reached offered only one substantial advantage viz. stabilization of naval construction till 1936. Now owing to French interpretation to which British experts are described as taking strong exception, bottom has been knocked out of agreement and formulas do little to mend matters.¹⁴

That the French aimed to increase their naval establishment seemed obvious to the disillusioned Italians.¹⁵ Count Grandi lamented: "It was doubtful whether Italy would built battleships and certainly she had no desire to construct aircraft carriers. It was far better for her to have no agreement at all and to let the French carry out their programme while herself pursuing her own of light cruisers and submarines."¹⁶

American annoyance with the Franco-Italian dispute took on a slightly different complexion during the frustrating aftermath of the "basis of agreement." Unhappy with French obstinacy, some American diplomats now believed that British stubbornness was also a contributing factor. Ambassador Dawes, in London, believed the British were too critical of a difference which seemed to amount to only some 4,000-5,000 tons; however, the British admiralty argued that this difference really involved an additional 30,000 tons by 1935 over what they were willing to grant the French.¹⁷

As indifference to compromise grew in Paris and Rome, the Americans and British continued to press counter-proposals until the opening of the World Disarmament Conference. At Geneva the Franco-Italian dispute became a part of the larger armament discussions and their differences began to affect American-British naval relations. Summarizing the naval aspects of disarmament from October to December 1932, the American delegation reported that, in the absence of an Italo-French accord, neither the British government nor the Admiralty would accept further reduction in cruisers and destroyers. In fact, they emphasized that the London limitation of destroyers to 150,000 tons constituted "a final concession," particularly now that France and Italy were building submarines. Clearly the differences over submarines were not so much an Italo-French difficulty as an Anglo-French one.¹⁸

A New Continental Naval Race. As France built a powerful submarine fleet and a substantial armada of auxiliary vessels, its apparent objective was to match the combined total of the Italian and German fleets.¹⁹

Combined Tonnage as of January, 1935-36

Italy	395,522
Germany	159,190
Total	554,712
France	555,042

Italy's desire for parity manifested itself in the construction of cruisers. Between 1922 and 1935 the Italians laid down 138,900 tons in cruisers, while the French put 143,250 tons on the ways. Each nation had built, by 1935, seven 10,000-ton vessels armed with 8-inch guns.²⁰

Competition also had begun in capital ships. Unhampered by the qualitative restrictions of the Washington and London treaties, German naval architects had designed the so-called "pocket battleship" Deutschland, a 10,000-ton vessel, armed with 11-inch guns, capable of a speed of 26 knots, and carrying superior armor.²¹ France, determined to preserve its naval superiority over Germany, began construction of two 26,500-ton battle cruisers mounting 13.2-inch guns and capable of cruising at 29.5 knots--the Dunkerque (laid down October 1932) and the Strasbourg (laid down December 1934). This action prompted the Italian government to respond by beginning construction in October 1934 of two 35,000-ton

battleships, the Vittorio and the Littorio. Again the French countered by announcing that it planned to build two more vessels of 35,000 tons, the first to be laid down as soon as the Dunkerque had been launched, and the second as soon as the Washington treaty restrictions expired on December 31, 1936.

Even a settlement of the long-standing colonial differences by the Rome Accord of January 7, 1935 failed to provide the basis for an Italo-French naval agreement. German re-armament was beginning in earnest. Thus on January 2, the French government announced, on receipt of Japan's abrogation of the Washington naval treaty, that it too considered the current treaty as terminating on December 31, 1936. To assuage American disappointment, the French ambassador in Washington noted that "while the United States had Japan to consider, France had Germany to consider and that it was the fear of German naval expansion which had made it necessary for the French Government to take a position of complete freedom of action; following our American idea of equality of security, it was necessary for France, in view of the important development of the Germany navy, to improve its naval defenses." The ambassador stressed that European, not Pacific, affairs prompted his government's action.²²

Near Eastern Naval Protocols

In an era when naval limitation was wide-spread among the larger seapowers, naval forces in the Aegean and Black Seas were stabilized with the signing of the Turko-Greek protocol of October 30, 1930 and a similar Turko-Soviet pact of March 7, 1931. If the purposes of these accords were similar to those of the better-known Washington and London Naval Treaties, their technique differed markedly. These Near Eastern pacts did not venture to establish "ratios" or to limit categories and types of warships, nor did they create a technically absolute "parity." But they survived and, on the basis of available evidence, functioned effectively.

In retrospect, the Turko-Greek and Turko-Soviet naval agreements are important in at least four essentials. First, the accords were prompted by a mutual desire to alleviate potential competition in naval armaments in Near Eastern waters. Domestic concerns--especially economic priorities--were sufficiently powerful to reduce contemporary, deep-seated antagonisms. Second, both of the naval protocols were developed within the broader context of general political understandings--accompanying or following treaties of

friendship, conciliation, and commerce--and implicitly recognized the security requirements of each nation. Third, neither naval accord sought to promote "disarmament" in a direct quantitative or qualitative sense; rather each accepted the current status quo of naval forces in Near Eastern waters and required six months notice of additional acquisition, transfer, or construction of warships. Fourth, both naval agreements remained in force during the interwar years without incurring "violations" and apparently satisfied the contracting powers.

Turko-Greek Naval Protocol, 1930. A potential naval race loomed between Greece and Turkey in 1928 when the latter nation announced plans to refurbish the former German battleship Goeben, now rechristened the Yavuz.²³ That the appearance of a single capital ship in the Aegean Sea could seriously disturb the equilibrium in those waters was clear both from historical experience and from a consideration of the contemporary positions of Greece and Turkey. A "third-class" battleship had enabled the Greek Navy to blockade the Dardanelles and prevent the transport of Turkish troops in the Aegean during the first Balkan War of 1912-13, a recognized factor in Turkey's historic defeat. The reconditioned Yavuz would endow Turkey with the potentiality of reversing the situation, particularly as those Greek (formerly Turkish) islands in the Aegean had been largely demilitarized by the Treaty of Lausanne. The security of these islands, lying as they did within range of Anatolian batteries, hinged on Greece's ability to relieve them by sea--an ability that would be jeopardized by the presence of the Yavuz should the Turks attempt to reclaim their lost possessions.

In light of these considerations and of Greece's long-standing desire to maintain naval superiority in the Aegean, it is not surprising that Greek officials--urged on by the Greek press--gave serious thought to the procurement of a counter-weight. Specifically, the Athens government decided to investigate the prospects of obtaining delivery of another prewar German capital ship, the Salamis, which had been ordered by Greece in 1912 from the Vulkan shipyard at Hamburg but had never been completed or delivered.²⁴

Moreover, the contemporary atmosphere of Graeco-Turkish relations reflected a mutual bitterness that extended back some five hundred years and that created a serious psychological obstacle to any peaceful understanding. While the Lausanne decisions had laid down the basis for resolving

ancient grievances by exchange of populations, the actual process of carrying out the exchange had caused a great social upheaval in both countries and Turkish-Greek affairs again had become strained. More specifically, the questions of property valuation and of treatment of remaining minorities--Orthodox Christians still in Constantinople and Muslims in Western Thrace--remained as impediments to better relations between the two nations.²⁵ Negotiations over these issues dragged on and finally halted early in 1928; official intransigence had caused more suffering which in turn fed the mutual hatred. This deadlock over the exchange of populations was made more serious because of the threatened naval armaments race. Observers reported that "the impasse in the Graeco-Turkish negotiations over the exchange of populations was the more serious because, at this juncture, there was a new threat of a Graeco-Turkish naval competition in the Aegean Sea."²⁶ It became difficult to ascertain which question was of greater primacy, that of exchange or that of security.

At this juncture, when hope of accommodation seemed most dim, a new spirit of compromise emerged to ease political tensions and resolve the question of naval competition. This fresh disposition stemmed from several factors: the soothing effect of Italian mediation; the open, accommodating attitudes adopted by Premier Eleutherios Venizelos of Greece and President Mustafa Kemel Pasha of Turkey, particularly that of the former; and the recognition of the admittedly slender financial resources available to both governments.

The Italian government had long sought to end the Aegean turmoil and enhance its own interest--commercial as well as political--in the area; indeed Rome aimed at no less than a comprehensive pact tying the three nations together. Finally settling for a series of bilateral pacts, Italian diplomacy brought forth on May 30, 1928 the Italo-Turkish treaty of friendship, neutrality, and conciliation and, on September 28, a similar Italo-Greek accord. However, efforts to obtain the final link, a Turko-Greek friendship pact, progressed very slowly during 1929 for the reappearance of the Yavuz had further alarmed some Greeks.²⁷

It was the statesmanship of Venizelos which oiled these troubled waters. The key to Venizelos's success was his emphasis of the issue of security and his announcement of a naval policy which called for equivalence rather than strict parity. Specifically, he avoided responding in kind to the

reconditioning of the Yavuz by acquiring the Salamis; rather, he advocated an investment in light naval craft and aircraft. This policy was set forth in a speech delivered to the Greek legislature on February 10, 1930. In this presentation, which had the ultimate effect of committing the Greek nation to his ideas, Venizelos moved adroitly from general to specific considerations. He began with a declaration of Greece's acceptance of all of the treaties that had followed the World War, and used this fact as a demonstration of Greece's attachment to peace with the world at large and with Turkey. Such an acceptance meant that the necessity of naval command of the Aegean by Greece was an outmoded concept. This was especially true, he declared, in view of the fact that Turkey, being an equally peace-minded nation, was not in the least desirous of seizing Greek territory either in Western Thrace or off the coast of Anatolia. Descending to particulars, Venizelos argued that even if war were to break out between the two powers in the Aegean--a contingency which, if not prevented by the lack of warlike intentions, was unlikely because of League of intervention--the Yavuz would not play a decisive role. Indeed, it would probably play no role, for ship in offensive operations which would expose it to attack by the craft in which the Greek Government was going to invest and which were, as he had alleged earlier, defensive rather than offensive in nature.²⁹

This formal statement did much to pave the way for a negotiated settlement. The Turkish journal, Millet, which had for years denounced the Greek leader, now praised Venizelos as "a realistic man of state" and noted that his declarations "on the subject of Turco-Hellenic relations are of a nature to satisfy those who, in both countries, desire that these relations be sincere and friendly."²⁹ The major breakthrough, achieved with the aid of Italian good offices, was the signing, on June 10, 1930, of a convention settling the long-festering exchange questions. Although the accord met with some opposition in both the Turkish and Greek legislatures, it provided the psychological turning point.³⁰

Deliberations continued in Angora during the following months with attention being given to general political questions and the naval issue. By August it appeared that the two governments had agreed to the principle of naval limitations, only the method was in contention.

In late October, 1930 Venizelos journeyed to Turkey to seal the new understanding on political, naval and commercial

issues. The visit began auspiciously when the Greek warship Helli--which carried the Premier to Constantinople--received full military honors, including a salute from the Yavuz, and warm acclaim from the large welcoming crowd. If the Turks were enthusiastic about the prospect of better relations with Greece, they soberly grasped the basis of this new era. As the Milliet commented:

This friendship draws strength from two sources. First, from the necessity of this rapprochement, and secondly, from the recognition of the fact that...in the words of the London Daily Telegraph it represents the triumph of good sense and political realism over an overwhelming and quite recently refreshed tradition of national and racial hatred.³¹

Nor were the Greeks reserved in their appraisal of the sacrifice and risk involved in cementing this new relationship. As the Athenian newspaper, Proia, noted: "It was the traditional policy of Greece to maintain its naval superiority over Turkey; we may well abandon this principle, but we can not give up naval parity because that would mean national suicide. We must now secure aerial parity, and parity of economic expenditure for war purposes."³² Not all segments of Greek and Turkish society accepted the new rapprochement. The Tachydromos, a nationalist Greek organ, reflected the general tone of the dissidents; after labelling Venizelos a traitor to Greece (and there were Turks who held a similar view of their leadership), it stated cynically: "So Venizelos goes to Angora! Fate seems to lead him to those battle fields where this man sacrifices Greece. The shame of an entire nation follows him, and the curse of an entire people is on him."³³

The official business of the trip was the signing on October 30, 1930 of three diplomatic instruments: a treaty of neutrality, conciliation, and arbitration; a protocol regarding naval armaments; and a commercial convention. These accords formed an indirect alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Italy; the role of the latter nation was evident as both of the other governments thanked the Italians for the part they played in bringing about a new era of Turko-Greek friendship.

Of greatest significance, for the purposes of this study, was the protocol designed to preserve the status quo in naval armaments in the Aegean. The text of the protocol read as follows:

The two High Contracting Parties, being imbued with the principles which have led them to the signature of the Pact of Friendship and Arbitration, signed to-day, and being desirous of forestalling useless increases in their expenses on naval armaments, and of advancing concurrently with one another along the road of a parallel limitation of their respective forces, without disregarding the conditions peculiar to each of them, undertake not to proceed to any other, acquisition or construction of naval units, or of armaments for naval units, without first giving the other party six months' notice in advance in order that opportunity may thus be given to the two Governments to forestall, in the upshot, a race of armaments by means of an amicable exchange of views and reciprocal explanations, in a spirit of perfect sincerity.³⁴

The naval protocol was brief, general, and subject to circumstances only the future knew; but it constituted a monument to reality and necessity, and it testified to the farsighted statesmanship that recognized the proportions of both conditions.

Ratification of these agreements came in due course. On December 21, the Greek Chamber considered the instruments during a two-hour debate--during which Venizelos successfully refuted opposition criticism--leading to their approval by a large majority. The Turkish Grand National Assembly granted its unanimous endorsement on February 12, 1931. "As to the protocol signed concerning the parity of naval forces," Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Ruchdi Bey told the Assembly, "it offers an importance even more considerable than all the other agreements." Elaborating on this theme, the Milliet thoughtfully noted that:

In order to battle against the world crisis which is extending over the entire earth, one needs above all external security, the security of frontiers. We see with satisfaction that our diplomacy has obtained this security. In this way, therefore, and on condition of not neglecting our security measures which are natural, we can devote all our efforts to our internal reforms.³⁵

Turko-Soviet Naval Protocol, 1931. Two events launched the negotiations between Moscow and Angora which led to the Turko-Soviet agreement on naval armaments in the Black Sea: Turkish concern with the transferring of Russian naval units to their Black Sea fleet; and Russian alarm at the significance of the British-inspired, but ultimately abortive, Franco-Italian "basis of agreement." The newly signed Graeco-Turkish protocol, of course, provided both precedent and form.

Turkish-Soviet relations during the interwar decades were characterized by a dualistic pattern. That pattern, briefly, was that Turkey sought and maintained good connections with the USSR when it needed that nation as a counterweight to Western schemes and antagonism. When the Turks enjoyed an amicable relationship with the West, their traditional fear of Russia and its designs on the Straits reasserted itself and they held their great northern neighbor at arm's length. Post-Lausanne relations were pouréed in this mold, for Turkish leaders had misgivings concerning Soviet economic aims in Turkey and these difficulties were aggravated by Turkey's suspicions regarding Communist propaganda.³⁶ Nevertheless, on December 17, 1925 a non-aggression pact was signed between Turkey and USSR.³⁷ This volte-face resulted from Turkish suspicion of British imperialism growing out of its diplomatic defeat--and Britain's victory--over the Mosul question.³⁸ Thereafter, however, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction as Turkey arrived at an accord with Great Britain in 1926, and less than two years later, Angora negotiated a new pact with Italy. Moreover, Turkey's desire to cement relations with the West, as evidenced in its efforts to arrive at an accommodation with Greece, was being pursued concurrently with "a general ideological reorientation in Moscow."⁴⁰ A new Soviet line had abruptly transformed Kemal "from a revolutionary hero to a reactionary tyrant." This transformation brought in its train a series of incidents which had a deleterious effect upon Turkish-Soviet relations. It was, consequently, rather remarkable that those relations underwent a dramatic improvement in the fall of 1929.

The last turnabout probably reflected a growing Soviet concern over the apparent redirection of Turkish attachments. Its most important result, for the purposes of this study, was a renewal of their 1925 non-aggression pact.⁴¹ In addition to a two-year prolongation, this new negotiation added a protocol which pledged the two parties "not to institute,

without referring to the other Party, any negotiations for the conclusion of political agreements with States in the immediate neighbourhood by land or sea of the said Party, and only to conclude such agreements with the consent of the latter."⁴² Although it was further provided "that instruments aiming at the establishment or maintenance of normal relations with such contiguous States, and which are made public, are not subject to the above stipulations," Turkey later seized the opportunity provided by its naval agreement with Greece to enter into similar discussion with the USSR.⁴³

Turkish statesmen were becoming increasingly concerned that the balance of naval power in the Black Sea might be altered. The more dramatic of these factors was the transfer, in January 1930, of two Soviet warships--the dreadnought Parizhskaya and the cruiser Profintern--from the Russian Baltic fleet to its Black Sea forces. This movement created considerable furor, particularly in England. (Indeed, the First Lord of the Admiralty had to explain to Commons that the Straits Commission, whose mission is detailed above, "has no authority...to intervene in the matter of movements in or out of the Black Sea of warships of the Powers bordering the Black Sea.")⁴⁴ Although there was Turkish anxiety about this event, the Angora government found itself confronted with a difficult paradox: while it could use the Soviet transfer as a lever to gain British support for a return of Turkish control over the Straits, it also was seriously perturbed by the effect these additional warships might have on naval construction in the Black Sea. This growth of Soviet naval strength was not the only disturbing element in that area for important new naval works were being planned by the Rumanian government. Indeed, construction of these facilities--which, it was said, were undertaken with British support and under British supervision--had already begun.⁴⁵ A race in naval armament appeared to be in the making.

To prevent any such competition and to preserve the existing naval equilibrium, Turkey undertook to carry its Aegean settlement with Greece into the Black Sea by means of an agreement with the USSR. Hard upon the heels of the first, therefore, Turkey entered into negotiations with Moscow to achieve the second.⁴⁶ Its desires fell upon fertile ground for the Russians were concerned about growing Italian prestige in the Mediterranean.

Soviet attempts at drastic reductions in naval armaments before the 1929 meeting of the Preparatory Commission had met with failure. It was during the recess of that body in

1929-1930 that the London Naval Conference had come about. That Conference failed to achieve a five-power agreement because of Italy's demand for parity with France. The Soviet Government had not attended the London meeting, but it had followed the Conference's proceedings closely and had expressed its dislike of the three-party agreement which had issued therefrom in April 1930.⁴⁷ The following November, the Soviets found a new opportunity to complain before the reconvened Preparatory Commission where, once again, Soviet proposals for reductions in naval armaments were rejected. Of greater immediate concern to the USSR were the talks which were continuing between France and Italy, assisted by American and British good offices, with a view toward solving Franco-Italian differences on this subject. The Soviet Union feared that the solution found by these talks would release the Italian navy to play a larger role in Aegean and Black Sea. The Italian commercial tonnage that moved annually through the Straits had, for years, far surpassed that of any other nation, while the 1929 visit of Italian seaplanes to this area had demonstrated an increasing military potential.⁴⁸ Also, the Greco-Turkish settlement had just given a new manifestation of Italian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The prospect of increased Italian naval activity, therefore, was not pleasant to the USSR. After all, under the stipulations of the Lausanne Convention, any increase in the strength of its Black Sea fleet meant that a non-Black Sea power could introduce equally strengthened naval units into those waters. And it appeared that Italy might be able to add capability to willingness along these lines.

Soviet fears appeared confirmed when France and Italy, on March 1, 1931, drew up their still-born "basis of agreement" for a naval settlement. Six days later, the Soviet-Turkish negotiations were concluded with the signature, in Angora, of a protocol supplementary to Article Two of the 1929 pact but modelled upon the recent Greco-Turkish naval understanding. A citation in full of its short text reveals its debt to the latter:

Neither of the High Contracting Parties will, without notifying the other Party six months beforehand, lay down any warship which is intended to strengthen the fleet in the Black Sea or neighboring seas, or give an order for the construction of any such ship by foreign dockyards, or take any other measures which would strengthen the present establishment of

their war fleet in the above-named seas. The present supplementary Protocol requires ratification and will, after ratification, become an actual part of the Protocol of 17 December 1929.⁴⁹

The Constantinople correspondent of the Times was quick to observe that there was some uncertainty here with regard to the reference to "neighboring seas."⁵⁰ It was not clear whether that phrase was meant to refer only to the Sea of Azov or to include the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmora. But despite this ambiguity, Turkey had achieved another success. Considering this agreement along with the Greek settlement, Angora had, in the words of one contemporary observer, "obtained the stabilization of naval power in her two neighboring seas, and secured herself against maritime competition with her two most important neighbors."⁵¹

Official and influential circles in both Turkey and Russia expressed optimism over the protocol. The Djumhouriet noted, on March 11, that the two recent naval agreements complimented each other and greatly enhanced Turkish security. "We thus do not have to fear any sudden fait accompli on the part of our neighbors on either side of the Straits." The article concluded by specifically pointing out that the latest protocol would "prevent Russia from unexpectedly transferring the whole of her Baltic forces or some of the units of that fleet into the Black Sea." On the following day, the Milliet emphasized the larger framework within which the Turks (and Russians) saw the protocol. "It is...satisfying that the conclusion of the Turko-Russian naval pact has coincided with the date on which the London Naval Treaty is completed by the Franco-Italian accord. For by this agreement Russia and Turkey have proved by acts that they intend to be peacemakers in the political world."⁵² From the Foreign Office in Moscow came the statement that this pact was "no document of the usual type, but an expression of the well-founded interests of the two countries," and that it intensified "the feeling of security to Greece and the Balkans as well." To the latter, the Athenian newspaper Proia attested:

This treaty is...very important from the Greek point of view. We are maintaining friendly relations with Soviet Russia, which is chartering many Greek steamships in the Black Sea ports, and we hope to increase these mutual relations. This treaty between Ankara and Moscow will further strengthen the peace of the Near East, and as such will create a favorable impression in the rest of Europe.⁵³

The naval protocol was formally ratified by the USSR on May 23 and by Turkey on July 22, 1931. Later that same year, on October 30, the two nations renewed the Treaty of 1925 and its two subsequent protocols (of 1929 and 1931) for five years. This extension was duly ratified by Russia on January 3 and Turkey on June 25, 1932.

Evaluation of the Near Eastern Naval Protocols. Although the Turko-Greek and Turko-Soviet protocols were officially described as parity agreements, they were pacts of stability. In the sense that they used the status quo of naval armaments as a base, these accords followed in the tradition of the "Washington system." However, the protocols did not attempt to reduce armaments, but to limit them; they envisioned no scrapping of ships, no levelling down of the number of units or of fire power, but were aimed solely at regulating further construction or acquisition. In view of contemporary increases allowed, in the form of replacements and anticipatory limits, by the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and outlined by the Franco-Italian "bases" (even though these latter were to prove abortive), this check upon construction would appear to have unique merits. It had been facilitated by several factors: the sincere desire for peace, the hope of balancing budgets, the recognition of changing tactics of warfare, and the relative simplicity of the agreements. Thus, for example, the vexing problem of actual parity was simply dismissed. To recall the clearest case, the problem in the Aegean was not approached from the standpoint of how many Greek cruisers might equal the strength of Turkey's Yavuz, but rather from the position that, since technological change--particularly the development of aircraft--was rapidly obviating such formulae, an acceptance of the status quo was the more direct, least expensive, and most logical solution between peaceful neighbors. It behooved Greece to acquiesce in the apparent Turkish superiority in the Aegean, just as it behooved Turkey to accept Soviet superiority in the Black Sea. Equivalence, not technical parity, won the day.

Of equal significance for this study is the fact that these agreements achieved their desired goals. Indeed, their impact was felt almost immediately. Thus, looking first at the Greco-Turkish pact, it was observed early in 1932 that its signature "was followed by a considerable reduction in the amounts allocated to expenditure on armaments in the budgets of both countries."⁵⁴ That this auspicious beginning seemed destined to continue was indicated by the by the negotiation of a Cordial Friendship Pact between

Greece and Turkey in 1933. That Pact became one of the foundation-stones of the Balkan Entente, which opposed Italian aggression and supported the revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention and the Treaties of Neuilly and Trianon. Undertaken "in the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact," this Entente was a manifestation of the desire particularly on Turkey's part, to present a united front to the threat of Balkan inundation by a major power.

The revision of the Lausanne Convention did create some problems between the two Aegean nations with regard to the demilitarized Greek islands. Yet these problems were surmounted, and basically good relations continued to be the norm. All of which implies, of course, that the naval protocol was being adhered to on both sides. In view of the disturbance that the Yavuz had caused earlier, it is instructive to look at the reception given it in 1937. In November of that year, this battleship led a Turkish squadron on a visit to Malta. A historic first, this visit was politically significant as well, since it symbolized the growing friendship with Great Britain.⁵⁵ And when the squadron stopped in Greece on its way home, it was welcomed very warmly there. Indeed, when on December 1, 1937 King George II of Greece visited the Yavuz, his royal ensign was hoisted on its main mast.⁵⁶ Even Venizelos might have hesitated to prophesy such a spectacle.

It is, of course, true that by this time the military budgets of Greece and Turkey were going up. They were increasing as a result of the threatened expansion of Italy, including the remilitarization of some of its Dodecanese islands, and the operations of "piratical" submarines in the Mediterranean, with the intent of halting supplies to the Loyalist Spanish government. The only ray of hope in these developments, according to one Turkish newspaper in November 1938 was that armaments might end by being useful to peace: "War will be so frightful that no one will be able to emerge victorious."⁵⁷ But while waiting for all the parties to a potential conflict to recognize this fact, one had to be prepared.

Turkey had been preparing. Its ordering of commercial steamers from both Britain and Germany was undertaken with trade rather than war in mind, although there was a Turkish awareness that "in the modern conception of things it would be neither just nor possible to separate the war fleet from the merchant marine."⁵⁸ There was a connection between these commercial orders and wartime preparations. The difficulties experienced with repairs in the steamers of

German construction strengthened the drive, already in evidence, to improve native capabilities along this line. The shipyards of the Golden Horn had previously benefited from this emphasis.⁵⁹ Significantly, their first use was in the construction of two new submarines.⁶⁰ Since these were not adequate to the newly felt needs, orders were placed for the construction of several destroyers and still more submarines in Great Britain.⁶¹

The importance of these Turkish naval constructions, from the point of view under consideration here, is that they were apparently carried out in accordance with the protocol of 1930. World-wide events of the mid-1930's forced the two Aegean powers to abandon the hope that any new construction could be avoided, but they could at least keep one another informed of what response they were making to changing conditions. They could continue to aim at friendship and equilibrium in the sea they shared. In fact, they confirmed this disposition in a new treaty of 1938, which renewed and extended the basic agreements of 1930.⁶²

Much of the same sort of history applies to the Turkish-Soviet agreement. Ratified in October 1931, and extended at that time for five years, this pact had the immediate effect of inducing an abandonment of the naval works being constructed in Rumania.⁶³ As with the Greco-Turkish accord, its successful operation depended upon the maintenance of good relations between the two rival powers. In this realm the picture was not as cheerful. It is clear, for instance, that the Balkan Entente was aimed as much at the USSR as at any other potential molester of Balkan liberties. Moreover, while the revision of the Lausanne Convention was favorable to the goals and desires of the Soviet Union, that nation was irritated by the growing Turkish attachment to the West as manifested at Montreux and after. Still, there was no outright split between Turkey and the USSR. Certainly, part of the reason for this was that the Soviets had been able, when the West was still in the grip of the depression, "to offer a method of economic expansion, capital to initiate it, and experts to assist in its application."⁶⁴ Turkish statism--particularly the government-sponsored growth of a textile industry--rested materially, if not ideologically, on Soviet support. Hence, complete separation was avoided. More to the point, the Turkish-Soviet naval protocol continued to guide Black Sea armament.

As was the case in the Aegean, this did not mean that armaments were not growing. The Russian Black Sea fleet

did increase in strength up to 1935, although not in such major items as battleships and cruisers. The increase came, instead, in submarines and in small patrol boats.⁶⁵ In 1935, the USSR laid down at Nikilaev a new 8,000-ton cruiser, the Molotov, to be armed with 7.1-inch guns; at the same time and place, construction began on two flotilla leaders. The mounting threat of German and Japanese building after 1935 forced the Soviets to concentrate their increasing naval construction in the Baltic and Far East.⁶⁶ Since all types of vessels were covered by the protocol and since these constructions do not appear to have raised any Turkish remonstrances, it must be concluded that they were duly reported and that they were not considered disruptive of the equilibrium. Indeed, the Turkish Foreign Minister declared in April 1936 that "Turkey hadn't the slightest anxiety about the naval programs of any of the Black Sea Powers. Under their naval agreement with the Soviets there was notification of any naval building and the confidence created by this fact eliminated any apprehension."⁶⁷

Actually, the major area of Soviet Black Sea arms growth was one which was not covered by the agreement of 1931, that of aircraft. The USSR increased its hydroplane air strength in those waters from 32 craft at the end of 1933 to 172 at the end of 1935.⁶⁸ But, although not dealt with in the protocol, a rough equivalence was maintained in this realm as well. The development of the Turkish air arm came in for a substantial amount of attention by the Turkish press and by Turkish officials. More importantly, it was also the object of a great deal of increased expenditure.⁶⁹ Particularly after the demonstration of the effectiveness of aerial bombardment in Ethiopia and, subsequently, in Spain, the Turks desired to possess a considerable number of aircraft--for defensive purposes. Significantly, the USSR not only did not object to that development, but actually fostered it. In an interview with the correspondant of a Cairo newspaper in the spring of 1938, the Turkish Foreign Minister went so far as to declare that "our friendship with the Soviets assures us of equilibrium in the Black Sea."⁷⁰

The Turkish Government maintained that friendship, while nonetheless approaching the West ever more closely. Consequently, the terms of the Turko-Soviet Treaty of 1925 and the two subsequent protocols including the naval agreement were continued for another ten years by an accord of November 7, 1935.⁷¹ The advent of the Second World War and the USSR's advance into the Balkans finally brought an end to this relationship. On March 19, 1945 the Soviets denounced

the 1925 treaty (and with it the naval protocol). Although the agreement did not expire until November, Stalin sought this means to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on the Turks. In June, the USSR declared its willingness to negotiate a new treaty if Turkey would return Kars and Ardakan and accept Russian participation in the defense of the Straits.⁷² The Turkish government refused, thus terminating their formal arrangements.

The Turko-Greek protocol, however, has remained on the books. But this relationship has been affected during the post-World War II period by two circumstances: first, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and second, the Cyprus question has reawakened Turkish-Greek animosities and called into question once more the Aegean naval equilibrium.

Chapter 17 Footnotes

1. Quoted in Howland, American Foreign Relations, 1931, p. 338.

2. For an Italian rebuttal, see F. R., 1930, I, 162-63.

3. MacDonald justified his acceptance of ratios for auxiliary warships with only America and Japan on the grounds that once the Big Three had reached an agreement "France, Italy, and ourselves shall continue efforts to come to an agreement in unison with that which has been reached between the United States, Japan, and ourselves." For the contemporary summary of the Franco-Italian naval issue between April, 1930, and February, 1932, see S.I.A., 1931, pp. 259-79; also see F.R., 1930, I, 132-86; Ibid., 1931, I, 358-439.

4. Quoted in S.I.A., 1931 p. 262.

5. F.R., 1930, I. 137. The proposed program called for construction of 50,000 tons of new warships in 1931; including one 10,000 ton 8-inch gun cruiser and the first of three swift 22,000 tons battleships.

6. Ibid., pp. 135-36.

7. Ibid., p. 140.

8. Ibid., pp. 153, 158. Assistant Secretary of State William R. Castle, Jr., even suggested to the Italian ambassador "that it would be rather wonderful if Italy would have the courage to act alone and make an announcement that they had no intention of building before the next conference.../and/ if Italy would do a thing of this sort, it would gain the sympathy of the entire world and that France would practically be forced by public opinion to cut down its own program." Mussolini felt such a step "altogether too dangerous." F.R., 1930, I, 151. The Italians reminded Washington officials that they had suggested a mutual "naval holiday" as early as May 16 and were still endeavoring to promote such an accord. Grandi did succeed in bringing about a general, one-year "armaments truce" among those nations who were to participate in the World Disarmament Conference. This "truce" was announced by the League Assembly to commence November 1, 1931. See S.I.A., 1931, pp. 294ff; and F.R., 1931, I, 440-71.

9. See D.I.A., 1931, pp. 73-75.

10. This agreement would grant France and Italy an increase in capital ship tonnage from Washington Treaty limits of 175,000 tons to 181,000 tons.

11. Age limits should not be construed to mean obsolescence since the time limits laid down by the Washington and London treaties represented only the earliest moment at which it would be reasonable for a ship to be replaced.

12. "Since August, 1930, the Italian Government consequently were justified in considering as settled that the Naval Agreement with France was to govern all construction by the two countries up to 1936 inclusive." D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, II, 414. For discussion of technicalities see S.I.A., 1931, pp. 271-72. Also see F.R., 1931, I, 394-404.

13. This dislike of invoking Article XXI of the London Treaty appears often in British discussions, see D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, II, 422; F.R., 1931, I, 421. The British feared that public opinion might not understand it.

14. D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, II, 391.

15. Mussolini told the British ambassador at Rome that "It was clear that the French meant to use the agreement in order to scale up their construction to the highest possible limit instead of scaling it down." Ibid., p. 392.

16. Ibid., pp. 392-393. One Italian Admiral later pointed to Mussolini's personal decision not to build aircraft carriers, or even develop naval aviation, as one of the major reasons the Italian navy performed badly in World War II. Also, apparently Mussolini did not wish to press naval rearmament because it might provoke an arms race. See, Admiral Romeo Bernotti, "Italian Naval Policy Under Fascism," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, (July, 1956), pp. 722-31.

17. D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, II, 412, 416-19, 421. Compare with F.R., 1931, I, 405-6. The British also pointed out that, "The annual programme demanded by France i.e., now 41,000 tons as compared with the agreed figure of 27,500 tons/ was too high to make it worth while for Italy to enter an agreement on such a basis." Ibid., p. 414.

18. F.R., 1932, I, 560-74.

19. League of Nations, Armament Year-Book, 1935 (1935), pp. 1010, 1013, 1018. Plans were submitted on November 11, 1931, and on December 14, 1932. See D.B.F.P., Ser., 2, II, 429-31; Ibid., IV, 554-57.

20. See Great Britain Admiralty. "Fleets--the British Empire and Foreign Countries," Accounts and Papers, 1935 (1935), Cmd. 4817, pp. 17-20.

21. The Treaty of Versailles only limited the displacement of German vessels to 10,000 tons, but placed no restriction on gun calibre.

22. F.R., 1931, I, 422, 425-26.

23. At the outbreak of World War I, two German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, were in the Mediterranean. Pursued by British and French vessels, they made their way through the Dardanelles; although the Allies protested, the Turks announced that both of these warships had been purchased to replace the two ships the British had promised but failed to deliver.

24. S.I.A., 1930, p. 158.

25. Ibid., p. 157; also see Stephen P. Lados, The Exchange of Minorities (1932), pp. 335-588; Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World (1959), pp. 50-51; Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirwood, Turkey (1927), pp. 207-09; and S.I.A., 1925, pp. 272-279.

26. S.I.A., 1930, p. 158. This same connection between the immediacy of solving the exchange of populations and the ominous threat of naval rearmament caused the journal, The Near East and India, to comment "that the exchange of populations is an open sore. There are others that the two governments nurse in secret, one of them being the question of naval armaments." "Greece and Turkey," (November 29, 1928).

27. See S.I.A., 1928, pp. 158-61; and D.I.A., 1928, pp. 122-54. The year 1929 was not entirely bleak. Venizelo's speech in the Chamber of Deputies on April 1, 1929, emphasized the peaceful desires of both Greece and Turkey and denounced the press of each country for accusing the opposing governments of a lack of good will, D.I.A., 1929, p. 140.

28. S.I.A., 1930, pp. 159-60.

29. See Bulletin de la presse turque (Paris), No. 75, p. 13.

30. D.I.A., 1930, pp. 155-65.

31. "Greece and Turkey Friends," Literary Digest (July 19, 1930), p. 16.

32. "Ending the Greek-Turkish Five-century Feud," Foreign Comment (November, 1930).

33. "Greece and Turkey Friends," p. 16.

34. See D.I.A., 1930, p. 165; and S.I.A., 1930, p. 166.

35. Bulletin de la presse turque, No. 82, p. 22 and No. 83, p. 14.

36. Kilic, Turkey and the World, p. 56.

37. Best translation of this treaty is in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1914-1956 (1956), p. 143.

38. The Turko-Soviet agreement was concluded on the day after the award of the Mosul province to Iraq by the League of Nations Council.

39. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, p. 144.

40. See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (1961), p. 279; and Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941 (1946-1948), II, 40.

41. This pact expired in December, 1929.

42. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, pp. 142-43.

43. J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security since Locarno, 1925-1931 (1932), p. 231.

44. Rapport de la Commission des Détroits à la Société des Nations (Année 1930) (1931, p. 7; P.P. Graves, The Question of the Straits (1931), pp. 196-197, while the Rapport said that passage of the Soviet warships had been

"vigorously criticised by the press in different countries," Premier Venizelos declared that such anxieties in some Greek newspapers was unjustified. See Bulletin de la presse Turque, No. 76, p. 17.

45. Graves, The Question of the Straits, pp. 196-197; Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security, p. 232.

46. See Bulletin de la presse turque, No. 77, p. 21.

47. See especially Stalin's comments to the Party Congress on June 27, 1930, in Jane Degras, ed. Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (1951-1953), II, 441-47. For some Turkish press comments on the conference, see Bulletin de la presse turque, No. 76, p. 13.

48. Easily established by the tables entitled "Movement Maritime Commercial dans les Détroits" and annexed to the Saitis Commission's Rapports.

49. Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security, pp. 232-33; however, the agreement is misdated by one day, see Oriente Moderno, XI, (1931), p. 137.

50. Ibid.

51. Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security, p. 233; Leonard Shapiro, ed., Soviet Treaty Series (1955), II, 15.

52. Bulletin de la presse turque, No. 83, p. 15.

53. "A New Russo-Turkish Love Feast," The Literary Digest (April 25, 1931), p. 15.

54. S.I.A., 1931, p. 329.

55. See Bulletin de la presse turque, No. 117, pp. 13-14.

56. Ibid., pp. 13, 16. When the squadron left on its return to Turkey, the head of the Greek navy, Admiral Sakellariou declared "My fleet will always be at the disposition of Turkey."

57. Ibid., No. 127, p. 10.

58. Ibid., p. 9.

59. Ibid., No. 128, pp. 6, 11; No. 118, p. 5.

60. Ibid., No. 118, p. 6; No. 121, p. 10; No. 125, p. 10; No. 129, p. 8.

61. See, especially Ibid., No. 126, p. 12, where it is remarked that another order is to follow; this does not appear to have been done.

62. Ibid., No. 123, p. 16, No. 124, p. 14.

63. Oriente Moderno, XI (1931), pp. 533-34; Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security, p. 233.

64. Kilic, Turkey and the World, p. 52; Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 280.

65. Changes may be followed in the Rapports of the Straits Commission; 1931, p. 6; 1932, pp. 6-7; 1933, pp. 6-7; 1934, pp. 6-7; 1935, pp. 6-7.

66. Donald C. Watt, "Stalin's First Bid for Sea Power, 1933-1941," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, (June, 1964), p. 91.

67. F.R., 1936, III, 507. Watt summarizes the USSR as "a sea power whose capital ship strength was barely above that of Turkey, Spain or the ABC powers of Latin America..." During World War II, he notes that "in these narrow enclosed seas /i.e., the Black Sea/, German air power was supreme and the Red Fleet had no comeback, its naval-air units being inordinately primitive." "Stalin's First Bid for Sea Power," p. 96.

68. Rapports of the Straits Commission, 1931-1935, pp. 6-7.

69. Bulletin de la presse turque, No. 109, p. 11; No. 110, p. 11; No. 111, p. 7; No. 112, p. 9.

70. Ibid., No. 124, p. 8.

71. Shapiro, Soviet Treaty Series, III, 150.

72. Jan Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire: A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York, 1964), p. 190.

Chapter 18

ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL PACT, 1935

The abrupt exchange on June 18 between British and German diplomats of their "Notes of Agreement," outlining a bilateral naval understanding, was one of the more startling events of 1935.¹ The occasion marked the termination of a brief, but misleading, session of "Preliminary negotiations" that had begun only fourteen days earlier in London. The terms of the Agreement provided: that a permanent relationship of 100-35 in total naval tonnage was to prevail between Great Britain and Germany, respectively; that this relationship was to exist regardless of the amount or nature of third Power construction; that Germany would apply this ratio to all naval categories, except submarines; and that Germany had the right to parity with Great Britain in submarines, but that it would temporarily restrict its U-boat tonnage to 45 per cent of this parity. Implicit in the pact was the understanding that Germany would also adhere to the qualitative restrictions to be designed by the London Naval Conference of 1935-36.

In analyzing the Anglo-German pact, several points stand out. First, while Hitler originated the idea of a naval accord, the British were quite receptive to an agreement, though not for the same reasons. For the Nazis an accord would represent British endorsement of Germany's unilateral abrogation of the Versailles restrictions; for the British it would mean that a major hurdle in the extension of naval limitations throughout Continental waters had been surmounted. Second, negotiations of the pact were sharply circumscribed by Hitler's use of ultimative diplomacy. Third, the political wisdom and technical necessity of the Anglo-German understanding were contentious issues at its conception and have remained so in historical assessments. Fourth, although Germany has been charged with violating the Agreement, evidence to substantiate this indictment is lacking.

Origins of the Agreement

A mixture of diplomatic and political consideration provided the motivating, if at times bewildering, impulse toward Anglo-German naval discussions. For Hitler, a naval agreement with Britain was seen mainly as a means to achieve broader political objectives, the most important of which was acceptance of German rearmament. British statesmen, on the other hand, viewed Anglo-German naval issues from a much different perspective. Concerned with the forthcoming second London Naval Conference, the British were seeking support for the restrictive qualitative proposals they were preparing to introduce. Supplementing these diplomatic considerations were domestic political factors. The Conservative Party was particularly sensitive to charges by the Labour Party that the Government was wanting in its enthusiasm for "disarmament"; an Anglo-German pact would relieve some of this pressure.

Hitler was unquestionably behind the opening of Anglo-German deliberations on naval limitations; indeed, the idea for such a pact can be found in his Mein Kampf.² The rationale behind this "grand strategy" lay in the Nazi leader's crude appraisal of Germany's plight during World War One in having to face both England and France, a consequence which he reasoned stemmed directly from the prewar Anglo-German naval race. If British supremacy in continental waters was assured, the Führer believed that England would not be hostile to the Third Reich's plans for eastern Europe even if such action should involve bringing heavy pressure to bear upon France.

Soon after he assumed office in 1933 Hitler informed Admiral Erich Raeder, Chief of Naval Staff, that he wished to reach a naval understanding with Great Britain by granting the latter a three-to-one preponderance. Raeder readily concurred with Hitler's plans, and he did so for largely the same reasons. "Hitler's intention of reaching a sane and friendly agreement with Great Britain was completely in accord with my own ideas," he later wrote. "It was regrettable that such an agreement on relative naval strength had not been reached before World War I, for we in the German Navy well realized that it was British and American seapower that had brought us to our knees despite the great victories of German arms on land and the Russian breakdown."³

At the same time Hitler was determined to end the military restrictions imposed upon Germany under the Versailles treaty. If some hope existed at the end of 1932 for a general

disarmament pact--including a meaningful recognition of Germany's claim to "equality" in armaments--this optimism quickly faded. Consequently, Hitler announced on October 14, 1933 Germany's withdrawal from these formal deliberations and from the League. In succeeding months Nazi officials interested themselves with limited, continental arms control measures. In February 1934, for example, Hitler offered to accept restrictions on the German army which were equally applied to the French, Italian and Polish armies, and to limit the German Air Force at 30 per cent of the combined strength of the air forces of Germany's neighbors, or 50 per cent of the strength of France's air force, whichever was the lower.⁴

Their desire to reach a naval understanding with England became evident in November 1934 when Admiral Raeder outlined the position of the German Navy regarding limitations to Captain G. C. Muirhead-Gould, the British naval attache. Raeder commented on the dimming prospects for renewing worldwide naval restrictions, and then hinted at a possible Anglo-German understanding.

There can be no doubt that our equality of rights must now be recognized in fact, i.e., the special restrictions for Germany on the size of ships, calibres, submarine construction, the use of aircraft, etc., must be removed. At the same time, Germany is prepared to accept any restriction applying to all Naval Powers. If, however, the Naval Conference should prove fruitless, it would seem worth while to try to come to an agreement with individual States; in this connection it is conceivable that negotiations of this kind with Britain would occasion the fewest difficulties, as the German Navy has no thought of competition at sea with your Navy.⁵

Meanwhile to the British Ambassador, Sir Eric Phipps, Hitler declared that he was "willing to come to an agreement with Britain in the naval sphere...on a basis of /about/ 35 per cent." When Captain Muirhead-Gould returned from London on January 7, 1935 he informed Raeder that the British government still held out hope for a general naval agreement and that it seemed certain Germany would be included in these deliberations "at a later stage."⁶

British officials had long been aware of Hitler's determination to achieve military "equality"--a policy which they found distasteful, yet understandable. That there was little enthusiasm in London for "enforcing" the Versailles restrictions

may be seen from their role in promoting the Five Power Declaration of December 11, 1932 which amounted to a theoretical endorsement of German military equality. Since the collapse of the Geneva disarmament talks, British officials had sought to bring France around to an understanding with Hitler which would result in arms control measures, particularly for air and sea forces. Most of all, the English wanted their former ally to face reality, that is, the bankruptcy of French policy toward German armaments. This attitude, as summarized in March 1934 by Prime Minister MacDonald, was that the French must decide either to stop German rearmament "at about where it is now" through a disarmament treaty and international supervision, or they must face "the inevitable" continuation of German rearmament without any controls.⁷ As for naval matters, the British were increasingly anxious about the Third Reich's new construction plans. Throughout the 1934 preliminary discussions for the next naval conference, London officials insisted that a sound limitation program would necessarily involve the continental seapowers, including Germany.⁸

Two domestic factors greatly influenced this British attitude toward German rearmament. According to D. C. Watt, "The first of these arose from the parlous state of Britain's armed forces in the early thirties, the second from the need of obtaining in the international field some agreement capable of being represented to the electorate as a success for disarmament." Both issues were substantially interlaced, but that of disarmament was more vulnerable to political partisanship. Thus, in the famous East Fulham by-election (a month after Germany withdrew from the disarmament conference and the League) the Labor opposition chose to campaign solely on the disarmament issue and won. This election was only one of the campaigns in 1934 which saw the conservative-dominated National government either lose or win with drastically reduced majorities. Little wonder, then, that "disarmament was a subject on which the National government at this date was almost morbidly sensitive."⁹

Early in 1935 events gathered in momentum and increased in complexity. In an Anglo-French communique of February 3, Great Britain announced its intention to stand with France against unilateral abrogation of the military restrictions of the peace treaties; at the same time, however, France agreed that the armaments sections of the Versailles treaty ought to be revised. This outward appearance of British firmness continued into early March when they issued a harsh "white paper" blaming Nazi rearmament for the launching of

their own preparedness program. While Hitler was cool toward the first statement, he chose to be outraged by the second. Initially the Führer's anger was appeased by the temporary postponement of an early March visit to Berlin by two British cabinet ministers. His most effective rejoinder, however, was to announce on March 11 the existence of a German air force, and a week later, to reintroduce military conscription. The reaction of London--apart from the rescheduling of the visit of Foreign Minister Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden to Berlin in late March--was to draw closer to Paris and Rome. During the next month the British government publicly gave every indication of taking a firm stand against Hitler: on April 11, with the creation of the "Stresa Front," Britain joined France and Italy in verbally censuring Germany's re-armament program and on April 18 at Geneva, Britain endorsed a similar League resolution.¹⁰

Meanwhile, British and German officials had privately continued to refine their differences regarding naval armaments. During the March 26 meeting between Hitler and Simon four points relative to these issues came under discussion. First, Simon extended (and Hitler accepted) an invitation to participate in the preliminary naval conversation then being bilaterally conducted with the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. Second, the Foreign Minister declared that the "ratio" system no longer seemed promising as a method of achieving naval limitation; instead, he announced that they were studying "the possibilities of reaching agreement on the naval construction programmes of the various countries for a given number of years." Appearing surprised, Hitler showed no sympathy for this deviation from the Washington system: "Should it, for instance, be decided to suspend new construction entirely during this period, the other Powers would then possess their fleets as at present completed, whilst we would still be in the position of having equality of rights in the naval sphere on paper only."

Third, Hitler declared that, although Germany was entitled to naval parity with England, his government had neither the desire nor the financial resources to challenge British supremacy but would voluntarily agree to adjust its construction to 35 per cent of the Royal Navy's tonnage. Simon objected to this formula as being too high because it would escalate French and Italian programs with the symmetrical effect of causing Britain to build and thus again raise the German maximum. Expectedly, Hitler refused to recognize French or Italian naval supremacy on the grounds that Germany's security requirements were equal to the other Continental

seapowers. Fourth, while Simon insisted that the preliminary discussions were to be held "without prejudice to the validity of existing treaty provisions," he also expressed his hope that these "conversations would produce results which would relate to the future and which could then replace the existing Versailles provisions."¹¹ To achieve legal sanction for their rearmament was, of course, one of the Nazi regime's political objectives.

This meeting did nothing to clear away the fundamental confusion between London and Berlin regarding the course which the preliminary talks would take. The British left under the impression that the Germans were in a conciliatory mood, while Hitler understood his statements to be declarative.¹²

Before the preliminary deliberations got underway, reports in the British press of German submarine construction temporarily unsettled officials in both countries. This episode began innocently with Simon's suggestion that an exchange of technical information between naval professionals would facilitate the forthcoming talks. The British naval attache was confidentially apprised of Germany's surface construction program on April 12 but his request for figures on submarines was blandly put aside. His German informant privately noted, however, that information on submarine construction probably could have been given "without arousing more unfavorable reactions" for the British appeared "thoroughly prepared to hear such news." It took an April 25 article about Germany's renewed U-boat construction, in the Daily Telegraph to smoke out the truth. The attache was promptly called in and told that "assembling" of twelve small boats of 250 tons had begun--after, of course, April 12. Although this expose aroused considerable hostility in the British press, public attention quickly shifted to the mounting potential threat of German air power.¹³ If MacDonald found the German decision to build submarines to be "ominous," the Prime Minister nonetheless informed Commons on May 3 that the Government was still prepared to hold the contemplated talks.¹⁴

Negotiating the Agreement

Basic differences between the British and German attitudes collided at the initial London meeting of the conferees and actual negotiations were almost nonexistent because of Hitler's ultimative diplomacy. Essentially, the

deliberations leading up to the naval agreement brought out in sharp relief the divergent approaches to the naval question which had dominated the preconference conversations. As the Germans were concerned with the broad political implications of the issue, while the British focused almost exclusively on its technical and domestic considerations, the initiative easily fell to the former.

The initial session of these conversations quickly revealed their direction. Sir John opened the June 4 morning meeting, claiming that informal meetings with other naval powers had shown that "no progress was to be achieved as long as one confined oneself to laying down quantitative limits" as the fixing of ratios had proven "extraordinarily difficult." Concluding his brief remarks, Simon suggested that "the best method of procedure was that there should first be a comprehensive exchange of views between the experts, while the Ministers responsible watched the progress of the negotiations carefully." British expectation of an intense technical examination of naval questions was abruptly shattered when Ambassador Joachim von Ribbentrop delivered Germany's ultimatum. After reiterating Hitler's "generous decision" to voluntarily limit German naval tonnage to 35 per cent of the Royal Navy, he demanded to know whether the British delegation was willing to accept this ratio as "an inviolable and firmly established" first principle. While Simon angrily pointed out that this demand "was something which properly belonged not to the beginning but to the end of negotiations," Ribbentrop made it clear that his position was not open to bargaining but was being put forward as "a final decision by the German Chancellor."¹⁵ Without replying Simon stalked from the conference room, pleading a prior engagement.

The remainder of this first meeting found the Germans steadfastly adhering to their demand for confirmation of the 35 per cent ratio as a prerequisite for continuing the discussions. In desperation, Robert Craige unsuccessfully argued that, while he did not see any "fundamental differences of opinion" between them, he must differ on retention of the ratio concept as the basic method for agreement. "Furthermore," he declared,

the ratio system of the Washington Treaty was responsible for all the present difficulties and for the grave danger of unrestricted competition in armaments. Germany was now claiming something which would be tantamount to increasing this danger. In these conversations they must not think in bilateral terms, but, in view of the coming

multilateral negotiations, they must keep future conferences in mind; nothing said in the course of these conversations would be in any way binding.

The Germans showed little concern for these technical considerations; indeed, Ribbentrop implied that British acceptance of the 35 per cent ratio was necessary to "creat the basis" for Germany's participation in "future international negotiations on the same conditions."¹⁶

When Craige's final efforts failed to dislodge the Germans from their stand, the deliberations rapidly shifted to explorat on of the difficulties inherent in the 100-35 ratio. Three basic considerations emerged during the next forty-eight hours: the status of the ratio in the event of increased third country building; application of the ratio to categories; and determination of Germany's submarine quota.

The British wished to determine whether the Nazi government would abide by the 100-35 ratio if, for instance, France should decide to counter the Anglo-German agreement by increasing its current 100-50 proportion to the Royal Navy? Ribbentrop declared that Germany would find such action "absolutely incomprehensible" and that, while the Third Reich was willing to accept an actual 15 per cent French naval advantage, this superiority would never be acknowledged in principle. The Ambassador denied that any third country construction would lead to an increase in the basic ratio; however, he observed that "Germany must proceed from the assumption that Britain would maintain her naval strength in a definite proportion to that of other European naval Powers." Ribbentrop did hope that Britain could be counter on to oppose such third-nation claims. While Craige confirmed that his government would probably seek to prevent any increases, he pointed out that they naturally would not be able to exercise any pressure against France.

Next, Criage proposed that the 100-35 ratio be extended to "the system of categories." While Ribbentrop expressed Germany's claim to global tonnage in principle, he also conceded that Germany was "prepared to come to an understanding" with the British on this point. However, should the French embark on "an unexpectedly" large construction program, Berlin wanted to be able to off-set this disadvantage somewhat by being allowed a certain freedom of transfer. When figures were finally suggested, Ribbentrop with a proposed 25 per cent transfer limit. Given the technical problems

involved in establishing figures for categories and transfer the matter was reserved for later consideration once the basic principles were adopted.

Finally, the Germans claimed the same privilege regarding submarines as allowed other powers; that is, if the current parity allowance was extended at the upcoming general conference, Germany would make a similar claim. Yet utilization of this privilege in actual practice was left open to negotiation. Later Ribbentrop affirmed that, even if no general treaty should emerge, Germany would limit itself to parity with Britain--a technical concession because France possessed a larger, more modern, submarine fleet.¹⁷

Simon finally informed the German delegation, at an evening session on June 6, that the British government was "prepared and intended to accept the declaration of the German Reich Chancellor as the basis for further naval discussions." Neither how or when this decision was arrived at, nor what arguments influenced the Cabinet, is known. Yet two considerations appear to have been significant: subsequent memoirs point to the Admiralty as being actively in favor of an Anglo-German naval understanding; and circumstantial evidence supports the contention that the prospect of securing domestic partisan advantage also argued on behalf of the agreement. To the Admiralty the practical advantages of stabilizing naval construction and gaining an exchange of information by means of a voluntary accord outweighed the legal and moral aspects of the problem; no longer did "clinging to theories" make sense to these professionals.¹⁸ That Baldwin and the Conservative leadership were watching closely for an improvement of their domestic opportunities is clear from their calling a "snap-election" in November 1935, a maneuver that gave them a handsome majority in Commons.¹⁹

Before arranging the formal accord, however, Simon insisted that the other maritime Powers must be informed of the Cabinet's decision. Despite German misgivings at the delay, the British circulated their intentions to Washington, Tokyo, Rome, and Paris, inviting comment. Although Washington declared that the differential between the British and German fleets was essentially a British decision, American officials did note "with particular satisfaction" that Germany accepted the concept of limiting naval tonnage by categories and that Germany was prepared to accept the ratio as final regardless of third Power construction. Tokyo likewise responded with no objection to the German proposal. Understandably the French were exceedingly dismayed by the political implications of

such an accord. While they did not formally reply until June 18, the French contended that: 1) the British concession went far beyond the limited scope set for the preliminary conversations; 2) the agreement ran counter to the understandings arrived at earlier in London, Stresa, and Geneva that the Treaty of Versailles could not be denounced or altered either unilaterally or bilaterally; and 3) the understanding went contrary to the French position that all armaments must be treated as a single problem. Moreover, Paris officials warned that if the Germans began to build they would have to add to their fleet "in order to maintain a sufficient margin over German war vessels which will all be concentrated in one sea." Also, the French wondered what effect German construction would have on Russian naval plans.²⁰ Although an Anglo-German agreement would not likely find great favor in Rome, it may be supposed--from Italy's attitude at Geneva toward the Versailles restrictions--that Italian objections were much milder.²¹

On June 18, an official exchange of notes between the British and German delegations officially sealed the new naval relationship. The intervening negotiations, between June 6-17, had found the German's agreeing to accept an immediate 45 per cent ratio in submarines while gaining the right to full parity. Berlin reserved the right to avail itself of its total U-boat tonnage should the political situation warrant such measures. The Admiralty's apparent lack of serious concern for the German construction of submarines stemmed from their belief that their recent developments in underwater detection, through the use of radar (Asdic), had greatly lessened this threat. Indeed, one of the reasons for Raeder's peacetime reluctance to vigorously expand U-boat construction was the Naval Staff's uncertainty over the extent of Britain's advances in anti-submarine methods. Thus up to the outbreak of war, British merchant shipping planners did not believe the submarine posed their greatest threat; rather they were more concerned about the menace of air attacks on the ports and on ships approaching port.²²

Also these negotiations saw the British delegation making a last minute attempt to insert a mild reservation regarding the Versailles restrictions, which was designed to pacify the French. Due to vehement German opposition this idea was quickly dropped.²³

Analysis of Terms

Outwardly the Anglo-German Agreement--apart from its political implications which will be discussed later--appeared to be a simply constructed, technical vehicle of accommodation. In reality, however, it was a bit more complex piece of machinery for it carried implicit as well as explicit considerations. Thus while the Agreement dealt with fundamental principles, it also implicitly authorized intermittent bilateral conversations to amplify and develop the specific technical features of the understanding. The subsequent negotiations finally resulted in the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1937, which incorporated the 1935 Agreement with the principle features of the 1936 London Naval Treaty. Overall, then, the Agreement was characterized by two essential factors. First, the initial understanding explicitly laid down the basic principle of the 100-35 ratio. Second, this understanding implicitly provided for a continuing mutual exchange of naval construction information and for continuing conversations designed to hammer the fundamental principles into policy commitments.

In the first sense, the Anglo-German Agreement summarized and spelled out the basic naval relationship of the two nations. The 100-35 ratio was "to be a permanent relationship" in that the total tonnage of the German fleet was never to exceed 35 per cent of the total tonnage (naval) of the British Empire. Germany was to adhere to the 100-35 ratio "in all circumstances," but if third Power construction should become "abnormal" the German government could ask for a re-examination of the basic formula. Germany agreed, in principle, to accept the system "which divided naval vessels into categories, fixing the maximum tonnage and/or armament for vessels in each category," and to apply its 35 per cent ratio to each of these categories, except submarines. However, the Germans reserved the right to vary the ratio in one or two categories, after consulting British officials, should conditions warrant such measures. Germany agreed to a temporary submarine tonnage allotment of 45 per cent of the British Empire's total, but insisted upon the right to full parity--after notifying the British Admiralty--if they felt the increase was justified.²⁴

Implicit in this statement of principles was the understanding that naval professionals from both sides would begin examining the technical implications of the Agreement subsequent to the official exchange of Notes. Consequently, the negotiations which began in early June continued unbroken

throughout the summer with British and German naval representatives succeeding by June 23 in reaching an understanding on qualitative limitations.

The German Delegation supports the aim of the United Kingdom to reach qualitative limitation in any future agreement.

Germany will be ready to accept any limitation of types, for instance reduction of displacements and reduction of gun caliber, as well as any abolition of types, e.g., the abolition of Cruisers A and Submarines, if such regulations applied, and were at the same time carried through, by all other naval Powers. Germany would particularly welcome any such measures as a further step towards the limitation of naval armaments.

More specifically, the Germans endorsed British proposals that would limit capital ships to 25,000 tons and 12-inch guns; limit aircraft carriers to 22,000 tons; prohibit further construction of type A cruisers (10,000 tons, 8-inch guns); limit type B cruisers to 7,000 tons; establish an 1,850 ton upper limit for destroyers; and abolish submarines.²⁵

While the conversations aimed at delaying German construction of capital ships and submarines, the Nazi government stated that its "unalterable" policy was to complete the construction of its "entire 35% quota by the end of the year 1942." At the same time the Germans announced that they were "prepared to adhere to the rules regarding submarine warfare as set out in Part IV of the London Naval Treaty /of 1930/, and to accept them for herself irrespective of whether they are adhered to by all other Powers." The Nazi government also agreed to adopt, reciprocally, "all measures for the exchange of information" which the British hoped to incorporate in the future general naval agreement.²⁶

Finally, the two nations agreed, in terms of tonnage figures, to the actual application of the 100-35 ratio. The following figures were an estimated projection of the two fleets as they would be at the end of 1942.

	Approx. Br. tonnage	Approx. Ger. tonnage
Capital ships	504,000	176,000
Aircraft carriers	111,950	40,000
Heavy cruisers "A"	146,300	50,000
Light cruisers "B"	326,200*	110,000**

	Approx. Br. tonnage	Approx. Ger. tonnage
Destroyers	150,000*	53,000**
Submarines	49,000	22,000

*British planned to retain, additionally, ten over-age cruisers and 50,000 tons of over-age destroyers.

**Germans planned to retain, additionally, 10,000-20,000 tons of over-age cruisers and about 17,000 tons of over-age destroyers.

Source: Compiled from D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 413-14, 587.

Although subsequent Anglo-German naval developments--including Hitler's April, 1939 denunciation--are treated in detail below, the German decision in December 1938 to construct U-boats up to 100 per cent parity warrants mention here. On December 10, the German government informed London that it was their intention to exercise their right, according to paragraph 2 (f) of the 1935 Agreement, "to build up to 100 per cent of the British submarine tonnage."²⁷ Representatives of the Admiralty, while not denying such action was within the Third Reich's perogative, met with German naval authorities on December 30, in an effort to dissuade the Nazi government from going through with their plans. The British hoped to obtain an adjustment of Germany's submarine construction short of full parity, however, this proposition was vetoed by Berlin. German naval officers did say, unofficially, that their U-boat program for 1939 would not exceed 65 per cent of the current British tonnage of 70,000.²⁸

Assessment of the Naval Pact

To evaluate the Anglo-German naval pact is to strike a balance between its partisans and its opponents; for if the Agreement's supporters have overly extolled its virtues, its detractors have charged it with too many sins. To the first, the naval accord was a pragmatic step designed to stabilize German construction and a forward step in naval limitation; while to the second, it constituted "appeasement" that was unnecessary, illegal and immoral and that rented all hopes of a united front against German rearmament. An interim assessment--as British records have not been opened--is most difficult because it involves consideration of vast political and technical factors. It is proposed, however, to examine the Agreement in two stages: how did contemporary statesmen

and officials view the pact? And what has been the historical verdict of the accord?

The Contemporary View. Examination of contemporary attitudes suggests several major considerations. First, the German and British governments each believed the pact largely secured their particular policy objectives. To the British this was to be found in the broad German concessions on technical points, while to the Germans it was to be seen in Britain's acknowledgement that the Versailles restrictions were dead. Second, domestic opposition in Britain to the Agreement was limited in volume and alternatives. The strongest arguments by these critics questioned the accord's legality and morality, and its impact on Anglo-French relations. Third, reactions from abroad were mixed, with the loudest outcry against the pact coming, predictably, from France. Two points stand out in analysis of these complaints. Those French and Russian statesmen who were vociferous in their condemnation suggested no meaningful alternative to curb Germany's unilateral rearmament, except to stand united in verbal protest. And those leaders who charged the British with seeking only selfish motives did so on the grounds that England's behavior injured their own national interests.

German officials were unanimously satisfied that the new naval understanding had furthered their own specific purposes. Although Ribbentrop called the accord "the beginning of a practical peace policy," he was very much aware of the Agreement's political implications. He deftly suggested that an important "result of these negotiations is that we have broken the ice in the rigid political situation in Europe."²⁹ In a confidential Naval Staff memorandum this point was made even more succinctly:

The success of the Agreement lies principally in the political sphere. In this respect its consequences should not be underrated. As a result of the Agreement the most powerful of our former enemies and of the signatories of the Versailles Treaty has formally invalidated an important part of this Treaty and formally recognized Germany's equality of rights. The danger of Germany's being isolated, which definitely threatened in March and April of this year, has been eliminated. A political understanding with Great Britain has been initiated by the naval settlement. The front recently formed against us by the Stresa Powers has been considerably weakened by the Agreement.

Nor did the German naval professionals find the ratio objectionable for, as a staff officer noted, "any substantially larger figure than permitted by the Agreement could hardly be reached in the next decade." In terms of the internal struggle among the military services within the Third Reich, the Navy now possessed a clearly defined policy with which to bargain for construction priorities.³⁰

British officials defended the Agreement on the grounds of technical necessity and political expediency. Before Commons of July 21, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, declared that the government regarded the naval accord as essential because "it held out the possibility of averting for all time the threat of /Anglo-German/ naval rivalry" and believed it to be "a contribution to world peace and international appeasement." The Agreement "must definitely be favourable to the naval interests of other Powers," he insisted, because it furnished "a fixed point of departure" for future naval limitation discussions. To Labor Party charges that the Cabinet had "tore up entirely" the Versailles Treaty, Sir Bolton claimed that the government had "to face facts." Indeed, he declared:

We have to deal with the essentially practical problem that Germany is already constructing a fleet which is outside the limits laid down in the Versailles Treaty; what we have done is, by agreement with Germany, to circumscribe the effects which might flow from this unilateral decision of Germany. We believe this to be in the ultimate interests of all the naval Powers of the world, and we are satisfied that a serious error would have been committed by this country had His Majesty's Government either refused to accept the offer or even hesitated unduly to do so.³¹

In the House of Lords five days later, Lord Londonderry argued that the naval pact was necessary because "we are a practical people and we have to face the facts of the situation." To Londonderry the issues were clear: the momentum for arms limitation had been slipping away due to missed opportunities. The naval arrangement, he emphasized, must be examined in the context of these three main considerations:

first, that the offer made to us by Germany was made to this country, and not to other countries; secondly, that in itself, it left the liberty of naval construction of other countries unaffected; and thirdly, that to have insisted on prior consultation with other countries

would definitely have meant the loss of the Agreement, with incalculable results, in our judgment, for the naval position of this and of the other naval Powers, and, and, in fact, I might go so far as to say for the future peace of the world.

Denying that the pact in anyway prejudiced the position of other naval powers, he discounted French complaints and claimed that the accord afforded France a permanent superiority over the German navy.³²

Reflecting the feelings of the Admiralty, Earl Beatty, Admiral of the Fleet, declared in the House of Lords that "I am of the opinion that we owe thanks to the Germans. They came to us with outstretched hands and voluntarily proposed to accept a 35 to 100 ratio in fleet strength. If they had made different proposals, we would not have been able to stop them. That we do not have an armament race with one nation in the world at least is something for which we must be thankful."³³

Opposition to the pact questioned the government's political wisdom in turning away from the Stresa Front and its previous stand against the unilateral abrogation of treaties. To Winston Churchill the Agreement was regrettable because it meant that the Cabinet had condoned Hitler's "flagrant breach" of the Versailles Treaty. While not suggesting that the Nazi offer should have been arbitrarily dismissed, he argued in Commons on July 22 that: "It would have been far better, even though we could not get complete assurances in regard to the ratio of Germany with ourselves, to have carried these matters forward to the League of Nations and endeavored to.../build/ a policy of collective security among all the nations of the world." In the same vein, members of the Labor Party accused the government of yielding "to power politics and blackmail" what it had "refused to international justice and co-operation."³⁴

Nor did Churchill believe that this isolated action worked "for the cause of peace." Instead, he felt that the net result of German naval construction was that the Royal Navy would lose much of its deterrent effect toward future war. The immediate impact of sanctioning Nazi seapower would be the loss of the command of the Baltic to the Germans; then, as a consequence, would follow the withdrawal of British seapower from the Mediterranean and the Far East to maintain a proper balance of power in the North Sea--thereby freeing the Italians and Japanese to carry out their

expansionist policies. Churchill believed that only a major rebuilding of British and French seapower, at a considerable expense, could prevent a general deterioration to the detriment of Britain.³⁵

The granting to Germany of the right to build submarines to 45 per cent of Britain's strength aroused reminders of the naval crisis of the World War. Hitler's pledge to join in the mutual abolition of these underwater warships and to subscribe to the international rules of submarine warfare did not appease Churchill. To find promise in the former point, he reminded the government, is to ignore the fact that France, Italy, and Japan were absolutely opposed to such abolition; while to find solace in the second consideration, he charged, is "the acme of gullibility" for a nation at war makes the fullest use of its best weapons.³⁶

The brief debate over the Naval Agreement ended when Commons voted 247 to 44 to endorse the government's action. With even Churchill finally voting with the majority, parliamentary criticism quickly died down. The Cabinet's relief can perhaps best be described by Prime Minister Samuel Baldwin's private view that the Anglo-German accord was "the first real and practical move in disarmament that has been accomplished since the war.../and/ he regretted that one or two in the House of Commons declared that you could not trust the Germans to keep their word."³⁷

In Paris, the Anglo-German naval accord was greeted in almost all circles with a virulent indignation that slowly gave way to a sulky resentment. The decision to announce the pact on June 18 was unthinking, as this was the 120th anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo. French officials, although measuring the language of their formal notes, privately felt that Germany had finally succeeded in driving an effective wedge into the anti-revisionist front which had been united at London, Stresa, and Geneva. In a speech on June 27 French Naval Minister Piétri labelled the Agreement "a grave occurrence" which "modified the equilibrium of European naval forces." While unsurprised at Germany's naval rearmament, he expressed astonishment at "the precipitous approval that England gave to it, under conditions which can cause us to doubt, not only her friendship, but her traditional prudence." That same day, the French Naval Commission issued a communique declaring that the naval agreement had "the necessary consequences of restoring to France complete liberty in naval matters until the conclusion of a new general agreement."³⁸

The French press immediately loosened a barrage of anti-British agitation in which they charged that London had broken the Stresa Front against Hitler and, worse still, that the British were not giving their naval secrets to Germany while refusing them to France.³⁹ While the first complaint, a constant theme in all quarters, was legitimate, the second was less so: the French government could have access to the British and German exchange of naval information on the basis of reciprocity. Arguments appeared also contesting the technical advantage of the pact. For example, it was pointed out that Germany, under the pact, would be allowed 183,000 tons for capital ships, when France, under the 1930 London Treaty (which she signed but did not ratify), could claim only 105,000 tons. Hitler's proposal to abolish the U-boat was dismissed out hand, and his willingness to abide by the rules governing submarine warfare was derided. To one author, the naval pact "spells an armaments race between Germany and France, and also between Germany and Soviet Russia."⁴⁰ He was, however, wrong on both counts.

In a private exchange with Eden, who was in Paris on June 21-22 to explain the treaty, French officials charged that the British government was guilty of failing to appreciate the seriousness of the breach in the Versailles restrictions and of not holding out for greater German concessions. In his memoirs, Sir Samuel Hoare recounts that Eden responded to his accusers "with a retort that was never answered."

Did Mr. Leger think that Part V of the Versailles Treaty that restricted German armaments was now worth anything as a bargaining counter?...Our case was that we circumscribed Germany's power and did not give Germany any new power. We could not postpone the naval question for a general agreement on all armaments that might never be made....The fact that Hitler was ready to accept the international rules for submarine warfare was of great value to France and Great Britain.⁴¹

Eden went further. He reminded Foreign Minister Pierre Laval that France had in April 1934 failed to objectively consider German propositions concerning land forces which would have limited the German army at levels far below those which they now claimed. Rather than find themselves in the same position regarding naval armaments, Eden declared that the British chose to profit realistically from the French example.⁴²

Perhaps the best rebuttal to Eden's argument was André Géraud's evaluations of the general drift of British foreign policy, of which the naval pact was only a symptom. He noted that:

One consequence of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement is a strengthening of all that is bold and adventurous in German foreign policy...after these last events we are not justified in presuming that Downing Street will have the wisdom to define and execute a policy which can prevent war. If a crisis arrives, England will perhaps end by entering the conflict on the side of those who are devoted to international peace; but she will not have known in advance how to create that 'deterrent to war' about which Messrs. Baldwin and MacDonald have frequently spoken during the past year. This is a matter of very serious portent.⁴³

It may be questioned, however, whether French Foreign policy was essentially more sound. In their approach to political issues such as disarmament and the Versailles Treaty restrictions--as to military strategy--a "Maginot" complex prevailed.

A few Frenchmen sought to understand England's decision to treat with Germany and to place this action in perspective. The President of the French Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee wondered if perhaps their own policy toward armaments had not been obdurate.

Have we not perhaps irritated our friends for the last few years with our everlasting mania for linking into a whole all the questions under discussion in order to solve any of them? If the 'multilateralism' dear to our bureaucrats has hitherto resulted in nothing but trivial arguments, is it not understandable that the British should prefer less dilatory methods than those which have resulted in the rearmament of Germany, not to 35 per cent but to 130 per cent of the French Army?⁴⁴

Laval, in his conversations with Eden, did not appear to be as concerned as some of his countrymen regarding the ratio; however, he noted that domestic opinion necessitated postponing the preliminary naval talks.⁴⁵ As French tempers cooled, Paris gradually came to recognize the desirability of cooperating with Britain toward resolving questions of naval rearmament. Informal Anglo-French talks expanded gradually and, by the end of the year, France's fulfledged participation in the London Naval Conference was assured.

The attitudes of other governments to the naval pact varied widely, from Russian hostility to American endorsement. In Moscow, the Soviet authorities were reportedly "intensely disturbed" by the Agreement; indeed, Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov began referring to the British as "blacklegs." Russian dismay, according to the American ambassador, was based on the theory that Hitler could be restrained only by "a 'chain' of states armed" to oppose him; now that England had defected from the united front, the Soviets feared that Italy and other nations would follow suit. However significant all of this was for European developments, Russian officials were even more concerned about its repercussions in the Far East because the new German construction would make it necessary for Britain to concentrate a greater part of its naval power in the North Sea. A natural, but extremely unpleasant, result of this would be the lifting of restraints on Japanese ambition. In Rome, Mussolini apparently did not show any alarm over the terms of the Agreement, yet he did object to not being more fully consulted.⁴⁶ If Italy was to be in sharp disagreement with England and to draw closer to France during the following months, it was due more to political matters in East Africa than to the naval pact.

Officials in Washington, as noted earlier, greeted the pact with considerable satisfaction as it showed that agreement could be found among the leading European naval powers and that quantitative methods, such as the ratio system, were still acceptable. The specific terms of the pact did not carry any significance for Washington because of America's principle concern with Pacific sea power. One American diplomat, Hugh S. Wilson, who was close to the Geneva negotiations, did note at the time how "unique" British policy was--first, joining in condemning Germany for its unilateral assumption of rearmament and, then, coming to a naval agreement with Germany in a similar unilateral move. "I would like," he wrote to a friend, "to be able to stand up and not only say but feel that such action was entirely consistent and that doubtless God Himself had inspired it! They are a wonderful race, regardless of this and other strange contradictions they generally work out sound results. More power to them!"⁴⁷

The Historical Verdict. Few historical verdicts of the Agreement can claim to be objective for, in the most part, these evaluations consist of the after-thoughts of

contemporary figures. "I feel neither regret nor doubt as to the course that I then took," Sir Samuel Hoare has written. "Has subsequent history condemned my judgment or changed my mind? So far from weakening the conclusions that I reached at the time, it has confirmed them." Admiral Raeder has been decidedly less generous for he has condemned allied leadership for refusing to discuss the readjustment of the Versailles military restrictions with the Weimar Republic, although "they unhesitatingly entered into such discussions with the National Socialist State of Hitler, and granted it everything they had refused the Weimar statesmen." The first scholar to study the pact in detail has criticized the entire affair. "The conclusion of the agreement," writes D. C. Watt, "is a sad comment on the order of priorities held by the Conservative government, on the admiralty's assessment of the weakness and needs of British sea power, on the failure and eclipse of the foreign office, and on the resulting lack of thought given to diplomatic considerations in the decade before the war."⁴⁸

Any assessment of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement must consider at least four points. First, the pact represented a substantial diplomatic victory for the Nazi government since it forgave Hitler's unilateral abrogation of the Versailles restrictions and signified the advent of Britain's "appeasement" policy. Second, it was not, on the other hand, as destructive of allied unity as its critics have so often claimed. Third, the accord provided the basis for furthering general naval limitation during the following months, although it may not have greatly affected actual German naval construction. Fourth, there is no evidence that the Nazi government deliberately intended to violate the 1935 Agreement.

That Hitler secured considerable diplomatic advantage from the naval pact has, surely, been made clear. In Watt's judgment, the pact registered "the first triumph for the new methods i.e., ultimative techniques/ of Nazi diplomacy" and stimulated Hitler's appetite for yet more revisionism. In this single action, he forced British approval of German re-armament and, in doing so, temporarily divided the allies. At the same time, the naval accord provided British Conservatives with the cornerstone for their ill-conceived appeasement policy. They subsequently extolled this understanding, as Churchill has sarcastically pointed out, "to prove to all the world how easy it is to have working arrangements between democratic Parliamentary nations and Totalitarian dictatorship." As A. L. Rowse has observed, in typical

that the naval Agreement "initiated the connivance and started the rot" that was to be known as appeasement.⁴⁹

That the naval Agreement was responsible for the dislocation of Britain's continental policies is a charge often uncritically levied. It is true that British officials could have handled the affair with more consideration for French feelings; but then the same could be said of the French in their previous considerations of British policies toward disarmament and naval limitation. Yet critics have gone so far as to indict the Anglo-German pact for fatally ruining Franco-British cooperation, for destroying the Stresa Front, and for undercutting the international and moral authority of the League. To suggest, as Churchill did later, that the League wielded "a combined opposition of force and of law to treaty-breaking, which Germany, then practically unarmed, could certainly not have overcome" is to confuse fact with illusion. The will to utilize force to enforce the law did not exist. Britain's difficulties with Italy came from Stresa, not the naval Agreement, and from the government's curious decision to treat with Hitler on armaments but not with Mussolini on Ethiopia. To tie the Anglo-Italianan rupture to the naval Agreement is to misread events. "There is less force in the imputation that we shattered the glass front of Stresa," Vansittart has written, "more in the charge that we broke an agreement made in February that we should only release Germany from restrictions as part of a general settlement. Tactless rather than faithless, we asked for trouble. The French Anglophobes all came to the surface; our Franco-philes carped back."⁵⁰ But this was a temporary state of affairs for when disappointment abated in Paris, French delegates were dispatched to the London naval conference where they joined in the 1936 treaty as well as the subsequent Anglo-German pact of 1937. If the French disliked the 1935 Agreement, they apparently had even less enthusiasm for the prospect of "unregulated" German naval construction.

That the Anglo-German pact facilitated the negotiation of later naval limitation agreements is a matter of record for without assurances from Berlin, British officials would have been far more circumspect in their pursuit of qualitative restrictions. The frequent charge that Japan's failure to adopt the 1936 restrictions had a circumscribing effect on these limitations--most notably those regarding capital ships--is true, but this effect was not a debilitating one. A naval race involving qualitative competition--which Lord Chatfield has called "the most virulent form of naval rivalry"--was avoided in continental waters.

Whether or not the 35 per cent ratio actually limited the size of the Nazi fleet is quite another matter. Sir Samuel Hoare alledges that "the Agreement...undoubtedly slowed down German naval construction. Between 1935 and 1939 Hitler could, with little difficulty, have expanded his ship-building yards and forced a race in all three fields of land, air and sea."⁵¹ Exception may be taken to this gratuitous estimate for the Third Reich's ability to expand the capacity of German shipyards was distinctly limited: its amount of available armor plate was quite small and its competing military consumers restricted the Navy to only a poor third for priority items such as funds and manpower.⁵² A better argument might be made that, under these circumstances and without the psychological effect of the Agreement, Raeder would have concentrated on submarines and commerce raiders which might have left him without a balanced fleet but would have posed an infinitely greater threat to British sea lanes. Watt claims that the Admiralty knew, but ignored, the fact that the Nazi could not have exceeded the 35 per cent ratio before 1942 even without a treaty, while Vansittart suggests that "the Germans accepted restriction to make virtue of necessity."⁵³ Just what actual limiting effect, if any, the 1935 pact had on the size of the Nazi fleet will probably remain a contentious point; but it is a fact that the German navy was actually at considerably less than half the ratio when war broke out in 1939.⁵⁴

The fundamental issue involved in the naval pact, from the British standpoint, must be kept in sight: the question before the Cabinet in June was not how to keep Germany from building a fleet--the time for this decision would have been earlier at Stresa or Geneva--but rather how to preserve British naval supremacy in the face of this renewed construction. This situation brought forth not only quantitative but, more importantly, qualitative factors. It has been Lord Chatfield's contention that "the wise, indeed the inevitable, course" was that which they followed: to arrive at a voluntary agreement with Germany in order to "try and stabilize naval construction in Europe and call a halt to secret construction and suspicion." In retrospect, he still maintains that, while France was irritated by the Agreement, "if we had refused it, there could be no agreement at all, quantitative or qualitative, in Europe and a race of ship construction of all types must inevitably ensue. The Versailles Treaty had been torn up by Germany;...it was no use clinging to theories."⁵⁵

This opinion coincides with the belated concession of a French admiral who has written: "Looking back after the intervening years, one can understand the cold logic of Great Britain in officially recognizing German naval rearmament and agreeing to a limit, even a very large one, rather than having no agreed limit at all. It would have been common-sense if the French too had been just as realistic and had jettisoned the ineffectual legalisms of the Versailles Treaty to which she still clung. At that time, however, the French Navy could not avoid the feeling of being abandoned."⁵⁶ In sum, the manner of negotiating the Agreement may not have registered the highest political wisdom, but it did provide certain technical advantages.

Finally, since World War Two an erroneous impression has lingered in some quarters that Germany secretly violated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement between 1935 and 1939. In large measure this belief stems from the charges made during the Nuremberg trials that the Nazi government systematically built more submarines and larger battleships than authorized. The British prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, cited from an essay prepared by the German naval historical office to indict Admiral Raeder for building 118 submarines prior to the denunciation of the Agreement; and from naval records to charge him with hiding the fact that the Scharnhorst, listed at 26,000 tons, actually weighed 31,300 tons and that the Bismarck and Tirpitz, listed at 35,000 tons, had a displacement of 41,700 tons.

The first charge resulted from an erroneous reading of German records, by the historical officer, which apparently substituted the 1942 projection figures for actual construction. The second indictment failed to consider that battleship tonnage limits were raised, by agreement on June 30, 1938, to 45,000 tons and that neither of these ships were commissioned until well after this date. While it is true that Hitler ordered that the actual tonnage figures not be released to the British, Germany's total capital ship tonnage was less than that allowed by the basic Agreement.⁵⁷ Consequently, Raeder was exonerated of these charges. It is Watt's conclusion that the 1935 Agreement "was more or less faithfully observed until its denunciation in April, 1939."⁵⁸

Chapter 18 -- Footnotes

¹ The best account of the Agreement is Donald C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement," Journal of Modern History (June, 1956), pp. 155-175.

² Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, tr. by Ralph Mannheim (1943), p. 140.

³ Admiral Erich Raeder, My Life, tr. by Henry Prexel (1960), pp. 166-67, 173; also D.G.F.P. Ser. C, III, 573. In April, 1933, the American chargé in Berlin noted that high German officials "emphasized that Germany did not wish to build up a navy and I gained the distinct impression that something might be done with them on this score." F.R., 1933, II, 219.

⁴ E. H. Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (1966), pp. 188-89.

⁵ D.G.F.P., Ser. C., III, 685-86. Also see Ribbentrop's letter, sent twelve days earlier on November 16, regarding his conversations with Eden and Simon, Ibid., pp. 638-41.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 681, 787-90.

⁷ F.R., 1934, I, pp. 224-25. Norman Davis reported the French predicament thusly: "While the French refuse to legalize German rearmament and to keep it within controlled and justified limits they apparently have no intention of taking any effective measures otherwise to stop rearmament because they are more afraid of the after effects in France of coercive measures against Germany than they are of German rearmament." Ibid., p. 77. The most effective French rejoinder, Davis thought, was that "it was not right to put a premium on Germany's unjustifiable action in leaving the Conference and beginning actively to rearm in the midst of negotiations." Ibid., p. 85.

⁸ Ibid., p. 228. In light of England's effort to promote its new naval limitation policies, Anthony Eden's visit to Berlin during February 19-23, 1934, must be included among the "preliminary discussions." During his talks with high Nazi officials, Eden volunteered the information that his government expected Germany to participate in the forthcoming naval conference. D.G.F.P., Ser. C, III, 61.

⁹ At East Fulham the previous government majority of 14,000 was converted into a Labor majority of 4,000; while at East Putney in November, 1934, a former conservative majority of 21,000 was reduced to 2,000. "An estimate prepared for the editor of the Times gave Labor gains at a hypothetical general election at 140-50 seats." However, the government could have suffered these losses and still retained a working majority. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 162-63. For a short, bitter commentary on British politics at this time, see A. L. Rowse, Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline, 1933-1939 (1961).

¹⁰ Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 153-154.

¹¹ D.G.F.P. Ser. C, III, 1064-67. The Nazi government had not announced definite programs for naval or air armaments, although they had asserted their right to full parity, Ibid., p. 1006.

¹² Ibid., pp. 1086-87; particularly, IV, pp. 87-89.

¹³ D.G.F.P. Ser. C, IV, 45-46, 89-92; and Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," p. 156.

¹⁴ S.I.A., 1935, p. 141. Mac Donald's statement and the government's public use of confidential information brought a brisk rejoinder from Raeder, see D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 99-100.

¹⁵ D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 254, 255-57 (italics in original); The strategy employed by the German delegation was hardly Ribbentrop's for he was only "his master's voice." See Robert G. Vansittart, The Mist Procession (1958), p. 524.

¹⁶ D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 259, 261, 265.

¹⁷ On June 4; Ibid., pp. 262-65, 270-72.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 278; Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, pp. 74-75.

¹⁹ Rowse, Appeasement, p. 22. In the midst of the negotiations, the British Cabinet underwent a major shake-up: Samuel Baldwin replaced MacDonald as Prime Minister, and Sir Samuel Hoare succeeded Simon as Foreign Secretary. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 168-69.

²⁰ D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 278; F.R., 1935, I, 163-68; Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (1954), p. 140.

²¹ D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 379; Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. I45, claims that Mussolini objected to not being consulted.

²² D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 295-96, 325; Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Sea Warfare, 1939-1945: A German Viewpoint (1957), p. 24; C. B. A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (1955), p. 24.

²³ D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 312-14.

²⁴ D.I.A., 1935, pp. 142-45.

²⁵ D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 321-22, 339-40.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 192, 342-43, 366-68.

²⁷ D.B.F.P., Ser. 3, III, 422, 429. The British in turn notified the other sea powers, Ibid., p. 452.

²⁸ D.G.F.P., Ser. D, IV, 368-73. Public announcement of Germany's decision was finally released on February 3, 1939.

²⁹ S.I.A., 1935, pp. 146-48.

³⁰ D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 588.

³¹ G.B., H.L. Debs., June 21, 1935, c. 809-11; Elaine Windrich, British Labour's Foreign Policy (1952), p. 126.

³² G.B., H.L. Debs., June 26, 1935, c. 903-11.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Winston Churchill, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement," in While England Slept (1938), pp. 217-20; Windrich, British Labour's Foreign Policy, p. 126.

³⁵ Speech of July 11 before Commons, in Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (1948), pp. 126-27.

³⁶ See, for example, The Economist, June 22, 1935; Churchill, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 217-18.

³⁷ Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 144; Rowse, Appeasement, pp. 37-38.

³⁸ F.R., 1935, I, 166-67. Much of the personal criticism was lodged, unfairly, against Craige who was accused of persuading the Cabinet to sell-out their allies; and S.I.A., 1935, pp. 153, 187.

³⁹ Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 143. It appears that the extremist Right press was most active in this anti-British campaign, see Charles A. Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany 1933-1939 (1943), p. 56.

⁴⁰ "To eliminate submarines in time of peace is merely to say that in time of war the strongest industrial power, or the power which has secretly prepared for aggression, will have a monopoly of this kind of weapon." Andre Géraud, "France and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty," Foreign Affairs, (October, 1935), p. 56.

⁴¹ Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 144-45.

⁴² Géraud, "France and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty," pp. 60-61.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 144.

⁴⁵ The American Embassy reported that Eden's request "met with a curt refusal," F.R., 1935, I, 74.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 168-69; Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 145.

⁴⁷ F.R., 1935, I, 167; Hugh S. Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (1941), p. 309.

⁴⁸ Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 146; Raeder, My Life, pp. 183-84; Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," p. 174.

⁴⁹ Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 173-74; Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 139; Rowse, Appeasement, p. 37.

⁵⁰ Churchill, While England Slept, p. 280; Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 158-59; Vansittart, The Mist Procession, p. 527.

51 Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 147.

52 Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Sea Warfare, 1939-1945: A German Viewpoint (1957), p. 22.

53 Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 526.

54 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 138. Germany had only 57 submarines of which only 27 were capable of operating in the Atlantic.

55 Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, pp. 74-75.

56 Rear Admiral Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal, The French Navy in World War II (1959), pp. 13-14.

57 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), XIV, pp. 12-15, 28-33, 144-170, 230-235.

58 Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," p. 160. Less generous in Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, 3 vols. (London, 1954-1961), I, pp. 57-58.

Chapter 19

THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY, 1936 AND
BILATERAL ACCESSIONS, 1937-38

The Three-Power London Naval Treaty of 1936 differed from its predecessors--the 1922 Washington Naval accord and the 1930 London naval pact--in that it provided neither quantitative limitations by categories, nor reduction in the existing fleets.¹ If it registered an understanding relative to new naval construction among the United States, Great Britain, and France, the 1936 treaty did not immediately bind such other sea powers as Japan, Russia, Germany, and Italy. Yet the agreement was significant in four important respects. 1) It standarized naval construction among the signatories through qualitative restrictions. 2) It also provided for the exchange of information concerning building and modernization programs. 3) it allowed the signatories to maintain, or improve, their relative sea power. And 4) it provided the basis for bilateral negotiations which would achieve, in 1937, the accession of Germany and the Soviet Union to the original treaty. It also provided for the assent in 1938 of Italy, Poland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland to the basic 1936 treaty.

In one sense, the London conference of December 9, 1935 to March 25, 1936 constituted the most universal approach to naval issues since 1922. This conclave of Americans, British, Japanese, French, and Italians--with the Germans, Russians, and Scandanivans in the wings--sought to stabilize Mediterranean and Baltic naval competition, to head-off a Far Eastern arms race, and to order, generally, European naval construction. Moreover it attempted to do so under less optimistic conditions than had existed at any time in the previous decade and a half.² Italy had already embarked on its Ethiopian conquest. Japan had long since taken control of Manchuria and expanded into northern China, actions which had been condemned by the League. And Germany would decide to occupy

the Rhineland before the meeting adjourned. Then, too, Japan had formally abrogated the Washington Five Power Naval Treaty which meant that, with the simultaneous expiration of the 1930 London pact, all naval restrictions would terminate on December 31, 1936. It is small wonder that most students of diplomacy have come to look upon the conference as a comedy; President Roosevelt at the time even likened it to "a Cocos Island treasure hunt." Yet perhaps this drama might better be described as a modern version of an ancient Greek tragedy in which the characters drifted fatefully toward a new conflagration that would scar them all.

The naval deliberations leading up to the London Conference of 1935-36 focus on four essential considerations. First, the international political climate of the early nineteen-thirties posed new challenges to the concept of naval limitation; indeed, most seapowers were contemplating naval rearmament. Second, the preliminary negotiations in 1934 among representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan established clearly the wide differences in national attitudes that would inhibit any future agreement. Third, the London conference saw the termination of quantitative limitations when the Japanese withdrew from negotiations and it witnessed an attempt to use qualitative restrictions to bring order to the impending naval construction. Fourth, the sea powers, in the aftermath of the formal conference salvaged broad qualitative restrictions on new naval construction. This and the bilateral accessions comprised the last desperate effort to stabilize European naval rearmament.

Challenges to Naval Limitation

The international political climate became increasingly less hospitable to naval disarmament as the world was progressively stirred by aggressive nationalism, economic depression, and conflicting ambition. As France, Italy, and Germany stepped up their construction of warships after 1930, the British became increasingly worried about the escalating effects of European rearmament. Americans, conversely, extended only a minimum of their attention to Continental naval issues but, as Japanese ultranationalists pressed for full parity, directed their efforts toward the Pacific. Thus during 1930-34, the naval policies of the oceanic sea powers varied significantly. The British became disillusioned with American insistence on quantitative limitation, parity, and reduction at the expense of the Royal Navy. Japanese naval

professionals, who had been forced to accept the 1930 London pact, rebounded to seize control of their nation's naval policies and to demand complete parity. However, the Americans optimistically continued to seek naval reductions and, belatedly, to build to authorized treaty limits.

Great Britain only slowly confronted the growing challenge to its Continental naval supremacy. In 1931, Sir Archibald Hurd told the Royal Institute of Naval Architects that their fleet, in European waters, was as strong as it had been in 1900.³ This sense of well-being was marred, however, by England's inability to mediate Franco-Italian naval differences (see Chapter 17) and by impact of their renewed construction on the Continental balance of seapower. The British banked heavily on the World Disarmament Conference to extricate them from the threatening European naval race, for in such competition only English construction was limited by treaty.⁴ But at Geneva, President Hoover complicated the British position by urging on June 22, 1932 that all armaments be sharply slashed. He suggested that the number and carrier, cruiser and destroyer tonnage by one-fourth; and submarine tonnage by one-third. British officials, Prime Minister MacDonald among them, reacted bitterly to the President's proposal. They felt that in 1930 they had made all the concessions they could and that Hoover had ignored their contributions. Stanley Baldwin reflected their disappointment in Commons when he summarized on July 7 the record of British naval reductions.

If a comparison is made with the year before the war it will be found that, taking account of completed vessels of the United Kingdom and other members of the British Commonwealth possessing vessels of any of the categories mentioned, capital ships have been reduced from 69 to 15; cruisers from 108 to 52; destroyers from 285 to 147; and submarines from 74 to 52.

There was a limit, he contended, to which England could reduce its fleet, in particular its cruisers.⁵

While he recognized the new emphasis being given naval construction, Baldwin signalled a perceptible shift in British policy. With further reductions too dangerous and multilateral agreement on ratios highly unlikely, they decided to emphasize qualitative restrictions to stabilize naval construction and control competition. This decision guided the formation of British policies for the second

London conference and, in the process, provided the basic principles of the Anglo-German Pact of 1935.

Japanese dissatisfaction with the existing limitations heightened rapidly after ratification of the 1930 London naval pact. Disgruntled individuals, particularly among the armed forces, argued that the parliamentary process failed to solve the depression or to serve the national purpose--the revitalization of the nation at home and the assertion of Japanese leadership abroad. As determined young officers and their civilian accomplices strove for a "positive" policy in Manchuria and China, they chaffed under the restrictions of the naval treaties.⁶

Ratification of the 1930 London accord triggered a showdown between the military and civil government. The Army, which had suffered three substantial reductions during the twenties and sought to prevent a fourth, led in denouncing disarmament and in extolling the necessity of national security. Naval officers, following suit, protested that the ratio system had attached to the Japanese people "a stigma of inferiority which hardly tended to sustain Japan's position in the Far East."⁷ On March 25, 1933 the Japanese hinted that they planned to withdraw from the naval treaties upon their expiration at the end of 1936. Next, the Japanese delegate to the World Disarmament Conference lashed out at the London treaty claiming that "instead of bringing an appeasement to all the signatory states, the treaty had resulted in the creation of an atmosphere of uneasiness and apprehension which did not increase the feeling of security."⁸ By October 1933 Japanese leadership was under military domination and committed to naval parity with the Anglo-Saxon powers.

American statesmen retained optimistic illusions about the prospects of naval limitation longer than other leaders. In 1932, Hoover's plea to reduce armaments by one-third was based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact. If principle was not sufficient motivation, he stressed the lure of "economic relief" to be found in arms reductions. Franklin D. Roosevelt, on entering the White House in 1933, also sought to inject life into the expiring World Disarmament Conference. When this transfusion failed, he turned his attention to the renewal of the naval treaties.

Two factors influenced American policymakers regarding naval limitation during the early thirties: the Manchurian Incident and the Great Depression. The former seriously impaired the Far Eastern system erected in 1922, while the

latter persuaded Hoover to forego building the Navy up to treaty limits. Hoover's decision to slash the Navy's appropriations provoked naval officers to criticize his frugality at the expense of national preparedness. Angered, the President retorted that the country's fiscal policy would not be decided by "subordinates who have no appreciation of national necessities," and that, if they persisted, there would be personnel changes. Hoover restored some funds to the Navy yet no new warship of size was authorized during his administration; the 80,000 tons of naval vessels built during his term had been designated by Coolidge.⁹

Shortly after assuming office, Roosevelt announced that he favored building the Navy to the London treaty limits. With the United States at approximately 65 per cent of treaty strength, he used Section 202 of the National Industrial Recovery Act to authorize funds, in July 1933, for 32 warships totaling 126,000 tons.¹⁰ To domestic critics, Roosevelt pointed out that this construction assisted economic recovery because the ship building industry employed persons in over 125 trades and professions, utilized materials from nearly every state, and paid out 84 per cent of each vessel's total cost in wages.

Roosevelt pressed his building program, in part, because he believed that American construction would be a lever in the forthcoming negotiations. On January 18, 1934 he wrote Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson that:

We will go to the next conference with our Treaty quota in all categories, either built or building, and possibly by that time we may be committed to a regular replacement program of over-age tonnage. Being so situated, we put the other fellow in the position of suing for a reduction assuming that foreign peoples usually desire limitations and find the consummation and maintenance of the present maxima too great a burden.¹¹

Although he sought to duplicate the situation of 1921-22 when the United States traded its partially built fleet for substantial reductions, FDR had misread the history of naval negotiations. It had been Coolidge in 1927 and Hoover in 1930 and 1932 who had asked for the lower limits, not "foreign peoples."

The Vinson-Trammel Bill of 1934 proposed to raise the navy to treaty strength by the end of 1942. As finally

passed, the bill authorized, but did not allocate funds for, 102 vessels and 1184 naval aircraft. This legislation aroused the ire of American pacifists. The tone of the public storm may be gathered from a telegram, one of the many, sent to FDR by a group of New York clergymen: "We believe the proposed naval construction program seriously compromises your Good Neighbor Policy and is a denial of our moral obligations under the Kellogg Pact."¹² Delegates to the Ninth Conference on the Cause and Cure of War deplored "beyond the power of expression, that \$286,000,000.00 should be spent in building up the navy to treaty limits." They found "the plan for naval expansion to be utterly inconsistent with our professed policies and likely to prove exceedingly mischievous to the welfare of the entire world."¹³ Such domestic criticism did not deter FDR, although he urged naval officers to tone-down their public statements.

Yet as he pursued his construction policy, Roosevelt urged naval reductions. In a confidential message to MacDonald in June 1934 he voiced his hope that "those in high authority in government will work with me for a new naval treaty calling for a reduction in navies and that to this end I have suggested a renewal of the Washington and London treaties for at least 10 years on the basis of a 20% reduction to be accomplished during that 10 year period."¹⁴

Preliminary Naval Discussions, 1934

Failure of the World Disarmament Conference to show any progress caused the oceanic powers to begin planning early for a 1935 naval parley. The British initiated confidential Anglo-American talks in March 1934 to explore each other's position and to estimate Japan's demands. These sessions made it clear that, if the 1935 meeting was to agree on substantive issues, the major seapowers would require extensive conversations to search out possible compromises. Consequently, representatives of Britain, Japan, and the United States met during the summer and fall of 1934 in irregular, preconference sessions. These informal, bilateral talks were conducted between the Americans and British and between the Japanese, after the arrival of their naval advisors, and British. This arrangement placed British diplomats in an excellent position, a point which did not escape them, to press their own policies in the form of compromise solutions.

As attitudes and events evolved during the ensuing months, the essential positions of the three oceanic powers emerged. Japan put forth a "common upper limits" plan designed to provide

it with parity with the Big Two. The United States clung to the existing quantitative ratios embodied in the Washington naval system. And Great Britain proposed a "middle course" based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative restrictions. These contending policies collided during the protracted preconference negotiations and foreshadowed the course of the later formal proceedings.

The initial round of preliminary talks found Anglo-Saxon diplomats searching for a common formula. That this could not readily be found was indicative how differently London and Washington viewed world conditions. To the Americans the main problem was the Japanese request for parity, while the British were preoccupied with Hitler's revisionist demands and Franco-Italian tensions. Moreover, the British complained that they could not depend upon American firmness in the Far East since the United States had demonstrated little desire to stand up to Japan in the Manchurian incident and seemed bent on withdrawing from the Philippines. (Interestingly, American officials held the same opinion of Britain in the Far East.)

Repeatedly MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin--now the real power in the Cabinet--and Sir John Simon stressed that the current situation was "very different and much more serious" than they faced in 1930. Therefore, the British developed, during the ensuing talks, a series of proposals which called for: 1) increased cruiser tonnage; 2) an Anglo-American Pacific agreement; 3) extensive qualitative restrictions; and 4) reductions of total fleet tonnages. Points one and two were interrelated: the only alternative to a larger cruiser fleet, they argued, would be a formal Anglo-American policy of Far Eastern cooperation which would reduce British commitments there.¹⁵

Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull found the British proposals for increased cruiser tonnage or a bilateral Pacific treaty "intensely disappointing." While they rejected the latter suggestion without serious consideration, MacDonald's subsequent elaboration of British cruiser needs provided a greater shock. The Prime Minister submitted a "tentative" request for the establishment of a separate naval category for Dominion fleets and an increased allotment of underaged cruisers to 491,000 tons (from the 1930 limit of 339,000 tons), together with ten overage cruisers. In all, the British were insisting on 70 cruisers. This position Washington ruled "wholly unacceptable. . . even as a basis of discussion."¹⁶

Arguing from the premise that "naval limitation cannot be said to serve its full purpose if it leaves behind it a genuine sense of insecurity," the British justified their claims for additional cruisers and denied as "incorrect and misleading" any implication that only the United States stood for naval reductions. If qualitative limitations (which the United States had resisted in the past) were fully developed and submarines abolished, MacDonald's government believed that a decrease of twenty-two percent in existing treaty tonnages might be achieved. On the practical side the British argued that some common formula ought to be adopted even if it endorsed slight increases. Certainly this was to be preferred to unrestricted naval competition.¹⁷

In September 1934 Anglo-Saxon hopes for a renewal of the naval treaty received a sharp blow when Tokyo authorities revealed their decision to abrogate the Washington Naval Treaty before the end of the year. This meant that the whole limitation system would automatically end two years hence.¹⁸ Yet Foreign Minister Koki Hirota was empowered to decide when the formal announcement would be made, thus holding what Davis called the "hammer of denunciation" over Anglo-American diplomats.

The decision to terminate the Washington treaty system verified military domination of the Tokyo government. All the senior naval officers who had supported the Hamaguchi government's ratification of the 1930 pact had been, by 1934, either forced to resign or demoted to unimportant posts. These changes placed Admiral Kanji Kato, notorious for his determined fight against the treaty, and Vice-Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, an irreconcilable foe of the pact at the head of the Japanese Navy. Although some Foreign Ministry officials doubted the wisdom of this precipitate action, fearing that it would drive the Anglo-Saxon powers together, their opinions were throttled by military intimidation. That such pressure existed may be gleaned from the comments of a Japanese naval captain who served as a disarmament advisor. In his opinion, any Japanese delegation that accepted a pact which included the current ratios would face death on their arrival home and any government which agreed to the ratios would collapse.¹⁹

The naval policies of Japan and the United States met head-on during late 1934. Gradually the ebb and flow of negotiations evolved their positions: the Japanese demanded an end to ratios and parity through global tonnage limitation (a "common upper limit"); while American diplomats steadfastly rejected any drastic alteration of the established quantitative

formula and prepared to let the Japanese delegates bear the onus of destroying the Washington system.

Japanese dedication to naval equality formed the basis of a proposal circulated on October 24, which highlighted four essential points: 1) a "common upper limit" embracing total fleet tonnage; 2) parity with Anglo-Saxon seapowers; 3) abolition of offensive arms; and 4) reduction in total fleet tonnage. The "common upper limit" was to be a figure which might not be exceeded, but within which each nation could build the vessels it believed necessary for national security. By establishing their program on "the principle of non-aggression and non-menace," the Japanese urged the lowest possible "upper limit" and abolition of "offensive arms."* While hinting they would not necessarily build to parity, Japan insisted on being free to do so if its security seemed jeopardized. To the Japanese the question of "offensive weapons" turned essentially on determining which vessels were peculiarly suited to offensive warfare. The Imperial Navy considered, in order, aircraft carriers, capital ships, and eight-inch gun cruisers, to be primarily offensive in design. They regarded submarines as defensive since their ability to attack merchant ships would be terminated with universal adoption of the 1930 London treaty rules of under-water warfare. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who later master-minded the assault on Pearl Harbor, defended Japan's proposals on the grounds that the Washington treaty had established an "equality of defense" in Japanese waters, but not for the mid-Pacific. "Since 1922," Yamamoto argued, "naval construction and technique and aviation have upset the equilibrium in favor of an attacking fleet."²⁰

Among sophisticated Anglo-American delegates, Tokyo's plan evoked little enthusiasm. They objected to the Japanese proposals for several reasons. First, the idea of a "common upper limit" would abolish the system of classifying warships which had been hammered out in extended negotiations at the Washington and London conferences and which had become a universal language among naval professionals. Second, the Anglo-Saxons refused to grant even the precedent of parity to Japan, whether or not it informally agreed not to build to this level, because they denied that Japan had the same worldwide commitments. Third, they appreciated that to have granted

*In 1932, Hoover, appealing to similar principles embodied in the Kellogg Pact, had suggested abolishing weapons of an offensive nature; however, he specifically limited this proposal to land and air armaments.

parity would have vast political significance for it would mean that Japan's position in East Asia, already quite formidable, would be nearly absolute and that Japan's recent policies had scarcely embraced the spirit of "non-aggression" or "non-menace." Fourth, the Americans and British objected to Japan's classification of "offensive weapons" for it seemed only to abolish those warships, such as aircraft carriers and heavy warships, which might carry any future war into Western Pacific waters.²¹

In Washington, Japan's proposals evoked an uncompromising response. To Hull's mind, the destruction of the Washington treaty system "opened up anew and afresh" the wide array of Asian issues. In a letter of November 1 to Roosevelt, he declared that all questions--economic, naval, and political--"were and are tied in with the 5:5:3 ratio or the Washington treaties" and that "a young, wild, and lawless group" had turned the Japanese government into "an international desperado...by brushing aside all treaty obligations and all decent international relationships."²² Two weeks later, the Secretary declared that "we should continue to emphasize our thesis that maintaining the treaties as a basis for future limitation rests on the equality of self-defense, equality of security, and a united purpose to avoid rivalry in armaments." Norman Davis, too, looked askance at Japanese policies: "We have set up a collective system for cooperation in the Far East to maintain peace and now what Japan is trying to say is that she won't have anything more to do with that collective system." To Davis, "If the Washington Naval Treaty goes, the whole system goes, and I think that is more important than the question of avoiding competition in certain types."²³ Hull and Davis, interestingly, had come to look upon the Washington agreements as creating a positive, viable collective system for the security of the Far East--the very point they had found politically expedient to deny in 1924!

Other American advisors also were for standing firm. The Navy's General Board, believing that Japan's ratio might be even slightly reduced without affecting its defensive abilities, argued that under no circumstances should the ratio be increased "even if by such non-agreement the Conference fails."²⁴ Ambassador Grew thought that the Japanese might bring forth compromise proposals after formally denouncing the present agreement because of the financial drain of an armament race. "I feel strongly," he concluded, "that the United States should make no material concessions at the present time."²⁵

Whatever their misgivings about Japan's new attitude, and they had several, the British set about to discover

whether any areas of mutual agreement existed among the contending nations. While rejecting the "common upper limit," it would recognize Japanese "prestige" and yet would retain the essence of the quantitative system. On November 9, they suggested recognizing the equality of the oceanic powers; however, because of their different naval requirements "each nation would not consider it necessary to build up to the point to which the other or others might have reached and the fact that they might not have built up was by no means to be considered as a denial of the right of parity." This formula would be expanded by "a 'voluntary' declaration whereby each nation after agreement with the others sets forth its building program which should be a contractual obligation as a part of the treaty."²⁶

During a lengthy meeting between the American and British delegations on November 14 the British seemed preoccupied with three thoughts: 1) that they be allotted 70 cruisers; 2) that, if quantitative limitations could not be agreed upon, qualitative restrictions should be imposed; and 3) that Anglo-American cooperation be maintained despite any surface differences. MacDonald stressed the latter point: "We want, if I may use this expression, to use our cooperation to terrorize the best of the world into giving great moral answers to great moral issues, rather than to use guns."²⁷

In subsequent weeks, the British elaborated their so-called "middle course" which consisted of an agreement on programs, if possible, non-fortification, qualitative limitation, and new-construction notification. If the Japanese remained intransigent, the British plan would salvage qualitative restrictions and a system of registering new construction. To the Admiralty and the key to naval competition lay not so much in the numbers of ships constructed but in the development of new designs. While the British delegation hoped for broader naval limits, they also felt "bound to envisage the situation when the choice is between nothing and something, and if that choice were put to us, we would feel that qualitative limits would be worth something."²⁸

Washington officials, however, rejected the proposed "middle course." To Hull discussions based on the British proposals meant abandonment of the Washington treaty ratios and principles. Instead the administration preferred to wait until the Japanese position weakened. "We are convinced," Hull cabled Davis, "that the best chance of ultimately negotiating a successful agreement would lie in letting the Japanese return home empty handed, without any new naval

agreement or any political agreement." The Secretary believed that prompt Anglo-American efforts to build to full treaty strength would bring the Japanese to terms. "From a more technical point of view," Hull informed Davis, "We believe that a treaty which did not contain a statement of building programs in contractual form maintaining present ratios would not be acceptable to this country, and a treaty on naval building containing qualitative but not quantitative restrictions would seem an evasion of the essence of naval limitation." In a not uncommon spirit of self-righteousness, Hull found it convenient to condemn both the British and the Japanese. He thought that MacDonald's government was "bent upon temporizing and avoiding a clarification of the real issue." And he believed that the chaotic Far Eastern situation was "directly attributable to the fact that there has been in the past too much temporizing and too little facing of the real implications and consequences of Japan's intransigence."²⁹

Intransigence prevailed as both the Japanese and the American governments adhered steadfastly to their contravening policies, each unable to sway the other, and neither seriously interested in British mediation efforts. Tokyo authorities considerably simplified the perplexing issue on December 29, 1934 by formally evoking Article 23 to terminate the Washington Five Power Treaty. After December 31, 1936 all naval limitations and restrictions would cease to exist; therefore, if the United States and Great Britain desired to control naval armaments in the Pacific Japan had made it clear that limitations would have to rest on new foundations.³⁰

The London Conference, 1935-36

Delegations from the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy met in London from December 9, 1935 to March 26, 1936 to draft a naval treaty to replace the abrogated Washington pact of 1922 and the expired London accord of 1930.³¹ Four issues faced the conferees. First, the seapowers were initially divided over relative vs. absolute naval programs. The United States and Japan favored the latter as it stipulated the maximum number of warships allotted to each nation, while the other delegations preferred a naval system which would allow each power to build warships to meet its own needs. Second, Japan's uncompromising insistence on parity with the Anglo-Saxon seapowers forced the conferees into an either/or situation. They chose to allow Japan to leave the meeting rather than meet what Britain and America felt to be

unreasonable and unjustified demands. Third, as the hopes for quantitative limits vanished with Japan's departure, Britain shifted the direction of negotiations to the consideration of qualitative restrictions as a means of controlling naval rearmament. Fourth, France and Italy seized upon Britain's eagerness for a treaty embodying qualitative limits to demand political concessions in exchange for their signatures.

The British Design. The British government, seeking the widest participation in the new naval pact, gradually moved away from the Washington system of quantitative limitations. Even before the conference began, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had suggested in Parliament that the ratio principle (with the exception of the recent Anglo-German treaty) no longer had sufficient support to be a viable concept. In its place, he outlined a plan for "declared building programmes" which would ask of each Power "what size Navy do you propose to have in, let us say, 1942?" In his opinion if the conferees could pool all these replies and accommodate the various naval programs, while providing adequate defense for each country, they would achieve an unparalleled benefit to the taxpayers of the countries concerned and they would contribute greatly to world peace. Later the London government announced that they would emphasize "qualitative limitation and programs rather than ratios."³²

The fundamental assumption underlying Eyres-Monsell's idea of "annual programmes" was that naval requirements were absolute. This concept actually offered little originality for it was consistent with London's attitude toward warships, particularly cruisers, since the initial Washington negotiations in 1921-1922. The United States and Japan, however, found this formula uncomfortable as they computed their naval needs on a relative basis, by pegging them to other fleets.

The British circulated, on August 2, a carefully composed memorandum outlining the provisions they hoped would receive serious study at the coming conference. This plan began with the premise "that the system of limitation by total tonnages in categories that was pursued in the Washington and London naval treaties will not again meet with general acceptance" and proceeded to stress five essential points. First, that with the termination of the Washington and London pacts a large amount of new construction would inevitably commence in 1937. Second, that as a result "agreement on

qualitative limits is of more immediate importance than agreement on quantitative limits, since the former will have immediate effect on the limitation of armaments and financial commitments by its application to all the ships to be laid down." Third, that the European seapowers (Britain, France, Italy, and Germany) had found the following qualitative limits acceptable: "capital ships, 25,000 tons, 12-inch guns; aircraft carriers, 22,000 tons, 6.1-inch guns; category A cruisers, 10,000 tons, 8-inch guns; category B cruisers and light surface vessels, 7,600 tons, 6.1-inch guns; submarines, 2,000 tons, 5.1-inch guns." Fourth, that no matter how agreeable to the European powers, Britain would accept qualitative restrictions only if endorsed by the United States and Japan. Fifth, that they agree to "the reciprocal notification of information relating to the laying down and characteristics of new ships."³³

The Italian government endorsed, in principle, the British plan and added that it believed "the only practical possibility [of limitation] which today seems to exist would be that of prompt communication of annual construction programs." Since the French had long opposed the Washington system of quantitative limits, they did not protest its fate; moreover, they felt that "if the quantitative question was... injected there would be practically no possibility of arriving at any conclusion." Thus, both the French and Italians endorsed a mutual exchange of information concerning naval construction and urged that the original proposal be expanded. To this end the French suggested that the mutual notification of the actual laying down of new keels be enlarged to include a previous notice of intent.³⁴ The final treaty included these points and they contributed the only unique feature of the pact.

Only Japan and the United States continued to press for quantitative limitations, but for distinctly opposite reasons. To the Japanese this approach would guarantee them parity with the Anglo-Saxon seapowers, while to the Americans quantitative limits were desired to ensure an inferior Japanese fleet.

Washington officials were generally disturbed by the British plan. They felt it implied the formulation of an "European view" which meant that American hopes for extending the Washington system of ratios would not receive a hearing. In addition, they believed, rightly, that the British, despite their disclaimers, were putting the United States "in a hot spot on the question of qualitative limitations."³⁵

Thus American delegates were instructed to "stress the importance of retaining the principles and methods of the Washington and London Treaties as a means of stabilizing the world naval situation." And they were to stand "unalterably opposed" to Japan's suggested common upper limit or to any increase in Japan's ratio. Nor were the delegates, should British officials bring it up, to even discuss any formal arrangement of Anglo-American political cooperation to offset Japanese demands.³⁶ Given American opposition to Japanese demands and FDR's desire to preserve some semblance of naval limitation, the American position moved closer to that of the British and, consequently, to qualitative restrictions.

In one sense the Roosevelt administration's policy did contrast with its predecessors in that it demonstrated a more sympathetic attitude toward British naval requirements. Admiral William H. Standly, Chief of Naval Operations, pointed out to Roosevelt that in the past the United States had been telling the British that they did not really need the warships they claimed. FDR agreed that a change in approach was needed and that "we should not try to define British requirements."³⁷

Japan Leaves the Conference. At London, Japan's uncompromising demand for parity met with equal Anglo-American determination not to grant naval equality, thus promptly deadlocking the conference. British officials probed in the political sphere for a compromise formula--ultimately suggesting consideration of a Pacific non-aggression, or even a consultation pact.³⁸ The American delegation, however, coolly brushed aside all such inquiries and instead, looked for an early showdown with the Japanese.

Even before the conference had convened Japanese authorities had officially rejected England's "middle course" proposal. They found "it impossible to accept a plan for mutual declaration of building programmes" because this scheme, unless fixed to a common maximum limit, "would result in a continuation in substance of the ratio system." Although favoring qualitative restrictions, the Tokyo government declared that "no qualitative limitation will produce the desired result unless it is undertaken simultaneously with quantitative limitation." Qualitative limits alone, the Japanese asserted, without the granting of parity "would only prove to be a convenient means of preserving the existing relationship in naval strength among Powers."³⁹

This uncompromising attitude had been earlier forecast by Ambassador Grew. He likened the state of mind throughout

the island empire to that prevailing in Germany. "I think it not an exaggeration to say that the determination of Japan to rid herself of the restricting bonds of the Washington Treaties (albeit she signed them voluntarily) is as great as the determination of Germany to rid herself of the similar restrictions imposed by the terms of the Versailles Treaty." Japanese demands for the abolition of the ratio, Grew believed, rested "upon two fundamental things: first, the necessity of having a navy of sufficient strength to implement her policy of exercising uncontested dominance over 'East Asia', and second of the passionate desire for equality in rank with the first class powers of the world."⁴⁰

Refusal by the Japanese to even discuss the British, French, and Italian proposals for an exchange of information brought the conference to its climactic point. In mid-January 1936, Japanese delegates were informed that if they wished to explore the various aspects of naval limitation the purpose of the conference might be achieved. However, if they planned to remain inflexibly committed to their own scheme they ought to withdraw from the conclave and allow the interested sea powers to get on with the task at hand. Unsurprisingly the Japanese delegation, leaving two members in London as observers, withdrew from the conference on January 15 and departed for Tokyo. Quantitative limitation had come to an end.

The import of this event for Japanese-American relations brought forth differing opinions. Norman Davis disagreed with Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who believed that Japan was preparing to launch a naval race. Reversing his earlier position, Davis believed that if the remaining sea powers came to terms on qualitative restrictions and building programs this could prove an incentive for a renewal of Japanese cooperation.⁴¹ At least, with an "escape clause" in the pact, there would be "no risk or disadvantage" in testing Japan's intentions. A senior State Department advisor on the Far East, Stanley Hornbeck, however noted that Japan's primary intent was to bring their navy to sufficient proportional strength to "render Japan invulnerable--and unrestrainable--in the western Pacific" whether this be done by disarmament agreements or by construction. British officials agreed with Davis for they felt that the Japanese would realize "the futility of starting a naval race and that a qualitative agreement between us with adequate escape provisions would serve as a powerful deterrent to hold Japan in line. Hornbeck expressed doubts that an agreement among the other sea powers would bring Japan

in tow; rather, he wondered whether it might "not be well to permit the nations to enter upon a period of unrestricted naval competition" as the almost rapid means of forcing Japan to ask for a renewal of naval limitations.⁴²

The Americans went into the final phase of preparing a naval pact without enthusiasm. They had become prisoners of their own strategy: the Roosevelt administration had initially desired to bring Japan to terms or to place the responsibility for ending the existing limitation system on Tokyo. The lesser priority had been achieved; yet when Japan left the conference and the British advanced the argument that the Japanese would probably follow, unofficially, whatever naval restrictions the Anglo-Saxon seapowers agreed upon, the Americans found themselves in the uncomfortable position of either formulating a treaty embodying qualitative restrictions they disliked or of leaving the conference. The latter alternative carried the possible onus of having destroyed the last hope for limitation. Thus Cordell Hull instructed his delegation that, as future questions turned to European interests, the Americans should leave the initiative to Great Britain. The specter of American sentiment against involvement in European politics dictated that no steps be taken by the delegates which "might be construed as indicating a desire or willingness on the part of our Government to take any unwarranted initiative in European questions."⁴³

The European Emphasis. After the Japanese withdrew, the British gained the initiative. For the next two months, British diplomats attempted to bring the remaining delegations to a decision on a treaty and, in the process, to appease the French, interest the Italians, placate the Americans, and restrict the Germans. The negotiations proceeded, with the British directing discussions, in essentially two, often interrelated, phases: the first revolved around the nature of technical limitations to be imposed; and the second dealt with the broader political interests of various states. Both of these phases posed contentious points, but the most trying aspect of these negotiations involved the political maneuvering.

Initially, there remained some question as to whether the treaty would seek to retain quantitative limits similar to the 1930 pact, or whether it would develop only qualitative restrictions. In Washington hope remained that any treaty to be written would adhere to the ratio system. By Davis, writing on February 3, pointed out that attempts to promote these features would clash with the uncertainty of European naval politics.

France refuses now to commit herself as to the ratio she intends to maintain relative to Germany. Italy's construction will depend on that of France. British building will in turn be influenced by French and Italian as well as by Japanese building. Under the Anglo-German agreement giving Germany a 35 per cent ratio with the British fleet, any increase in the latter would permit an increase in the German fleet and thus again affect French and Italian construction.

The only question at issue, Davis reported, was "whether or not a treaty for qualitative limitation is of sufficient value to the United States" to continue negotiations. "We have been proceeding upon the assumption that a qualitative agreement...is advantageous." From this point on Washington ceased to raise questions concerning quantitative formulas.⁴⁴

The most contentious issue between London and Washington during the remaining negotiations was over the gun caliber for capital ships. With maximum battleship displacement placed at 35,000 tons, the British urged restricting its heavy batteries to 12 or 14 inches because "a 14-inch, 35,000-ton ship is better balanced than one with 15-inch or 16-inch guns." American technicians did not favor 14-inch batteries; however, the delegation was finally instructed to endorse the British proposal as a tactical diplomatic maneuver. They were "to develop a formula of agreement that during this year no signatory would lay down any ship with over 14-inch gun caliber, but that if Japan does not adhere all will be free at the end of the year." As he did not believe that the Japanese would agree, Hull anticipated nothing would be lost. But such a move had the diplomatic advantage of standing "by the existing limitation while making an offer of a concession rather than to move away from this, the 16-inch gun, limitation and then have to take an initiative and action in order to move back to it."⁴⁵

For the first time since discussions began on auxiliary warships there were few Anglo-American disparities regarding cruisers. This new atmosphere resulted from two factors: first, the United States already had in commission or under construction twenty-seven 10,000-ton cruisers, nine of which mounted 6-inch guns and eighteen with 8-inch guns; and secondly, the American naval establishment, with this superiority in the 10,000 ton category, began to look favorably upon lighter cruisers. Consequently the Americans accepted

the long-held British view that the smaller warships could perform certain tasks more efficiently than the "Washington" cruisers.⁴⁶

The negotiations with France and Italy were more complicated for these discussions involved several political and technical issues; but usually the technical issues were raised in the hope of extracting political concessions. The French recognized that England had designed its qualitative proposals with the aim of extending them to Germany. After all, one of the vital features of the Anglo-German Pact of 1935 was its provisions that the two signatories would adjust their naval accord to include the technical restrictions embodied in any 1936 treaty. Consequently, the French felt that they might profit in this situation by demanding, as a price for their signature, a discussion of aerial limitation and, perhaps, an Anglo-French understanding on what to do if Hitler invaded the Rhineland. Meanwhile, they urged the Americans "to be patient and not press them too much for immediate decisions on technical questions."⁴⁷

To Paris the question of German participation in any treaty arrangements, either directly or bilaterally, to which French were parties raised serious domestic political considerations. Some observers questioned whether the government could sign an agreement which included Germany and survive the up-coming national elections. Such action might appear to the electorate that the present government as acquiescence to Hitler's violation of the military clauses of the Versailles treaty.⁴⁸ To lessen the political consequences of the naval negotiations, French diplomats searched for something that could be used as a quid pro quo.

Prompt negotiation of qualitative restrictions were, from the British standpoint, "of vital importance" in limiting German construction. They pointed out to the French on February 14 that these limitations were of a distinct advantage to Paris and that they had made several technical concessions to meet French views. The British warned the French, consequently, not to try "to bring in extraneous questions." Five days later this warning was put even more strongly: the French were asked "as an act of friendship" to aid in bringing about "a satisfactory and effective" agreement, and agreement, that is, to which Germany would adhere. The British ambassador in Paris informed that government that it was "essential for Anglo-French cooperation that France give this concrete evidence of her desire to cooperate in the proper spirit."⁴⁹

Italy, too, attempted to employ British desires for a naval settlement to its own political advantage. At this moment, British and Italian relations were strained by the former's imposition of an economic boycott in response to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. Consequently, the Italians indicated on February 25 that they "would find it difficult to justify signing a naval agreement so long as sanctions are being applied." The next day, Count Dino Grandi, the head of the Italian delegation, intimated that he had instructions to refuse to sign any treaty "on political or technical grounds, or both." Mussolini ultimately desired to join the naval pact, according to Grandi, "but as long as Italy was at war and sanctions are being applied against her..., it was not possible to find any way to do so which would have a harmful effect on public opinion." As if the conference were not sufficiently complicated, the Italians now sought to use the naval proceedings to initiate a settlement of the Abyssian question.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, the actual French and Italian concern over technical issues was difficult to ascertain because of their constant use of qualitative items as a smoke-screen for political objectives. Their most impressive technical arguments centered on tonnage and gun calibers. The Italians desired a reduction in battleship tonnage and objected to the so-called "zone of no construction" between 10,000 and 20,000 tons. The French sought to lower capital ship tonnage and to reduce their gun calibers. Charging that "all the naval delegations in London except that of the United States have agreed to a reduction from 35,000 to 28,000 tons and from 16-inch gun caliber to 12-inch," the French insisted that some "real progress" was required to provide them with sufficient incentive to sign a naval pact. Even these points, however, were not essentially contentious for both nations ultimately agreed that these technical reservations could easily be withdrawn if given adequate motivation, that is, if their political goals were advanced.⁵¹

As French and Italian delegates extended the conference in pursuit of their own political objectives, the Americans became increasingly uneasy and desired to terminate the affair. The British, quick to sense this mood, asked if the United States would enter a tripartite pact with Britain and Germany or if it would sign an Anglo-American agreement, with the understanding that Britain would seek bilateral accords with Germany, France, and possibly Italy. This latter method appealed to London because it avoided the complications of Franco-German relations. Washington, however, frowned on the

former and disliked the latter. To avoid the appearance of becoming involved in "European problems," Hull desired to limit the new treaty to the original parties of the Washington and London pacts. At the same time, he had no objections to bilateral accession in addition to these signatories.⁵²

Events caught up with the protracted naval discussions when Hitler re-occupied the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. German boldness provided the impetus necessary to terminate the disagreements between England and France. The French, used the naval settlement to regain a measure of goodwill in London and Washington through a gesture of cooperation. Thus on March 25, 1936 France, Great Britain, and the United States signed the second London naval accord of the decade.

Assessing the Terms

If far short of what American officials desired, the London Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936 represented the maximum that then could be achieved without political arrangements. To the extent that it would be termed successful, the pact reflected British concern with qualitative restrictions and applied almost exclusively to European naval construction. For in addition to the original signatories (the United States, Great Britain, and France), the British correctly believed that Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy would become bilateral parties. Eventually, the Scandinavian countries also accepted its terms.

Although providing none of the direct quantitative limitations embodied in previous naval agreements, the 1936 treaty did regulate certain aspects of naval competition.

- 1) It restricted ship displacement and gun calibers by class.
- 2) It provided for the annual exchange of detailed information concerning building and modernization programs.
- 3) It retained the Anglo-American principle of parity.
- 4) It called for a six-year "holiday" in the construction of cruisers in excess of 8,000 tons.
- 5) It embodied a general "escape clause," or "escalator clause," which protected the signatories from excessive building by those nations not bound by the arrangement.

To the extent that American students of diplomacy or naval policy have passed judgment on the 1936 naval pact and its bilateral corollaries, they have been almost unanimous in classifying them as "totally innocuous" or "virtually useless."⁵³ In that these accords failed to prevent World War II,

it is difficult to quarrel with these evaluations. And yet as "stop-gap" arms control measures the 1936 pact did have some merit. According to one contemporary American naval officer, it "is obviously better than no treaty at all" on two counts: it standardized and classified warships into definite groups which "should be a stabilizing factor;" and it established "the principle of exchanging information concerning building programs" which "prevents the construction of ships in secret."⁵⁴ In addition, the treaty, while acknowledging Anglo-American parity, left the United States free to maintain naval supremacy over Japan, and Britain to adjust its construction to French and Italian building without the self-limiting features of quantitative quotas.

Unfortunately neither the 1936 London treaty nor the bilateral accessions alleviated the prospects of quantitative naval competition. An examination of various building programs in January 1937 show that, inspite of the "no-construction zone" and the notification clauses, a naval race was in fact underway.

Vessels Under Construction, Or Appropriated For
January 1, 1937*

Country	Total Tonnage	No. ships	Air-						Sub- marines
			Cap- ital ships	craft ships	Heavy car- riers	Light cruis- ers	De- stroy- ers		
U.S.	355,215	95	2	3	2	9	61	18	
Gr.Br.	321,310	69	2	3	-	16	34	14	
Japan	90,194	31	-	2	-	4	18	7	
France	202,608	44	4	-	-	5	22	13	
Italy	118,858	40	2	4	-	2	19	17	
Germany	197,866	41	3	2	3	-	22	11	

* In "Naval Limitations," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (April 1937), p. 469.

Indeed these figures--however imperfect they may be--reveal that there were more ships then under construction than ever before in history, with the exception of the period from 1914 to 1918 when the world was engulfed in war.

The historical circumstances surrounding the 1936 naval pact have unfortunately hindered efforts to evaluate its basic arms control concepts. Many analysts, especially Americans, have assumed that the quantitative method was the only viable technique of naval limitation and that the application of qualitative approaches was meaningless. Yet European naval professions such as Lord Chatfield, the First Sea Lord, urged the abolition of ratios and quantitative limits altogether in favor of only qualitative restrictions.⁵⁵ While the latter technique did not provide for the means of halting the escalation of naval construction, it does appear to have assisted in maintaining the naval balance of power, particularly in Europe.

From examination of available evidence the 1936 naval treaty and its bilateral accessions were generally honored. Although he considered the entire affair "a complete fiasco," a French admiral has concluded that their qualitative features were observed. "These agreements were pretty fairly observed," he commented, "yet since no controls were provided, compliance depended entirely upon the good faith of the nations themselves." A minor exception to this assessment was the Soviet government's refusal to submit an annual program of its construction plans, but as Russia was not an important seapower this default was not considered critical.⁵⁶

In its efforts to regulate naval competition, the treaty emphasized qualitative restrictions which were to govern construction until December 31, 1942. The more significant limitations were contained in Part II of the pact:

- a. No new capital ships to exceed 35,000 tons.
- b. No new capital ships to mount guns exceeding a caliber of 14 inches; 1) but with the proviso that Japan must also adhere to this restriction or it would not be binding on the signatories, who would return to the 16 inch restriction;
- c. No new capital ships of less than 17,500 tons or cruisers of over 8,000 tons would be laid down (thus creating a no-construction zone from 8,000 to 17,500 tons).
- d. No new aircraft carrier to exceed 23,000 tons or mount guns in excess of 6.1 inch caliber.

- e. No new submarine to exceed 2,000 tons or mount a gun exceeding 5.1 inches in caliber.
- f. No arming of merchant ships during peacetime.

The 14-inch caliber restriction on capital ship armaments did not become effective, because Tokyo authorities declined to accept it. In a note of June 18, 1937 the Japanese government insisted that "a mere limitation in quality alone will only induce a tendency to make up for the deficiency caused through such limitation, by resorting to quantitative augmentation, thus ultimately leading to a competition in naval armaments in quantity. Thus President Roosevelt announced on July 10 that the United States would mount 16-inch guns on its battleships currently under construction.⁵⁷

Only indirectly did quantitative features find their way into the treaty. Article 6 provided for a six-year "holiday" in the building of cruisers in excess of 8,000 tons. This "holiday" meant that, with those vessels currently building, the quantitative ratio of large cruisers would be maintained and replacement would take place only in accordance with the stipulated treaty schedule governing "over-age." These considerations rested, rather tenuously, on the obvious proviso that the non-signatories, particularly Japan would not expand their heavy cruiser construction; should this occur all quantitative limits were to be removed.⁵⁷

The provisions relating to "advance notification and exchange of information" were the most intriguing innovations contained in the 1936 accord. Each of the contracting parties were to exchange information regarding his "annual programme for the construction and acquisition of all vessels." This exchange--which was to be "confidential" until published--featured a yearly estimate itemizing, by each stipulated category, the number of vessels under construction or to be placed under construction during the reporting period and a separate, extensive report containing technical particulars, such as tonnage, guns, horse-power, speed, etc., on each new ship no later than four months before the laying of the keel. Thus each nation would have prior notice on the laying down of any new keel and would have specific technical information concerning its design.

Finally, the convention embodied a general "escape clause" or "escalator clause" which protected the signatories from excessive building by those nations not bound by the arrangement. Should such a situation threaten, the injured

party could abandon any painful treaty restrictions three months after notifying the other contracting parties of their intent.

Continuation of future Anglo-American parity was assured by mutual agreement outside the formal treaty. Davis and Anthony Eden, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, exchanged notes on March 25, 1936 acknowledging that naval parity had "become a well established principle acceptable to the peoples as well as governments of our respective countries" and pledging that there would be no competitive naval construction between them. To the British, however, this equality would be set by the Empire's needs. Prime Minister MacDonald had informed Davis that while "we of course agree to parity...we have the greatest naval responsibility and it must be parity on a level dictated, not in Washington, but in London."⁵⁸

While the treaty was in the process of being ratified, during the fall of 1936, the British belatedly raised the question of continuing Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty and thus of maintaining restrictions on fortifications of stipulated Pacific insular possessions after the treaty expired. Referring to these restrictions as "vital," they argued that the article "should be renewed in a separate instrument." The surprised Roosevelt administration brushed off this suggestion on the grounds that the current instability in the Pacific dictated that "we must keep our hands free."⁵⁹ However, the United States never did utilize these opportunities.

Ratification of the 1936 naval treaty was accomplished with none of the domestic furor that had accompanied similar consideration of the earlier pacts. Indeed, there was surprise and gratification that any treaty had emerged, a point that even seeped into the congratulatory remarks of the concluding session. No doubt the delegates were impressed that, as Arnold Toynbee put it, "although all of them had had to give way on some point for the sake of agreement, none of them had made any sacrifice which seriously affected national interests, and all of them had had their own way over some matter to which they attached special importance." The British were free to build as many cruisers as they desire; yet they had failed to secure a reduction in the size of capital ships.⁶⁰ The French also had given way on the question of battleship displacement, but they welcomed the advance notification of building programs and the omission of quantitative limitations. The Americans were disappointed at the passing

of the quantitative system and at the lack of interest in naval reductions; moreover, they had made concessions in regard to the type of cruiser now to be built and had accepted a lesser maximum armaments for capital ships than they desired. Even so, the United States had kept the displacement of battleships at 35,000 tons, had retained a free hand to maintain the existing ratio with Japan, and had again, registered its claim to parity with Great Britain. All in all, Norman Davis noted optimistically, the new naval pact was "less rigid and less restrictive" than former accords and a hopeful harbinger of future disarmament.⁶¹

Within a little more than two months after the signing of the accord the United States had completed its ratification as the Senate, with no opposition and little enthusiasm, granted its approval on May 18. Roosevelt officially ratified the treaty on May 28. At least three factors help account for this senatorial attitude: 1) the advocates of increased preparedness were influenced by the Navy's General Board's assent to the pact; 2) the gloomy international outlook which had prevented any realistic hope of reductions; and 3) the Congress' simultaneous passage of the largest peacetime naval appropriation bill in American history to carry forward the construction authorized by the Vinson-Trammell Act.

Although neither France nor Great Britain acted with the same dispatch, both completed the ratification process during the summer of 1937. In Paris where initial eagerness for the treaty quickly began to pall, the government did complete ratification on June 24, 1937. The British, meanwhile, delayed formal acceptance of the treaty until they had gained German and Russian bilateral approval. Once this was achieved the London authorities along with members of the Commonwealth--Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India--ratified the agreement on July 29, 1937.

The 1936 pact stood until the outbreak of war in 1939. On September 3 the British government, in accordance with Article 24, "suspended" all treaty restrictions; France followed on September 22 and Italy on October 14. The United States, meanwhile, decided on September 21 that, since the other parties were bowing out, it would do likewise. On December 31, 1942 the second London naval treaty expired unnoticed.⁶²

Bilateral Accessions of 1937-38

Confusion has led to misinformation concerning British efforts to extend the qualitative restrictions of the 1936 naval treaty.⁶³ To illustrate, one author has written in an otherwise excellent text that "the hope that Italy, momentarily obdurate because of sanctions, would adhere eventually to all or part of the treaty and that England could bring in Germany or Russia through bilateral agreements prove to be illusory."⁶⁴ Such statements attest not so much to the author's disdain for the pact as to the great crush of events, pregnant with larger significance, which so vastly over-shadowed it. In point of fact, Germany and Russia did, on July 17, 1937, accede to the naval treaty in separate bilateral instruments, while Poland followed suit on April 27 and Italy on December 3, 1938. Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland bound themselves to the 1936 restrictions on December 21, 1938.⁶⁵ If the significance of these accessions is subject to question, their existence is not.

The decision to seek bilateral treaties stemmed from a series of interdependent factors. As Britain was tied to Germany by the 1935 accord it was essential for London to obtain the Nazi Government's adherence to the qualitative restrictions. Germany and Russia had been prevented from joining the London negotiations because of French and Japanese objections, thus necessitating separate discussions. As they were concerned about the Baltic, the Germans would not agree to additional restrictions unless the USSR was also bound by them. But Russia was alarmed by Germany's renewed building and Japan's aggressiveness; therefore, Moscow was determined to improve its decrepit fleet not only in the Baltic but in the Pacific. Consequently British diplomacy sought to bring all of these European seapowers under qualitative limitations, as outlined in the 1936 pact, to regulate naval construction.

At the conclusion of the formal conclave, London issued invitations for bilateral accession to Japan, Germany, Russia, Italy, Poland, Turkey, and the Scandinavian countries. The Japanese reaffirmed their disinterest in qualitative limits. The only advantage Japan could derive from acceding to the London treaty would be that it then would be entitled to receive advance information regarding the construction programs of the other signatories; however, the freedom from a corresponding obligation upon the Japanese naval command to announce their future plans appeared to outweigh the advantage. While the Japanese refused to adhere officially to the pact, British statesmen hoped that they would informally

cooperate by providing information on naval construction. These hopes, however proved ill-founded. In May 1936 rumors circulated, which the Japanese denied, that they were designing a giant battleship. Though rumors of Japanese naval construction would persist, the government refused to volunteer information of its naval plans.⁶⁶

Poland and the Scandinavian states readily agreed in principle to the new naval system; the latter nations looked upon the effort as one of further solidifying Scandinavian unity. Italy finally acceded to the naval restrictions in December, 1938, as the "first fruits" of the Anglo-Italian friendship pact; however, this hardly altered Italian naval policies for they had been voluntarily adhering to the 1936 limitation. The discussions with Turkey, on the other hand, were protracted and carried over into 1939 without formal acceptance.⁶⁷

More intense negotiations were necessary to bring Germany and Russia to terms. In February 1936 the Nazi government accepted the naval pact, subject to "the unreserved accession of the Soviet Union." The Germans had reservations regarding a few technical points such as a desire to reduce the age limits of capital ships to 20 years instead to the London treaty's 26 years. In addition, the provisions of the 1935 Anglo-German pact were amended to permit Germany to build a total of five type "A" cruisers, two more than earlier authorized.

The Soviet government advanced in 1936 four conditions for its acceptance of the pact: first, that Germany subscribe to the restrictions; second, that the Soviet Far Eastern fleet be excluded from the terms; third, that they be allowed to build capital ships mounting 16-inch rifles; and, finally, that they be permitted to lay down nine or ten 8,000-ton cruisers with 7.1-inch guns. The latter request carried the most alarming features for such an extension of Soviet cruiser construction would enlarge Germany's, and possibly Japan's, demand for large cruiser which undoubtedly would increase French, Italian, and American building programs.⁶⁸

Britain and Germany finally gave way on Russia's insistence that its Far Eastern fleet not be included in the bilateral treaty and a complicated formula ultimately resolved the differences over large cruisers. The British accepted the increase of gun calibers for Russian cruisers (from 6.1 to 7.1) because Soviet arsenals could not readily retool for the lesser caliber and this deficiency would delay Russian

construction. The difficulties brought about by the proposed number of Soviet units posed a more serious matter, for Germany would not accept an inferior cruiser fleet. As a compromise, the Soviets agreed to limit their 8,000-ton cruiser program to seven warships and, as mentioned above, Germany was allowed to construct two additional heavy cruisers. Although no agreement was reached on the demand for 16-inch guns for capital ships, the Soviet government acceded to the pact on July 17, 1935.

Agreement had been reached but at a price; the London limits had been raised in three instances. The United States was not too happy with these departures but it chose not to register "any formal objection or to comment" on these technical concessions, nor "either formally or informally to acquiesce in or reject" the bilateral accords.⁶⁹

Chapter 19 -- Footnotes

¹ See Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1933-1938 (1964), Ch. III; S.I.A., 1936, pp. 49-116; and Thomas C. Irvin, "Norman H. Davis and the Quest for Arms Control, 1931-1938;" unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Ohio State University, 1963).

² For an excellent contemporary summary of naval armaments in 1935, see David H. Popper, "The End of Naval Disarmament," Foreign Policy Reports (Oct. 23, 1935), pp. 202-12.

³ The Times (London), March 25, 1931.

⁴ For British naval proposals of 1932, see S.I.A., 1932, pp. 244-46; for the Japanese proposals, see F.R., 1932, I, 410, and Thaddeus V. Tuleja, "United States Naval Policy in the Pacific, 1930-41," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Fordham University, 1961), p. 74, 90-91.

⁵ F.R., 1932, I, 212-14, 563; D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, III, 611-12. Some American officials were also alarmed at Hoover's proposal. Secretary of State Stimson and Admiral Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations, argued against reduction of the navy. Pratt reluctantly acknowledged the possibility of a 20% reduction. To these men and others even this cut-back of naval armaments seemed dangerous in view of the Pacific situation. Stimson Diary, May 22-23, 1932, as related in Fred H. Winkler, "The United States and the World Disarmament Conference, 1926-35," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Northwestern University, 1957), pp. 273-74.

⁶ For an illuminating examination of the social and economic conditions in the thirties which enabled the military and likeminded ultranationalists to seize control of the government, see "The Nationalistic and Militaristic Reaction" in Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan, Past and Present (1954), pp. 157-85.

⁷ Takehiko Yoshihaski, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (1963, pp. 10207, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, "Japan's Demand for Naval Equality," Foreign Affairs, (Jan., 1935), p. 197; Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-45 (1957), pp. 96-97.

⁸ F.R., 1933, I, 189. That Japan's action in Manchuria and elsewhere might have contributed to the tension was hinted at in the American rebuttal.

⁹ William Starr Meyers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover Administration (1936), pp. 121-22, 534-35; Lynwood E. Oyes, "The Navy and the United States' Far Eastern Policy, 1930-1939," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Nebraska, 1958), p. 96.

¹⁰ Four 10,000-ton cruisers, twenty destroyers, four submarines, two aircraft carriers, and two gunboats. Under previous authorization, five additional warships were laid down, totalling 17,000 tons.

¹¹ Roosevelt Library, Official File 18, Navy Dept., 1933-July, 1934, Box 1.

¹² New York Times, Feb. 11, 1935.

¹³ Memorial, Jan 29, 1934, Comm. Papers, Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, SEN 73A-F10 (112B), National Archives.

¹⁴ F.R., 1934, I, 277.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 264, 279, 288.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 284; a resumé of the British proposal can be found at ibid., p. 286, while defense of their program is at pp. 300-03.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 300.

¹⁸ F.R.: Japan, 1931-41, I, 253; also Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, pp. 78, 97.

¹⁹ F.R., 1934, I, 219, 271.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 314-34, 322-24. Subsequently, the Japanese suggested that "France and Italy would be entitled to the same common upper limit at the three principle naval powers" but that they would not be precluded from arriving at a mutual lower limit, see ibid., p. 318.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 232-34; Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 30.

²² Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary File, II, Dept. Files, Hull, Cordell, 1933-41, Box 23.

²³ F.R., 1934, I, 327-29, 338, 343-44.

²⁴ General Board 438-41, Serial No. 1640, 1 Oct. 1934, Records of the General Board, Arlington (ONH), cited in Tuleji, "United States Naval Policy," pp. 159-60.

²⁵ F.R., 1934, I, 322-23.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 326.

²⁷ For. Rels., 1934, I, p. 338.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 339-40, 344, 349. Roosevelt privately supported a program of formal notification and full publicity concerning naval construction, see ibid., p. 334. Rumors appeared in the press that the United States might counter Japan's intended abrogation by threatening to fortify its Pacific bases, see ibid., pp. 324-25. FDR confidentially asked the Secretary of Navy on Dec. 17, 1934, to consider the possibility of establishing air bases in the Philippines, Guam, Midway, and the Aleutian chain. See Irvin, "Davis and the Quest for Arms Control," p. 265.

²⁹ For. Rels., 1934, I, pp. 354-55, 388, 391-92.

³⁰ For diplomatic correspondence on the denunciation, see ibid., pp. 405-26.

³¹ Accounts of the conference may be found in S.I.A., 1936, pp. 49-116; F.R., 1935 I, 64ff; F.R., 1936, I, 22ff; Department of State, Conference Series No. 24, The London Naval Conference, 1935, Report of the Delegates of the United States... (1936); and Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1935 (1936).

³² S.I.H., 1936, p. 81, fn. 1; F.R., 1935, I, 80-81, 87.

³³ F.R., 1935, I, 88-90.

³⁴ Ibid., 95-96, 106.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 114.

36 There were many such hints. Stanley Baldwin declared: "I have always believed that the greatest security against war in any part of the world whatever, in Europe, in the East, anywhere would be the close collaboration of the British Empire with the United States of America. The combined powers of the navies, the potential man-power, the immediate economic power of the combined blockade, and refusal to trade or lend money would be a sanction that no power on earth however strong dare face." The Times (London), May 28, 1935. Also, see Davis' telegram of July 3, 1934 in F.R., 1934, I, 286-87.

37 F.R., 1935, I, 145. Chatfield found this new attitude on the part of American naval officers sweeping away all the old friction and antagonism, It Might Happen Again, p. 71.

38 F.R., 1936, I, 24-25.

39 F.R., 1935, I, 102, 128-29.

40 Ibid., p. 70. Admiral W. H. Stanley (USN), technical advisor to the American delegation thought one of the main reasons for Japan's abrogation of the naval treaties was "her need for keeping her construction yards in operation," a need with which Stanley sympathized. Ibid., p. 87.

41 F.R., 1936, I, 35; the Japanese ambassador to Rome lent some substance to Davis' position when he reported that the Imperial Admiralty had declared before the Emperor that Japan's policy of naval freedom would not lead to an expensive arms race. Ibid., p. 64.

42 Ibid., pp. 35-36, 44.

43 Ibid., pp. 38, 69.

44 Ibid., p. 55.

45 F.R., 1936, I, 47; they also were concerned with the time lost in converting their designs to 16-inch batteries.

46 When Admiral Stanley, Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May, 1936, that he had learned by experience that some naval jobs could be performed more efficiently with smaller types of cruisers. S.I.A., 1936, p. 95 fn. 2.

47 F.R., 1936, I, 57-58, 61, 63.

48 Ibid., pp. 41, 58-60, 71, 90.

49 Ibid., 60, 68.

50 Ibid., pp. 71, 75-76, 78.

51 Ibid., pp. 65, 73-75.

52 Ibid., pp. 71-72, 74, 83.

53 Borg, United States and Far Eastern Crisis, p. 114; Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 4th ed. (1950), p. 753; and Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History (1962), pp. 525-26.

54 Lt. H. H. Smith-Hutton, "Naval Limitations," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (April, 1937), p. 468.

55 Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, pp. 72, 91.

56 Rear Admiral Paul Auphan (F.N., ret.) and Jacques Mordal, The French Navy in World War II (1959), p. 14; Lord Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (1954), p. 147.

57 F.R., 1937, I, 634-37. The Japanese were experimenting with 18-inch guns.

58 Ibid., pp. 98-99; Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 70.

59 F.R., 1936, I, 122-31.

60 S.I.A., 1936, p. 103.

61 Norman Davis, "The New Naval Agreement," Foreign Affairs, XIV (July, 1936), p. 583.

62 For notification of suspensions, see F.R., 1939, 558-61.

63 S.I.A., 1936, pp. 110-16; D.I.A., 1936, pp. 634-42; accounts of these accessions may be found in the above and F.R., 1936, I, 102-21; D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 1123 ff.

64 Leopold, American Foreign Policy, pp. 525-26.

65 New York Times, Apr. 28 and Dec. 2, 1938.

66 S.I.A., 1936, p. 111.

67 F.R., 1936, I, 110, 120-21; New York Times,
December 2, 1938.

68 D.G.F.P., Ser. C, IV, 1187-90; F.R., 1936, I, 102-03.

69 F.R., 1936, I, 143.

Chapter 20SUPERVISION & CONTROL OF THE WASHINGTON"NAVAL SYSTEM," 1922-41

Problems of supervision and control arose in carrying out the Washington treaty of 1922 and the London accords of 1930 and 1936--which together comprised the Washington "naval system." The most important issue concerned Japan's compliance with its nonfortification pledges regarding its Pacific mandates, a problem of magnitude in Japanese-American relations. Analysis of this episode investigates the validity of contemporary control procedures and raises doubts as to its use as an historical precedent in support of extensive verification systems. Of less importance were the problems stemming from the supervision of the basic naval terms. These issues include the difficulties of using naval attachés for inspection purposes, the unexpected developments in utilizing the 1936 system of exchanging construction information, the employment of the "escalator clause," and an Anglo-American dispute over certain technical modifications to existing vessels.

These problems raised several essential questions concerning adherence to both the "letter" and the "spirit" of the Washington "naval system." First, in the implementation of the Washington treaty, the question of Japan's compliance with Article 19 became at the time a seriously divisive issue and has since become a subject of historical controversy. While Japan was frequently rumored during the 1920's and 1930's to have violated the nonfortification terms by secretly rearming its Pacific island mandates, more current research has raised doubts on the issue. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Japanese violations of the treaties were few and relatively insignificant up to 1939.

Second, the historical reappraisal questions the

relevance and necessity of inspection. That Japanese secretiveness and opposition to outside inspection gave rise to suspicions and fears there is no doubt--which has prompted many to conclude that inspection and supervision would have eliminated these doubts and eased tensions. But verification of the Japanese building programs on the islands--limited to the construction of "commercial" airfields and harbors--would have transferred the suspicion and fears to a different level of analysis--to that of interpreting Japanese "intentions". Thus, the confirmation that Japan was building airstrips and dredging harbors--acceptable and legitimate if for commercial purposes--would have merely raised the suspicion--which could not be confirmed by an objective criteria--that these projects were "really intended" for military use.

Third, while inspection provisions would not necessarily have eased suspicions over Japanese noncompliance with the treaty, the establishment of some kind of adjudication machinery might well have eliminated the conflict--minor to be sure--which broke out between the United States and England over an issue not explicitly covered in the treaties. The conflict--relating to gun elevations on capital ships--raised the problem of interpreting the "spirit" as well as the "letter" of the treaties; and in the broader context it revealed the dangers inherent in a situation where the parties to a dispute determined themselves the relevance of the evidence, in this particular case, the meaning of the treaty terms.

The Mandates Issue, 1922-41

Verifying compliance of Japan's nonfortification pledges toward its Pacific mandated islands became an increasingly serious problem to American officials during the interwar decades. These mandates, comprising three groups of former German-held islands, the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls, bisected the United States' sea communications between Hawaii and the Philippines.¹ Because of Japanese secretiveness regarding their activities in these areas, Western officials and their publics gradually became convinced that the Japanese government was violating its promise not to construct military installations on these islands--a conviction that has persisted.²

Most accounts of Japanese-American relations during this period stress the unsuccessful efforts by the United States'

Navy and State departments and the League of Nation's Permanent Mandates Commission to penetrate the bamboo veil woven by Tokyo authorities to isolate their central Pacific islands. The Far Eastern Military Tribunal, in its investigations of Japanese "war crimes," did little to clarify the precise nature of Japan's construction in these islands prior to the war. Nor, indeed, have recently published historical studies moved much closer to eliminating the confusion surrounding Japan's prewar activities in its central Pacific Mandates.

Thus at least five essential, but interrelated, questions are posed by this episode. First, what authority did the United States of the League's Mandates Commission possess to verify Japanese "building programs" on these islands? Second, how did the United States react to the need for the development of a verification system during the interwar years? Third, what was the League's Permanent Mandates Commission response to the rumors concerning Japanese "remilitarization"? Fourth, did the Japanese actually violate their pledges not to "fortify" the mandates? And Fifth, would an international inspection system, employing on-site visitation privileges, have successfully resolved Western apprehension concerning Japan's pre- 1939 activities in these islands?

Inspection Rights. Concern with the nature of Japanese construction in their central Pacific islands gradually became aroused in the late nineteen-twenties and early thirties. During this time both the American government and the League's Mandates Commission examined the question of inspection rights. Authority for such formal machinery would have had to come from one or more of three basic agreements which, in varying degrees, regulated Japanese activities in these newly-acquired isles: the League's Mandate arrangement (based on Article 22, Part I of the Covenant) with Japan of December 17, 1920; Article 19 of the Washington Five Power Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922; and the United States-Japanese Convention of February 11, 1922.

To insure the proper functioning of the trustee system, the League established a Permanent Mandates Commission and required each Mandatory Power to "render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge."³ As it did not possess the authority to address the Mandatory Powers directly, the Commission functioned

essentially as an advisory body to the League's executive council. The commission examined and discussed each annual report in the presence of an authorized representative from the Mandatory Powers, verbally requesting any supplementary information its members desired. This report, together with the recommendations of the Commission, then went forward to the Council for final action. League supervision, therefore, did not include on-site verification.

Japan's initial pledge of December 17, 1920 to the League, relative to military policies in the Mandates, embodied three points: the Japanese were to rigorously control all "traffic in arms and ammunition" in accordance with the League's September 10, 1919 Convention--the so-called Treaty of St. Germain; they were to limit the military training of natives to "purposes of internal police and the local defense of the territory;" and they were to abstain from erecting military installations in the Mandates--"no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory." Finally, the Tokyo government was to "make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed" under points 1, 2, and 3 above.⁴

The non-fortification pledge contained in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, a particularly contentious issue among American naval professionals, did little to clarify the problem of verifications. After identifying the islands to be covered, including both Japanese and American ones in the central Pacific area, Article 19 simply stipulated that "no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces; and that no increase shall be made in the coast defenses." However, the naval pact made no formal provision for verification of compliance with its restrictions; fulfillment of these terms rested on each signatory's "national honor." This attitude toward verification was in harmony with the United States' general policy toward international inspection during the early nineteen-twenties. For when the French, in 1919, first introduced the concept of compulsory, long-term inspection--with an eye toward incorporating it in the Versailles restrictions then being formulated for Germany--President Woodrow Wilson firmly vetoed the idea and, instead, stressed that sovereign nations⁵ should be placed on their honor to fulfill their commitments.

Only the Convention of February 11, 1922 which was negotiated by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and Ambassador Baron Kijuro Shidehara as an adjunct to the Washington Naval Treaty and was subsequently approved by the United States Senate, could be held to have provided for extraordinary supervisory authority over the non-fortification stipulations governing Japan's Pacific Mandates. This pact extended the provisions of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 to include the mid-Pacific mandates and reiterated for benefit of the United States the pledges Japan had given to the League of Nations not to fortify these mandates. An additional explanatory note given Hughes by Shidehara on February 11, 1922 declared:

In proceeding this date to the signature of the Convention between Japan and the United States with respect to the islands, under Japan's mandate, situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying north of the equator, I have the honor to assure you, under authority of my Government that the usual comity will be extended to nationals and vessels of the United States in visiting the harbors and waters of those islands.

Just what "visitation" rights the United States gained in these agreements is not certain. To build his brief for Hughes, Pusey argues that the note of February 11 granted the United States adequate authority to verify compliance of Japan's non-fortification pledge in her mandated islands. "Usual comity" meant "the courtesy which is normally accorded by one country to the nationals and vessels of another," according to his interpretation. "Here was ample authority for the United States to keep watch over what Japan was doing in the mandated islands and to revoke our assent to the mandate if the Treaty should be violated."⁶ Pusey's contention appears strained for normal courtesy need not be extended to touring foreign warships and naval officers whose mission would obviously be that of "spying." Certainly the security-minded among Japanese officials could take such a position. It also should be pointed out that the Japanese did not technically deny visitors or exclude all tourists; it is equally true that they enacted a vast number of complicated regulations to govern travel in the Pacific mandates and that they frequently managed to "misplace" most properly filed applications for visas to the islands. Furthermore those few persons granted passage through the mandates were carefully screened and most cautiously guided.

The Convention of 1922 with its incorporation of the 1911 treaty proved even more doubtful as a legal device to gain access to the mandates. A careful study of United States "inspection rights" by the State Department's legal staff in 1929 resulted in the decision that it could only claim most-favored nation treatment. Thus if the mandates were closed to foreign commerce of all Powers, which they generally were, the United States could expect no better treatment.⁷ Also, the extension of the League of Nations's nonfortification pledge offered little comfort for those in quest of a means of verification. To gain access for inspection, the Mandates Commission needed the permission of the trustee. In sum, few inspection "rights" were granted in the treaties and agreements governing the Pacific Islands.

Inspection Policies. Even though inspection and verification were not considered in these agreements, Secretary of State Hughes did attempt to initiate a system of exchange visits to areas affected by Article XIX of the Five Power Treaty. He arranged in January, 1923, for a Japanese officer to visit Guam and the American naval attache at Tokyo to visit Japanese bases in the Pescadores Islands. In subsequent letters to the Navy and War Departments, Hughes suggested other areas be open to mutual inspection by Japanese, American, and British officers. "It seems desirable to this Department," he wrote, "from the viewpoint of assuring a mutual confidence among the countries participating in the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922."

The Secretary of Navy's lack of enthusiasm for this proposal bordered on hostility: "I think that there should be no question of the good faith of the signatory powers and that, in consequence visits of inspection either to ships or to stations to verify the execution of the terms of a treaty are undesirable and may be provocative of friction." The Navy believed that Japan had more to gain by inspection than did the United States and that conversely the nearness of American islands to Japan made it likely that in event of hostilities United States installations in the Philippines would be overwhelmed before they could be strengthened. Yet, Japan could reinforce and modernize any of its bases before the United States could mount a countering military pressure. Secretary Denby refused to recommend an exchange of visits to fortified areas or written exchanges of information, but suggested that "reliance be placed on the good faith of the powers concerned." Secretary of War John W. Weeks agreed with Hughes in principle, yet thought that the United States

would gain nothing from inspections and might lose whatever slight advantage it possessed in the Philippines.⁸

Disappointment of the State Department officials may be found in an acid memorandum prepared for Hughes by the chief of the Division for Far Eastern Affairs. With remarkable foresight John Van Antwerp MacMurray concluded that "we will each of us cherish our own military and naval secrets and our suspicions as to the secrets of the other parties to the Treaty."⁹

Earlier, in 1922, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt argued, somewhat like Hughes, that a verification system would be desirable in connection with naval limitation. He suggested the establishment of an official American and Japanese commission to inspect both navies--also presumably the non-fortification zone--and to reassure both publics that the letter and spirit of the Five Power naval pact was being carried out.¹⁰

The Navy and War Department's rejection of Hughes' 1923 proposal for an informal system of mutual exchange visits followed President Wilson's earlier stand and anticipated the Coolidge administration's official position. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg detailed the United State's policy toward international inspection in 1926, when he declared that:

The execution of any international agreement for the limitation of armaments must depend, in so far as the United States is concerned, upon international good faith and respect for treaties. The United States will not tolerate the supervision of any outside body in this matter nor be subjected to inspection or supervision by foreign agencies or individuals.

Moreover, Kellogg suggested that the administration's was basically sound for "it has been shown by the successful operation of the Washington Naval Treaty that such supervision is not necessary."¹¹ Not until 1932 and 1933 did this American policy shift to an emphatic and total endorsement of international inspection; a reversal of attitude that appears to have been less an abandonment of principle than a recognition of a worsening world climate.¹²

What role the Navy's growing uncertainty toward Japanese designs for the Pacific islands played in stimulating this policy change is difficult to tell, yet it must have been a

major consideration. For in spite of earlier hostility to inspection, the Navy soon became concerned with the mandated islands. Anxiety grew as attempts by naval officials to visit these islands during the 1920s were frustrated by Tokyo's refusal to grant permission. Unannounced visits, such as that of the USS Milwaukee at Truk in September, 1923, proved undesirable for it only antagonized the Japanese who entered vigorous protests through diplomatic channels. Flights by Marine aircraft over Rota, to the north of Guam, also drew down the wrath of the Japanese Foreign Office; the Chief of Naval Operations, with tongue-in-cheek, merely instructed officers at Guam to exercise greater care "in the selection of carrier pigeons so that as far as possible they will return to Guam instead of landing on the Island of Rota." Frequently during these years Japanese diplomats would glibly announce that ports in the Pacific mandates were open to all ships providing proper notification; but, in fact, the Imperial Navy held final review of all invitations.¹³ Few requests to tour the mandates were authorized.

By 1929 the Navy had reversed its original position and now asked the State Department to press Tokyo for visitation rights to the mandated islands. In light of America's few legal grounds, the State Department, with the Navy's reluctant concurrence, urged against forcing the issue officially at that time for fear the Japanese might take an obstinate public position from which later retreat might be impossible.¹⁴ This inaction merely illustrated the issue: the United States simply had no lever, at a cost commensurate to the objective, to pry open the door to the Japanese islands.

During and after 1929, the United States sought Japanese permission to "visit" the mandated islands, but without any success. In 1929, the American authorities tendered two such requests: in the first instance, the State Department inquired, on behalf of the Navy, whether a homeward bound destroyer might stop at unopened ports in the mandates, and in the second instance the Department asked whether American naval ships engaged in hydrographic studies might call occasionally at mandated harbors. These inquiries met with ambiguous replies all adding up to a polite but firm denial.¹⁵ In 1936, Secretary of State Cordell Hull pointed out to the Japanese that suspicions of the latter's activities in the mandates were running high in America and reminded them that their ships had been granted permission to visit closed American harbors in Alaska and the Aleutians to alleviate any fears that violations were occurring there. Unfortunately, he noted, the Japanese had yet to reciprocate to ease American

distrust. Hull inquired whether the USS Alden, ready to leave home for an Asiatic station, might stop at the Pacific mandates. The venture proved in vain, despite assurance given the previous year by the Japanese ambassador that foreign naval vessels might freely cruise the mandated waters.¹⁶

Even though the Japanese were allowed to visit American islands within the non-fortified area specified in Article XIX of the Five Power Naval Treaty, they protested American activity there. Guam loomed as a sensitive point; in 1933 American refusal to renew the labor permits of 112 Japanese workmen stirred the suspicions of the Japanese press. Strategically-minded Japanese writers continued to view Guam as an American Naval base and to refer to its impending massive development. Persistence of this attitude, that Guam was heavily fortified despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, may account for the fact that the Japanese landing in 1941 cautiously avoided Apra Harbor, as though it were well protected.¹⁷

Guam became, in 1935, a commercial air base with the inauguration of trans-Pacific mail and passenger service. Operated by Pan American Airways over authentic commercial route, this new venture found the Navy most cooperative. The company was to use (and obviously to modernize) the channel, landing ramps, and hanger at Guam and radio beacons at Guam and Midway. The Navy acknowledged that these facilities would be available in emergencies. Japanese naval officers quickly pointed out that these improved and extended air facilities impaired their sea communications, particularly to the mandates. In the fall of 1936, the United States announced it was spending \$2,000,000 to improve seaplane bases at Midway and Wake, but denied that this expenditure related to fortifications.¹⁸ This denial of improving the military potential of these islands had little to do with Article XIX for it would expire at the end of the year; but rather it was designed to quiet domestic pacifist and isolationist activists who protested any such action on the grounds that it was provocative.

While it is true that the Japanese naval ministry frustrated the American attempts to send "inspectors" to the mandated islands, it is equally true that this agency constructed its policy on premises (i.e., national security) not due to an alteration of premises but rather that the United States after 1929 had more to gain than to lose from adoption of an inspection system, that the Japanese continued their

secrecy indicated they believed the contrary to be true in their case.

League's Efforts At Verification. Meanwhile the League of Nation's Permanent Mandates Commission also made an effort to determine whether the Japanese were violating pledges regarding fortifications. In November 1932 members of the Commission called upon the Japanese representative to explain why the latter's last seven annual reports failed to mention whether the military or naval clauses of the mandates had been executed. The Commissioners wanted assurances that the tripled budget (from 94,145 to 307,896 yen) for "harbor improvements" in the islands were not going toward the construction of naval bases. Although the Japanese government filed a letter with the Commission denying any intent of violating their mandate charter, the Commissioners remained skeptical.¹⁹

In 1934 and again in 1935, the Commission interrogated the Japanese representative concerning rumors appearing in the Press that the building of naval and air facilities was underway in the mandates. The chairman suggested to the Japanese that, as the Commission was in no position to send observers, foreign ships should be given permission to visit these islands at the first opportunity in order to allay suspicions and verify Japan's contentions. The Commission's report for 1934 expressed dissatisfaction with Japan's explanation that its expenditures were for civil and commercial endeavors alone and voiced its hope that next year's report would give more particulars.²⁰ That the Japanese failed to meet this latter wish is evident from the sharpness with which the commissioners crossexamined the Japanese representative in 1935. In particular, the commissioners' found Japan's fear of foreign inquisitiveness quite troubling and saw its elaborate regulations governing the conditions under which the islands could be visited equally disturbing. In defense of his government's attitude, the Japanese representative suggested that Western values were of little assistance in understanding Eastern problems and urged that the commissioners not press their curiosity. Although the issue was officially closed, some of the commissioners retained their skepticism as to Japan's word.²¹

The inconclusive probings of the League's Mandate Commission pose three essential considerations. First, the very fact that the Commission's efforts were to remain inconclusive would seem to attest to the desirability of that agency possessing adequate authority to verify, either positively or negatively, reports of Japanese transgressions.

For the position of the Commission during the interwar years was such that it could hardly question the good faith of a mandatory Power without indisputable evidence since the entire system was constructed on the premise that a nation's word was its bond. Admittedly granting the League inspection privileges involved more than merely administrative procedure, for the United States had opposed the introduction of this principle at the 1919 Paris Conference on political grounds. If international inspection had been an anathema, as it meant inhibiting national sovereignty, to isolationist-minded Americans in the 1920s, it could hardly have been looked upon with favor, even if it involved unofficial "visits", by security-minded Japanese in the 1930's. The conduct of verification missions by an international agency might have eased American wariness toward the mandates and lessened Japanese fears that their security would be compromised; or, conversely, it might have further antagonized both.

Second, since the League agency could not arrest rumors or Japanese violations its endeavors succeeded only in lending credence to these accusations and thus heightened tensions. The American press used accounts of the Commission's interrogations to inflame the already considerable domestic anti-Japanese sentiment. The December 24, 1934 frontpage of the New York Times carried the headline "League Board Criticizes Japan on Mandate; Finds Reply As To Policy Is Unsatisfactory." There can be little doubt that such press statements lent support, in the public's eyes (and among officials), to the unsubstantiated rumors which had received wide currency and which would circulate in the future.²² Some indication of this may be found in a stillborn Senate resolution reported to the Foreign Relations Committee in January 1935 calling for an investigation into the question of whether the Japanese had kept their non-fortification agreement regarding the mandates. This latter event sheds some light on the State Department's attitude toward the issue and the nature of the dilemma it faced. In a letter to Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the committee, Secretary Hull declared that the Department opposed the proposed investigation because the United States had consented, in the treaty of February 11, 1922, to Japanese administration of the islands in accord with the League mandate and because Japan was required to report to the League regarding the execution of its pledges. Pointing out that the League was examining the question, Hull stated that a separate investigation at the time would be "untimely and be likely to serve no useful purpose."²³

Third, these challenges to Japan's "honor", coming as they did after the Manchurian crisis even though reports of transgressions had been published before 1931, could only have strengthened the Japanese government's belief that they were politically inspired and, consequently, that they were designed to pry into matters of its national security. There was no lack in friction between Japan and the United States in these interwar years: in the 1920s the anti-alien land laws of California and Washington gained Supreme Court approval and outright discrimination appeared in Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924; while in the mid-1930's incidents occurred which, to the Japanese, seemed to justify their concern over security. In 1934 President Roosevelt, visiting Pearl Harbor, lauded the efficient manner in which the naval units there contributed to American "defense", a remark which prompted General Tanaka to observe that "Such insolent behavior makes us most suspicious. It makes us think a major disturbance is purposely being encouraged in the calm Pacific." And FDR was at the same time moving ahead with a naval construction program designed to bring the American fleet up to treaty limits. In 1935 the United States Navy's maneuvers off Hawaii and Midway, but avoiding the western Pacific, aroused alarm in some Japanese quarters.²⁴ Throughout these years the Japanese attitude before the League Commission seemed, according to one writer, to be "motivated by a psychological drive to expurge the slightest shadow of guilt."²⁵ All of this is not to impugn the motives or the activities of either country, but to simply point out the League's investigations--timing which was not likely, in view of Japan's withdrawal from that body in 1933, to lead to fruitful accomplishments.

Nature of Japanese Fortification. Japan stood convicted by 1941, in American official and public opinion, of violating its non-fortification pledges; indeed, according to one writer since then "it has been common practice to refer to fortifications as fact."²⁶ And interestingly enough even he, writing in 1951, did not feel sufficiently sure of his facts to applaud or deny the charges. Few rumors have shown the persistence of the one which has branded Japan with secretly and illegally fortifying its mandated islands far in advance of the Second World War.

Accusations of surreptitious Japanese activity began while the Washington Conference was in session. The Hearst papers reported in January, 1922, that Japan had been "caught

in the act" of building "formidable" military installations on Saipan, but had been forced to dismantle them.²⁷ During the late 1920's and 1930's similar charges again were levied. In February, 1933 a retired American physician of Russian birth living in Yokohama notified State Department officials that he "had been informed by Russians living on the islands and by a Spanish Catholic priest who made frequent trips there that the Japanese were fortifying the islands" of Yap, Saipan, and Palau.²⁸ About the same time Ambassador Grew noted in his diary (March 27, 1933) that "we have abundant first hand evidence of Japan's fortification activities."²⁹ Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles echoed these charges in 1944 when he wrote that it was a matter of actual knowledge to the United States that Japan, in flagrant violation of her treaty obligations..., had undertaken on a vast scale the fortification of the most strategic islands in the mandated areas.³⁰ The United States' Board investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster declared flatly that "Japan, without authority of international law and in violation of the treaties and mandates...for nearly twenty years successfully and completely excluded other nationals from the mandated territories, and during that time built up army, navy, and air installations of tremendous strategical value."³¹ And Pusey in 1951 stated that: "Reports that islands were being fortified were numerous in 1932, and the State Department certainly knew of the violations as early as 1933."³²

Yet these pointed allegations have never been proved. The Tokyo War Crimes trials held shortly after Japan's surrender failed to substantiate these charges: indeed, although affidavits were introduced in 1946, reiterating these charges, when Japanese witnesses flatly denied that there had been no military fortifications built prior to December 7, 1941 the prosecution offered no challenge.³³ While this should not be taken to mean that these Japanese statements were necessarily true (and later evidence will indicate that they were not), it does reflect the lack of available information to the contrary. American intelligence sources did not possess proof of Japanese violations or even much information at all about the mandates.³⁴

Although the evidence available from Japanese naval record has not been fully digested, investigations of these captured documents affords a more complete basis for an analysis of Japan's activities in the Mandates than the hastily gathered materials of the International Tribunal or the unsubstantiated rumors of the 1930's. Thomas Wilds'

extended and authoritative search of these records, as well as other sources, has prompted him to conclude that "Japan made no improvements of permanent military significance in the Mandates for twenty years after she took them from Germany in 1914." While the Imperial navy built military installations for its initial occupation forces, the troops were withdrawn in the early 1920's and the military facilities were abandoned as required by treaty restrictions. From 1934 to 1939, beginning a year after withdrawing from the League, the Japanese Navy began constructing permanent installation at four key locations: the Aslito airfield, a seaplane ramp, communications centers, oil storage facilities, and harbor improvements at Saipan; a seaplane ramp, an airfield, oil storage facilities at Truk; and an airfield and oil storage facilities at Ponape. The Japanese also started work on airfields at Tinian and Pagan, and perhaps at other locations in the Mandates; but their efforts concentrated on the four key islands. The progress of this construction program was not impressive, for at the end of 1939, "only the Saipan airfield and the ramps were completed and there were no fortifications, guns, or troops to defend them."³⁵

In late 1939 the Imperial Navy decided to expand its construction activities. More work was accomplished in 1940 and 1941, according to Wilds, "than in all the years before." It was also during this period, contrary to defense testimony at the Tokyo War Crimes trials, that outright military construction was begun and military garrisons were established.³⁶

Whether Japanese activities during the two years prior to the Pearl Harbor attack violated the mandate pledge--for, of course, the nonfortification pledge of the Washington Naval Treaty had expired on December 31, 1936--is a contentious point. Under the rulings of the International Military Tribunal (Far East), Japan's construction of fortifications and bases in 1940 and 1941 did constitute a violation of its treaty obligations even though it was no longer a member of the League. This judgment held that according to international law Japan's withdrawal, being unilateral, did not relieve it of the pledges incurred under the Covenant.³⁷ Japanese officials naturally felt that their termination of membership in the League, in accordance with the Covenant's procedures, legally relieved them of any past obligations--even though they apparently believed they were abiding by the letter of the mandate pledges until 1939. And the League was unwilling to challenge Japan's claim of ownership.³⁸ The United Nations International Court of Justice ruled in 1966 that

the mandate obligations incurred by League members terminated with the death of the League.³⁹ In fact the League showed little sign of life after the outbreak of war in 1939; while this might not be a legal reality it certainly was a political one.

The Nature of the Dispute. Contemporary observers and subsequent students have viewed the controversy surrounding Japanese construction in the Mandates as evidence supporting the case for international inspection. Explicitly or implicitly, they arrive at the same conclusion: Western fears could have been lessened (or substantiated) and Japanese innocence (or guilt) validated by on-site verification procedures. This reliance on the value of inspection to solve the mandate dilemma rests on a series of untested assumption, a critical examination of which suggests that the case for international inspection was not nearly as uncomplicated as it appeared. To question whether an international verification system, employing onsite enquiry privileges, could have successfully resolved Western apprehension concerning the Mandates is to challenge a basic tenet underlying the United States "disarmament" policies since 1933. However as American officials have insisted that the establishment of a fool-proof inspection system is a prerequisite for "disarmament" in the nuclear age, perhaps an evaluation of the Pacific Mandates question in a pre-atomic era may be instructive.

The problem may be summarized briefly. First, reports of construction--oil storage facilities and airfields--in the mandates caused wide concern in American governmental circles and in the Western press in the late 1920s and 1930s. Second, the purpose of this activity was openly questioned by the League's Permanent Mandates Commission. Third, Japanese officials acknowledged that construction was taking place but insisted that it was designed only to facilitate the exploitation of the islands economic potential. Fourth, the questioning of Japanese activities arose against a back-drop of mounting American-Japanese tensions and at a time when each nation was increasingly suspicious of the military activities of the other. Fifth, postwar investigations have failed to produce evidence to substantiate the charges that Japan built military fortifications, naval installations, or stationed troops in the Mandates prior to 1939.

The basic issue, then, is this: any international inspectors who would have visited the key islands of Saipan.

Palaus, Truk and Ponape between 1934 and 1939 would have found airfields, harbor improvements, communication facilities and fuel storage depots under construction. Having learned this, would these visitors have determined whether these activities were intended for military use or whether they constituted legitimate commercial and administrative endeavors? Obviously, such a distinction was severely complicated by the vague, loosely-worded restrictions which only forbade the construction or improvements of "naval bases" and "fortifications." Under these circumstances, it is Wilds' contention that the Japanese argument was not without merit.

Since the key islands were actually administrative and commercial centers that could use economic improvements, the Japanese argument had its merits. Even the fact that these very facilities were later used in World War II does not detract from their legality through 1939. Indeed, Japan might have made a good case for her adherence to international law had she opened the Mandates to foreign observers before the end of 1939. Her refusal to do so apparently stemmed from a general policy of strict military security and a reluctance to expose her interpretations of the treaties to hostile criticism.⁴⁰

Wilds' observations point up two additional, but interrelated, factors which must be considered: the problem of physical differentiation and the matter of political intent. The examination of Japanese construction programs by the League's Permanent Mandates Commission exposed the central, baffling problem of differentiating between "commercial ventures" and "warlike preparations." An airfield may be used by both civil and military aircraft, a naval facility may be used by merchant ships or warships, fuel depots may service engines of commerce or war, and communications equipment may carry civil or military messages. It is difficult to believe that on-site inspections throughout the Mandates, prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, would have aided in resolving the basic dilemma posed by differentiation. It might be argued that the existing restrictions could have been extended to limit the size and nature of "commercial" facilities; however, to attempt to create such regulations would have raised additional areas of contention. Would the scope of these installations be restricted to existing commercial requirements or would they be allowed to take into account future expectations? Now, in the latter instance, would these potentialities be

measured? And by whom?

At its root, the problem of physical differentiation rests on the matter of political intent for the inspiration toward the choice of usage installations was, obviously, political. It is possible that on-site inquiries in the Mandates, through 1939, would have been able to produce solid evidence that would indicate the political intentions of future Tokyo authorities? In as much as the Japanese militarists-who were still consolidating their domestic position throughout the thirties--do not appear to have given much attention to developing long-range strategy, it appears extremely doubtful that physical inquiries would have resolved the matter of political intent.

Indeed, it may well be that actual inspection visits might easily have contributed to the growing tensions between the Japanese and Western governments without any corresponding advantage. Given the antagonistic political climate of the thirties, it requires very little imagination to envisage the dichotomy of responses to any inspection report when interpreted through national "selective preception." Japanese military officers would feel sure that the inspections only revealed, in detail, the inadequacies and vulnerability of their defensive status and that their security had been jeopardized; while American officials would have interpreted the new construction, particularly of airfields, as confirmation of their long-held suspicions of Japan's potential aggressive intentions. As Roberta Wohlstetter has pointed out, in her exceedingly skillful analysis of American surprise at Pearl Harbor, there is a "very human tendency to pay attention to the signals that support current expectations about enemy behavior."⁴¹

Clearly, then, if the choice of usage or intent is one nation's prerogative, so is the choice of interpretation another nation's privilege.

Supervision of Naval Terms

No provisions were made in any of the three naval pacts comprising the Washington "naval system" for formal inspection or supervision of treaty compliance. The Washington pact (1922) provided for the prompt reconvening of the signatories should their security be placed in jeopardy by a change in "circumstances", or for reconvening the signatories, after eight years, should technical and scientific

development greatly alter treaty purposes. In the two London accords (1930 and 1936), the principal device for safeguarding each signator's special interests was the so-called "escalator" clause. This escape provision allowed any signatory to increase its quota, should it fear that the construction by nations not bound by the treaties, by merely notifying the other parties to the agreements. Naval provisions in these accords were self-enforcing and, presumably, compliance was to be verified by the traditional agents of military intelligence--the naval attachés. Given the closed nature of authoritarian states in the 1930s, the second London pact (1936) included among its provisions, as discussed above, a system of "Advanced Notification and Exchange of Information." While asking for an elaborate array of technical specification prior to the beginning of any new construction or alterations, compliance with this arrangement none the less depended upon "national honor."

If no formal charges of premeditated evasion of naval terms were ever made, problems arose nevertheless in the administration of the treaties. First, the traditional method of obtaining naval information from attachés encountered difficulties in Japan. Later treaty efforts to improve the flow of information through an annual exchange clashed unexpected political and administrative problems. Second, the escalator clause also ran into unforeseen political difficulties which restricted its effectiveness. Even so, the escape clauses in both London treaties were ultimately employed. Third, an Anglo-American dispute arose over interpretation of the Washington treaty's restrictions on remodeling capital ships. This controversy focused on determination of the "letter" and "spirit" of the accord and suggested the desirability of some formal supervisory machinery.

Verification of Naval Terms. Even though national attitude toward inspection generally, and in the Mandates particularly, have been above, further examination of this idea relative to the naval terms is appropriate here. The Americans and British had experiences under the Washington treaty regarding Japanese failure to cooperate in the exchange of information in the traditional fashion. Difficulties were also encountered with the 1936 system of circulating information when the Russians and Germans created problems.

American attachés in Japan seeking to verify compliance with the naval terms of the Five Power pact, found their visits to Japanese naval bases unproductive. Captain Lynman

A. Cotton noted in his diary that visits in September and October 1922 to Japanese bases at Yokosuka Kure in Sasebo provided little information. He returned with the impression that he had been given the "brush off."⁴² Another officer, Lewis D. Libenow, recalled similar experiences during the time he served as a junior language officer in Japan from January 1927 to April 1930.

"The Naval Attaché or Assistant Naval Attaché would from time to time make 'inspection' trips and usually take along one of the naval language officers so we would all get a chance to see more of the country. These inspections had to be arranged well in advance with the Kaigunsho (Navy Department), and the Japanese saw to it that you were given no opportunity to see, hear, or guess whether they were living up to their agreements. Everything that they didn't want you to see was gotten out of sight, or if they couldn't move it, the best you got was a long distance view. The usual 'inspection' was a long drawn out call on the local Admiral, followed by luncheon and then a quick drive back to your hotel. If you inquired or asked to see something, all of a sudden they did not understand your English or Japanese. In short, the socalled inspections were considered a joke."⁴³

The British Admiralty, too, became concerned with Japan's "growing secretiveness." Their complaint was that while Great Britain was "flooded with Japanese naval officers, ever on the prowl and claiming admission to our ships, dockyards, armament factories and college," British naval officers and attachés in Japan were "kept at arm's length and permission to visit naval yards became more and more restricted." The Admiralty decided to insist on greater equality of treatment. An opportunity arose in 1926 when Japanese naval engineers applied for admission to the annual courses at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. Although such requests had been routinely granted previously, the Admiralty chose this occasion to press its point. The Japanese naval attaché was informed that greater reciprocal consideration must be given if this practice was to be continued.

At this juncture, Lord Chatfield requested from the Japanese as much secret information as the technical courses imparted--certain technical drawings of the new Japanese cruiser Furataka. The shocked attaché forwarded this request to Tokyo from where, a month later, a negative reply came. Chatfield's ultimatum "no Furataka, no courses" stuck, and the

old practice of Japanese admission to the Greenwich courses terminated.⁴⁴

Among the parties to the London treaty of 1936 and its bilateral accessions, the intriguing question developed over which countries were to be included in the stipulated annual exchange of information. Many observers thought that all signatory powers, no matter how they were interrelated, would participate; but in practice Great Britain--the one intermediary of all parties--came into sole possession of these facts. American officials were particularly jealous of this arrangement; indeed, shortly after conclusion of the Anglo-German pact of 1935 they had protested against being denied access to Germany's naval plans. German and French reluctance to have their plans become the property of the other, because of their broader political differences, thwarted British efforts to conduct a mutual exchange.

This issue was discussed frequently during the negotiations leading to the accession pacts but without resolution. Finally, in November 1938, the British Foreign Office circulated among all adherents of the 1936 limitations a draft protocol which would authorize them to act as a clearing-house for the general exchange of naval construction data. Refusal by the Nazi government to open "any fresh direct treaty relations" with Russia wrecked any chance of gaining the unanimous consent necessary to launch the new program. Yet until the Germans denounced the accord, their naval staff, unlike Russian naval authorities who never completely fulfilled their obligations, continued to exchange their plans and progress of construction with the British.⁴⁵

Apart from this bottle-neck, the program for the exchange of naval information appears to have worked reasonably well.

Employment of the Escalator Clause. If the "escalator clause"** granted a theoretical contractual safeguard against unregulated naval competition, it did not in practice prove to be the reassuring safety valve its English originators had hoped. This was especially true with regard to continental building during the early 1930s. Hector C. Bywater reported, in October 1934 that "Eighteen months ago the British Premier told a peace deputation that if professional, that is,

* Article 21 of the 1930 London Treaty and Articles 25 and 26 of the 1936 London Treaty.

Admiralty, advice had been taken, the escalator clause would have been invoked in 1932. That this was not done is a tacit admission that as a safeguard the clause is worthless.⁴⁶ This judgment is perhaps too harsh, for it rests, by implication, solely upon the evaluation of naval officers--men who were not sympathetic to naval limitation generally and who held the 1930 treaty in particular contempt--and ignores the estimates of diplomats such as Sir Robert Craige who, as late as October 1936, noted that "the treaty had been a success for six years."⁴⁷

Yet, two major drawbacks appeared to mitigate against British invocation of the escalator clause during the early thirties. First, the government feared that the British public would not understand why their officials were "breaking a disarmament agreement" and, consequently, that the resulting disquietude would react adversely in future elections. And secondly, the government found most distasteful, from the standpoint of its effect on general foreign policy, the necessity of publicly justifying that the naval policies of France or Italy (or both) jeopardized British security. The latter situation would compound the former and both would further alienate diplomatic feelings abroad.

Nevertheless in 1936 the Oceanic Powers led by Great Britain chose to utilize the escalator clause. These nations had extensive naval rearmament programs, however, their construction of replacement vessels had left each national with "excess" over-age, but usable, auxiliary warships which, according to the 1930 treaty, had to be disposed of prior to December 31, 1936. All three countries had an excess in destroyers, the United States and Japan a surplus in submarines, and Great Britain and Japan an excess of cruisers. The only legal method of retaining these serviceable vessels was to employ Article 21.

The decision to invoke the escalator clause raised contentious procedural issues and exercised diplomats in London, Washington, and Tokyo. Briefly, these differences stemmed from the British desire to weigh the political consequences of retention, while the Americans appeared to give more attention to legal form. Yet behind the State Department's insistence on formalities lay its self-interest for the United States did not have the same surpluses as did Britain and Japan, nor, apparently did it wish to assume the initiative in using Article 21.

The British government privately informed Washington in February 1936, that it intended to retain 40,000 tons of over-age destroyers.⁴⁸ In May, they asked the State Department to arrange this retention by "friendly negotiations" presumably outside the treaty; however, Secretary Hull rebuffed this solicitation with the suggestion that "it would be preferable to invoke Article 21." At the same time, Washington reserved its right to retain a proportionate amount of excess destroyer tonnage. The British formally invoked the escalator clause on July 15 to save their over-age destroyers on the grounds that "a serious disequilibrium" existed between destroyers and submarines--a point adequately justified as France, Italy, Germany and Russia (nonsignatories) had built more than 200 submarines since 1930. A month later the United States "reluctantly" followed suit.⁴⁹

Japan was entitled to a proportionate increase in destroyer tonnage of 28,000 but it did not have a sufficient destroyer surplus. Therefore, the Imperial Navy proposed that they retain destroyers amounting to 11,089 tons and make up the deficit with submarines totalling 15,598 tons. The difficulty in this solution was that the Treaty did not authorize such transfers from one category to another. Although the British were inclined to sanction this formula, Washington was not so disposed--Hull informed Tokyo that there was "no legal warrant" for the retention of the submarines except through recourse to Article 21. The Japanese invoked the escalator clause on December 28, 1936 to preserve its 15,598 tons of over-age submarines, and two months later the United States claimed its right to retain 15,230 tons of its own excess submarines.⁵⁰

England's desire to avoid a legalistic approach stemmed from its own efforts to retain additional cruisers. Earlier, on May 2, London announced it planned to retain four over-age class "A" cruisers of the Hawkins class, but that three of these would be downgraded to class "B" by installation of smaller guns and the fourth would be utilized as a training ship. In order to keep within the Empire's tonnage allotment, five smaller 4,000 ton cruisers were to be scrapped. By September, however, the British government--in response to public demands--intimated that they planned to also keep the five serviceable cruisers designated for scrapping. Stressing increased world tensions and pointing out that the Cabinet had pledged to build up to seventy cruisers (scrapping the five ships would reduce the Royal Navy to forty-eight cruisers), London sought private consultations with Washington for a solution to the problem without recourse to Article 21.

"We are reluctant to attempt to invoke the escalator clause in this matter," Sir Robert Craige declared,

because, on a narrow interpretation of Article 21, we must first be able to affirm that the 'new construction' by other powers is of a character materially to affect our national security. Whether our security has been so affected is a point on which there might, for certain technical reasons, be a divergence of view, and, pending any understanding on this matter with their cosignatories, His Majesty's Government consider it of great importance to take no action which might conceivably be held to strain the obligations assumed by this country under the treaty.⁵¹

The Roosevelt administration responded unsympathetically to both British proposals regarding cruisers. At a meeting of officials from the State and Navy departments on August 25 it was decided not to accept the original proposal to convert the four Hawkins; moreover, the Americans also decided to exercise their right under Article 17 of the 1930 Treaty to retain 19,000 tons of over-age destroyers by transferring ten per cent of their allotment from type "B" cruisers. Before this initial objection to British plans could be registered, however, Hull was confronted with the second request for retention of the five additional cruisers. In the exchange that followed, the Secretary questioned the admissability of the British plan for converting the three Hawkins cruisers although he accepted reclassification of the fourth as a training vessel even though no formal provisions existed for such action. Moreover, he refused to consider London's request for special consideration regarding retention of cruisers because this country had no over-age cruiser tonnage and he would not sponsor any transaction where "the position of the United States relative to Japan and Great Britain will be adversely affected." How England would handle the Hawkins transfer the Secretary left for London to determine although he hoped that it would "be affected in such a manner that this Government will not feel called upon to make a formal objection;" but he did insist that retention of the five smaller cruisers must be through recourse to Article 21.⁵²

Before the year was out the Americans formally announced the transfer and retention of 19,000 tons of destroyers (November 5), and the British invoked the escalator clause to protect their five small cruisers (December 24). The Admiralty also informed Washington, rather coolly, that they were replacing the 7.5-inch guns on their three Hawkins class cruisers

with 6.1-inch weapons which brought them into conformity with the Treaty.

In 1938 the United States sought relief from the restrictions on capital ships contained in the 1936 Naval Treaty on the basis of reports of new Japanese battleship construction, which Tokyo would neither confirm nor deny, that exceeded the displacement and armament limitations of 35,000 tons and 16-inch rifles. (In December, 1941 the Imperial Navy commissioned the Yamato and the following August her sister ship, the Musashi--these superbattleships displaced 64,000 tons and carried 18.1-inch guns. A third ship of this class was converted during construction into an aircraft carrier.) This decision raised three ancillary problems: first, the most propitious legal method to employ--whether to invoke Article 25 or 26; second, the form and extent this escalation should take--whether it should be done unilaterally or mutually and whether it should be "open" or whether a new tonnage limit should be set; and third, the consequences this action would have on European construction. Ultimately, the second and third consideration became intertwined and shaped the final outcome.

In Washington the State Department initially preferred to utilize Article 26--a change of circumstances materially affecting the national security of a high contracting party--as the basis for escalation by citing the refusal of Japan to supply information concerning its construction. The Department held that the United States' use of Article 25--the authorization, construction or acquisition by a nation not a party to the treaty of a warship not in conformity with treaty restrictions and limitations--might raise serious objections because it did not possess "completely convincing evidence" that this situation actually existed. Legal experts of the British Admiralty, however, held that recourse to Article 26 was "impossible" in peace time and that, while the case did not "exactly fit," Washington should nevertheless invoke Article 25. The British view carried.⁵³

The controversy over the form and extent of escalation found, in Washington, Norman Davis and the Navy at odds on several counts. First, the latter recommended that America take unilateral action to escalate because "In this way we are perfectly certain of complete independence without outside agreements to provide for our national defense as we see fit." Davis, on the other hand, favored mutual escalation on the grounds that: a) we had approached Japan for information jointly with England and thus we should remain consistent;

b) "Psychologically,...it would be a mistake for us to take the initiative in destroying a type of naval limitation for which we had a distinct paternity;" and c) unilateral and total escalation at this time "would make the future negotiation of a disarmament treaty infinitely more difficult." To Davis the only way out of the current armaments race, short of war, was through disarmament and thus America should not prejudice the possibility of its future success. The second point of contention was over the actual extent of escalation; the Navy urged removing restrictions on all types of warships but with the expressed intention of exceeding treaty limits only in capital ship construction, while Davis held that the United States should renounce restrictions only for those types that it was planning to build. The heat of this intra-government debate may be gauged by Davis' closing thrust: "As the Navy is building as fast as it can at the moment the question of regaining a theoretical freedom is no longer a technical matter to be decided by naval officers, but becomes a matter of high policy where the civilian branch must remain supreme."⁵⁴

The State Department proceeded along the lines suggested by Davis and attempted to gain mutual approval for lifting all restrictions on only capital ships. This proposal for "open" capital ship construction, however, encountered strenuous objection in London where the Foreign Office and Admiralty weighed naval armaments not only in terms of Pacific, but also Continental seapower. At this point they were joined by French officials who likewise dreaded the implications of "open" escalation. As Paris saw the issue, "Great Britain was tied by special treaties, to which France had consented, with Russia and Germany. If Britain should now resume qualitative freedom in building, Russia and Germany might well follow suit not to mention Italy. France would have to base her building program on action taken by Germany and Italy." To meet this threat the British, with French support, mustered diplomatic pressure to get the United States to agree to a new 40,000-ton capital ship ceiling with no change in armaments. In Washington officials again shifted ground and set their absolute minimum at 45,000 tons, while agreeing to keep the current 16-inch restrictions on guns. Repeated efforts by the British to lower the displacement limit failed to move the Roosevelt administration and, subsequently, the 45,000 ton figure became the new limit when the Americans threatened unilateral escalation to secure their position.⁵⁵

The formal statement of escalation came in a protocol of June 30, 1938, signed jointly by the United States, Great Britain, and France.⁵⁶

Dispute over Gun Elevation. The only major technical dispute to emerge under the Washington Five Power Naval Treaty hinged on interpretation of its qualitative restrictions and revolved around whether the "spirit" or the "letter" of the treaty governed naval practices.⁵⁷ It was triggered by the United States Navy's determination, over the objections of the British and ultimately the Department of State, to raise the gun elevation--so as to increase the firing range--of its retained capital ships. This episode demonstrated the need of formal machinery to resolve questions of technical interpretation.

Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, appearing before the House's Committee on Naval Affairs on January 22, 1923, conveyed the impression that the British had recently begun increasing the elevation of the turret guns of their battleships. Therefore, the Secretary asked for \$6,500,000 to modernize similar American vessels by increasing their elevation, adding deck armor as protection against aerial attack, and adding "blisters" to protect against submarines. Hughes meanwhile had publicly endorsed the Navy's plan on the grounds that "in a considerable number of British ships bulges have been fitted, elevation of turret guns increased, and turret-loading arrangements modified to conform to increased elevation."⁵⁸

On March 5, 1923, Sir Auckland Geddes, the British Ambassador at Washington, protested to Hughes of what he considered erroneous information concerning British naval practices. When informed that the Navy Department's statements had actually been verified by American naval officers and the Naval Attaché in London, the Ambassador declared that these officers must have been mistaken. Minor modifications had been made to gun sites to permit effective use of the maximum elevation for which the mounting had been designed; however, this work had been completed by the end of 1916. Geddes declared "categorically" that the elevation of British capital ships had not been altered since they were initially commissioned and that additional deck armor had not been provided. In view of this, the Ambassador asked Hughes to place the facts before the American public.⁵⁸

Hughes accepted the British statement and five days later apologized publicly. The Secretary of the Navy immediately followed suit declaring that the \$6,500,000 appropriated for elevating the guns of thirteen battleships would not be employed until directed by Congress. Nonetheless Denby still insisted that a disparity existed although "it is not so great

as was then supposed."⁵⁹

The Japanese government did not view the gun elevation issue with the same alarm. In a conversation on May 3, 1923 the Japanese Ambassador at Washington informed Hughes that his government believed formal negotiations on the issue were unnecessary. The Japanese felt that there was danger, should the discussion be unsuccessful, that they "might tend to impair the cordial understanding which was happily the result of the Washington Conference." Nonetheless the Japanese government desired informally and confidentially, to make its position clear on the subject:

Many things might be done which would increase the actual capacity for offensive action in the case of a battleship which, nevertheless, were not prohibited by the Naval Treaty. The treaty makers, very wisely, had not attempted to deal with all these things, but had established certain general standards for their capital ships. It must also be observed that two new ships were to be built by England and certain ships were to be completed by the United States, but there was no attempt to define all the particulars that went to make up the offensive power of the ships or just what should be done. Probably no agreement could have been reached about such details and so the treaty merely dealt with certain standards which were deemed to be practically sufficient without attempting to prescribe limitations as to everything that went into the actual fighting capacity of the ships.⁶⁰

It was the Japanese government's position, in light of these considerations, that a change in gun elevation was not in violation of the treaty.

The following year the British government once more became annoyed when United States naval authorities again asked for authority to utilize the funds already appropriated to increase the elevation of the turret guns on thirteen capital ships. The British protested that Chapter 2, Part III, Section 1 (D) of the Naval Treaty prohibited, subject to certain exceptions expressly provided for, any reconstruction of retained capital ships except to provide for defense against air and submarine attack. It was their view that "an increase in the elevation of turret guns of capital ships cannot be intended for the purpose of providing means of defense against air and submarine attack." While protesting that an increase in gun elevation was not permissible

under the terms of the treaty, the British felt that the dispute laid bare "a larger aspect of the question." Apart from the legal interpretations of the treaty, the British claimed that the American plan violated the "spirit" of the Washington naval treaty--that is, as the Preamble declares, "to reduce the burdens of competition in armaments." It was London's contention that if the American's persisted with their plan of modernization, then they and the Japanese would have to follow suit and "the peoples of the three countries concerned would have to support the great expenditures involved, while the relative position of the three fleets would not be materially affected by the alterations."

Secretary Denby defended the navy's position on the gun elevation issue in a letter to Hughes. Here the Navy Secretary declared that it

is my very firm belief that a decision adverse to our right to increase the elevation of the turret guns of 13 of our present capital ships would permanently and irrevocably consign our present capital-ship fleet to a position of insuperable inferiority to the British capital-ship fleet. Such a position of inferiority was never contemplated by the terms or by the spirit of the Washington treaty. Equality in capital-ship strengths of the American and British fleets was the basis and backbone of that treaty. No other interpretation of the intent of the treaty is possible.

It was Denby's belief that the British fleet enjoyed "a very marked superiority in the number of ships that may be brought into action at the moderate and decisive ranges between 21,000 and 24,000 yards." This superiority, he believed, was reflected in a statistical analysis which revealed:

Range in yards	No. of British ships in action	No. of American ships in action
24,000	13	10
23,000	20	10
22,000	20	12
21,000	20	18

"I do not need to point out to you the very grave import of these comparisons," he concluded. Denby justified using the British navy for purposes of comparisons pointing out that since naval strengths were always relative, and not absolute,

such comparison was obviously unavoidable. Although capital ship parity had been extended to British and American fleets in the Five Power Treaty, he claimed that "at present there is no parity...but rather a very great superiority of the British ships fleet at vital and presumably decisive ranges."

On August 3, 1924 the British Ambassador once again drew Hughes' attention to the gun elevation issue. The British protested the misstatements of fact that had appeared in the American press: specifically they pointed to an editorial in the Washington Post (July 31, 1924) which declared that "It is assured that both Great Britain and Japan have elevated some of their big guns since the Treaty became effective; but this has been denied and the point is in doubt." This misinformation the British found alarming because it inspired even more erroneous reports in other newspapers.⁶¹

Hughes' reply on November 29 defended the legal right of the Americans to carry out their modernization, but deferred the British interpretation of the "spirit" of the pact. While pointing out that gun elevation was not defined in the treaty, he informed the British that as a measure of practical economics he did not believe Congress would appropriate funds for this purpose. While the issue did pass from sight and the impression is given that Congress failed to provide the necessary money, the Navy apparently went ahead with its program for, according to a statement of Secretary of the Navy Charles Francis Adams in 1930, the elevations of guns on four capital ships had been accomplished.⁶²

In retrospect this exchange between London and Washington pointed out the near impossibility in writing a "fool-proof" arms limitation contract. For, as the Japanese government pointed out, negotiations could not successfully resolve every technical difference of the armaments under question: to attempt this would be to guarantee that no treaty would emerge. Consequently, international agreements must compromise elements both of the "letter" and "spirit" in that order; the letter of the treaty laying down general specification whose technicalities must be interpreted by the spirit. It would seem that both Anglo-Saxon governments erred in attempting to base their claims on the letter, when at contest was fundamentally the spirit, of the Five Power Treaty. All this aside, the fact at issue was a matter which would be automatically eliminated as the older battleships were replaced in accordance with treaty stipulations. As Richard Hooker has noted:

The joint blunder served to magnify the issue and to develop in the United States suspicions of the British attitude towards the maintenance of equality, even in those ships in which the Washington treaty had definitely sought to establish equality. The official mishandling of the issue helped to assure an audience to ignorant or malicious writers on both sides of the Atlantic who made disturbing charges that, in different ways, the provisions of the Washington treaty were being 'evaded'.⁶³

Donald Myers has argued that the dispute additionally revealed a weakness in the treaty which failed to provide the formal machinery for handling such problems of interpretation. "The contemplated change was not illegal under the treaty," he has written, "but would have disturbed the balance of strength. The incident, particularly in its public airing, left an impression which might well have justified formal examination if any machinery under the treaty had been provided for investigating complaints."⁶⁴

Chapter 20: Footnotes

¹ For the background of this arrangement, see Earl S. Pomeroy, "American Policy Respecting the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas, 1898-1941," Pacific Historical Review (Feb. 1948), pp. 43-53; and Russell H. Fifield, "Disposal of the Carolines, Marshalls and Marianas at the Paris Peace Conference," American Historical Review (Apr. 1946), pp. 472-79.

² Such conclusions may be drawn from Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor (1963), pp. 87-89; and Dorothy Borg, United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1933-1938 (1964), ch. VIII.

³ See Nicholas Efimenco, "Imperialism and the League Experiment with the Mandate System," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Minnesota, 1948), pp. 366-85.

⁴ "Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean Lying North of the Equator," in Terms of League of Nations Mandates (1926). C. 216.M.77.1926.VI. C.P.M. 391.

⁵ F.R.: Peace Conf. 1919, IV, 358.

⁶ Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (1951), II, 449-50. Admiral W.S. Pye, testifying, before the Army's Pearl Harbor Hearing Board, complained that the Navy Department had been after the State Department for nearly twenty years to get permission for American ships to visit the mandates but that the "State Department never stood up for our rights." Pearl Harbor Attack (1946), pt. 27, p. 55s.

⁷ Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, p. 88: also see Huntington Gilchrist, "The Japanese Islands: Annexation of Trusteeship?" Foreign Affairs, (July, 1944), pp. 635-42.

⁸ Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, pp. 88-89.

⁹ Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁰ See William L. Neumann, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Japan, 1913-1933," Pacific Historical Review (May, 1953), pp. 147-48.

¹¹ F.R., 1926, I, 87-88.

12 See Richard Dean Burns, "Origins of the United States' Inspection Policy: 1926-46," Disarmament and Arms Control (Spring, 1964), pp. 157-68.

13 Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, p. 87; Earl S. Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost (1951), p. 106; Borg, The Far Eastern Crisis, p. 241.

14 Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, p. 88. The Navy tried unsuccessfully again in 1936 to gain permission to visit the mandates, see, F.R. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 307-9.

15 F.R., 1929, III, 256-61. See also Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 28, pp. 1589-90.

16 F.R., 1934, III, 664, 681; and F.R., 1936, IV, 984-92.

17 Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, p. 102.

18 Ibid., pp. 120, 123.

19 Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, Minutes of the 22nd Session, November 3 to December 6, 1932, pp. 179-299.

20 Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 26th Session, October 29 to November 12, 1934, pp. 89-94, 206.

21 Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 27th Session, June 3 to June 18, 1935, p. 201. The Norwegian Commissioner declared the explanations offered by the Japanese representative had been "most unconvincing." League of Nations, Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Sixth Committee, Provisional Minutes, Fourth Meeting, September 18, 1935, p. 17.

22 See Paul H. Clyde, Japan's Pacific Mandates (1935), pp. 167, 170, 203-4. The Pacific Islands Monthly on February 21, 1935 reported, in part, that: "Private advices which we have received through various channels during recent weeks indicate extraordinary naval and aviation activities by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands (Marshalls, Carolines and Mariannes). Some of the latest types of destroyer-cruisers have been seen there, carrying mysterious equipment....Much 'mysterious' cargo is arriving and being stowed away." State Department Files, 862i01/315, National Archives.

23 Letter, Hull to Pittman, January 31, 1935. State

Department Files, 793.94/6860, National Archives.

- 24 Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, pp. 102-3
- 25 Efimenco, "League Experiment With The Mandate System," p. 468.
- 26 Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, p. 103. Pomeroy, pp. 101-9, and Borg, The Far Eastern Crisis, ch. VIII, list the more familiar of these charges; however, Pomeroy examined these charges critically while Borg does not. Willard Price in Pacific Adventure (1936) describes the native folkways and scenery he found in his 1936 trip through the mandates; however, during World War II he suddenly recalled evidence and suspicions of illegal "fortifications" in his Japan's Islands of Mystery (1944), pp. 121-28. Amelia Earhart's mother became convinced that the Japanese had killed her daughter (an other myth still occasionally revived in pulp magazines) while she was on a mission through the mandates for the United States government, see New York Times, July 25, 1949. Even more bizarre accounts of American suspicions can be found in Ellis M. Zacharias, Secret Missions (1946), p. 40, and Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Brass (1949), p. 56.
- 27 Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, p. 103.
- 28 Department of State, Dispatch No. 296, Tokyo, Feb. 21, 1933, File 862 i.01/252, National Archives.
- 29 Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, (1944), p. 84.
- 30 Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (1944), p. 286.
- 31 New York Times, Aug. 30, 1945.
- 32 Pusey, Hughes, II, 450. State Department files in the National Archives do not reveal this certainty.
- 33 Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, pp. 104, 105.
- 34 As late as the summer of 1941 American military officials asked for an aerial reconnaissance of the mandates, a project that was still being developed when the war came to the Pacific. For information about the entrance to the powerful Japanese naval and air base at Palau, the Americans in 1945 had to utilize observations made by the British in 1783. And finally, American naval officials testified time and again that they did not know what was going on in this region. *Ibid.*, p. 107; Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls (1955), p. 206.

35 Thomas Wilds, "How Japan Fortified the Mandated Islands," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (April, 1955), p. 402. Mr. Wilds conducted this research while engaged in studies of Japanese operations in the Pacific during World War II for the office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army. In this office's General Reference Collection may be found a 112-page, documented ms. (n.d.) by Wilds on Japanese fortification and garrison forces in the Mandates. Additional documentation of his conclusions may be found in Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Mariannas (1960), chs. I, II, and IV, and bibliographical note, pp. 459-64; and in Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 206-18, 339-43, and bibliographical note, pp. 377-81.

36 Ibid., pp. 402-3.

37 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Proceedings, pp. 39, 43, 204-16, 408-15.

38 Department of State, Dispatch No. 1179, February 21, 1935, file 862.01/313, National Archives.

39 Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1966. The Particular case involved South Africa's mandate over South-West Africa.

40 Wilds, "How Japan Fortified the Mandated Islands," p. 402.

41 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (1962), p. 392.

42 Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, p. 89, fn. 38.

43 Ltr., Commander L.D. Libenow (USN, ret.) to R.D. Burns, Mar. 11, 1965.

44 Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 32.

45 D.B.F.P., Ser. 3, IV, 628-37; D.B.F.P., Ser. D, IV, 349-50; Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 147.

46 Hector C. Bywater, "The Coming Struggle for Sea Power," Current History, (October, 1934), p. 13.

47 F.R., 1936, I, 147.

48 For an account of the utilization of the escalator clause, see F.R., 1936, I, 132-59; and S.I.A., 1936, pp. 107-9.

49 F.R., 1936, I, 134-36. Unforeseen at the time, this transaction made possible the Anglo-American "destroyer deal" of 1940.

50 Ibid., pp. 136-38, 156, 158.

51 Ibid., p. 139.

52 Ibid., pp. 141-43; 149-50.

53 F.R., 1938, I, 891-917; an explanation of the British interpretation is found on 900-1.

54 Ibid., pp. 896-97.

55 Ibid., p. 892, 902, 907-8, 913.

56 D.B.F.P. Ser, 3, IV, 628-37.

57 Another apparent misunderstanding emerged, this time concerning British capital ship tonnage, during the naval conference at Geneva in 1927. American naval officers were "all considerably surprised...to learn that the actual standard tonnage of those British capital ships was very much greater than we had heretofore supposed.: Apparently this came about when British tonnage figures in the Five Power Naval Treaty were submitted in so-called legend tons. The disparity 1927, meant that after the Rodney and Nelson were completed and the four ships of the Thunderer and King George class were scrapped, the British standard tonnage on capital ships "would be 607,950 tons and the American" figure on the same basis of measurement "would be 511,945 tons--a ratio to us of 6:5. This information constituted "to date...the greatest surprise that we have had,: one American officer noted. Original Diary of Frank H. Schofield, Naval Advisor, American Delegation, Geneva Armament Conference, 1927," (written by Admiral F.H. Schofield, now in the U.S. Navy's General Board files), p. 14. As quoted in B.S. Custer, "The Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Georgetown University, 1948), p. 78.

Also some friction was created by American proposals that conversion of coal-burning battleships to oil be permitted by the treaty. Here again the British protested, in 1924, and their voice carried. Hector C. Bywater, Navies and Nations (1927), p. 168.

58 F.R., 1923, I, 24-30. Seventeen days before Denby's

statement the British had publicly denied that they had, or were planning to, increase the gun elevation of their ships; nor had any deck armor been added since the signing of the naval treaty.

59 Ibid., pp. 30-32. Elsewhere, the Navy Department stated "Congress was informed erroneously but with candid intent that the guns of the British fleet had had their elevations similarly increased." Annual Report of the Secretary of Navy, 1923, p. 114.

60 F.R., 1923, I, 32-33.

61 F.R., 1924, I, 9-13, 628.

62 Ibid., pp. 13-14. Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, London Naval Treaty of 1930, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1930), p. 8.

63 Richard Hooker, "The Geneva Naval Conference," Yale Review, (Jan., 1928), pp. 268-70.

64 Donald Myers, World Disarmament (1932), p. 239.